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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation traces two connected stories through the literary imagination 
of four American authors: William Dean Howells, Charles W. Chesnutt, Henry Adams, 
and James Weldon Johnson. Firstly, this dissertation examines the ideological role the 
expansion and ossification of the railway played in the development of American 
progressivism in the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the 
twentieth. I argue that the logic of the railway provided American writers with a new 
vocabulary through which to describe the abstract development of American history. 
Whereas in the eighteenth century, historical progress was conceived of as a course of 
human events, with the advent of the railway system, many began to imagine historical 
movement as a result of scientific certainties managed and developed by humans who 
conceived of themselves as not directly in control of those movements. By the twentieth 
century, the railway became what Henry Adams called an “Empire of Coal,” a material 
system of exchanges that spanned to globe and whose logic determined the moving limit 
of possibility for all civilization. Secondly, my dissertation tells the story of racial 
division in American during this period. Although the railway was often conceived of as 
a radically democratic space where the American people could interact as equals, this 
period also saw the development of state-sanctioned segregation laws against black 
citizens of the country. As the railway and its logic of historical development ossified in 
the minds of those who benefitted from it, many black authors were perceptive critics of 
not only the politics of the railway but the underlying assumptions about how societies 
functioned that seemed to guarantee the dominant ideology’s concept of history. Taking 
my theoretical starting point in the works of Jacques Lacan and Karl Marx, I argue that in 
this period, the logic of the railway created a shift in the dominant assumptions of the 
nature of social differences. Whereas in the eighteenth century, racial difference had been 
conceived of as a historical constant, with the railway, racial difference became 
spatialized along the path of the railway.  
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Introduction:  
They Must Be Soldiers 
Le Progrès calme et fort, et toujours innocent,  
Ne sait pas ce que c'est que de verser le sang.  
Il règne, conquérant désarmé; quoi qu'on fasse,  
De la hache et du glaive il détourne sa face,  
Car le doigt éternel écrit dans le ciel bleu  
Que la terre est à l'homme et que l'homme est à Dieu; 
Car la force invincible est la force impalpable. 
 Victor Hugo, “Le Progrès calme et fort, et toujours innocent” (1853) 
 
Young Man –  
Young Man –  
You’re never lonesome in Babylon. 
You can always join a crowd in Babylon. 
Young Man –  
Young Man –  
You can never be alone in Babylon. 
 James Weldon Johnson, “A Prodigal Son” (1927) 
 
 
Towards the end of the American Civil War, General William Tecumseh Sherman 
found himself in a difficult position but for unexpected reasons, as later he would recall 
in his Memoirs. After his famous burning of Atlanta and subsequent march to the sea in 
1864, the purpose of his army changed from “hard war,” as Sherman put it, on the 
Southern army and civilian population to a more regulatory role. As the infrastructure of 
the Southern government and army broke down and a Northern victory looked more and 
more likely, Sherman’s army increasingly took up the responsibility of peacekeeping in 
Southern communities in addition to militarily defeating what was left of their army. In 
1865, three months before Robert E. Lee’s surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia to 
Ulysses S. Grant at the Appomattox Courthouse, Sherman’s army was visited by 
Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, while camped at Savannah, 
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Georgia. Stanton, according to Sherman, “seemed very curious about matters and things 
in general” but particularly spoke to Sherman “a great deal about the negroes, the former 
slaves” (Sherman 723-4). Sherman continued that the “negro question was beginning to 
loom up among the political eventualities of the day and many foresaw that not only 
would the slaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes,” a possibility 
that Stanton was already hoping would work to the advantage of the current 
administration (Sherman 725). Though Sherman himself “did not dream” of such an 
eventuality, it became clear to him through his talk with Stanton that “the former slaves 
would be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters” (Sherman 725). The 
two men, then, took it upon themselves to draft and implement wartime policies toward 
the legally ambiguous “former slaves” that would “manufacture” them into voters as well 
as support the effort to finally defeat the Southern armies. 
Perhaps most significantly, Sherman described in his Memoirs the chaos of 
Savannah and the contending forces influencing the mobile population of escaped or 
liberated slaves. Upon arriving in Savannah, he and his army “were beset by ravenous 
State agents from Hilton Head[, an island just off the coast of Georgia], who enticed and 
carried away our [black] servants, and the corps of [black] pioneers which we had 
organized, and which had done such excellent service” (Sherman 729). Sherman at one 
point found “at least a hundred poor negroes shut up in a house and pen, waiting for the 
night, to be conveyed stealthily to Hilton Head. They appealed to [Sherman’s aide-de-
camp, Colonel Audenried,] for protection, alleging that they had been told that they must 
be soldiers, that ‘Massa Lincoln’ wanted them, etc.” (Sherman 729; emphasis in original). 
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In response to this complex and uncertain situation, Sherman and Stanton drafted the 
much-disputed Special Field Order No. 15 which “reserved and set apart” confiscated 
rebel land for certain black families who were “free, and must be dealt with as such” 
(Sherman 730). The process of “manufacturing” voters as it presented itself to Sherman 
would, to a large extent, be a matter of creating “protection” as an alternative to either 
being pressed into service or stealthy flight for former slaves within the precarious 
political space of a nation at war with itself. Stanton’s and Sherman’s initial answer was 
to immediately imbricate former slaves in new property relations in order to make them 
visible to and productive for the state as full (which is to say propertied) citizens. In this 
way, they could make freed slaves to a degree protected from exploitation by the nation’s 
laws. Although the order was quickly undermined and ultimately denied by the policies 
of the federal government, Sherman’s actions acknowledged that the reconciliation 
between newly freed slaves and a predominantly white supremacist American tradition 
would to some extent need to occur within the dialectic between race and property 
relations as they were developing. 
The general problem of reconciliation after the war was dialectic in the sense that 
it was a mutating idea that evaded clear definition because it was based on a tradition of 
meaning and yet radically new at the same time. Rather than simply incorporating an 
intransigent South into a Northern, free-labor economy, it quickly became clear that both 
the North and the South would both have to change in some way to move forward as a 
whole. This radical ideological shift was at least partially recognized by many writers 
after the war in the proliferation of various “questions” that an implicitly white, 
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propertied, masculine, and Christian American imago of society assumed itself to have to 
deal with in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The “Woman Question,” the 
“Negro Question,” the “Jewish Question,” and the “Labor Question,” were all common 
phrases in American popular magazines throughout the last decades of the century. Each 
of these phrases betrayed the paucity of traditional concepts to describe new ideological 
articulations brought about by an expanding nation and a developing economy that could 
no longer hide its internal contradictions in the same ways. Despite the seemingly 
detached and abstract phrasings of these “questions,” the stakes of their answers were 
very real and responses to them often turned to violence in the streets after the war. If the 
war had, in fact, brought about a “new birth of freedom” in which “that government of 
the people, by the people, and for the people” did not “perish from the earth,” it had by 
no means settled the question of what that “people” would be or how they would imagine 
themselves after the most violent conflict the world had seen to that point (Lincoln 417).  
 For a brief moment after the war, an exhausted nation had the opportunity to 
reimagine itself as it wished it could be. For W.E.B. DuBois, this imagined future took 
the form of a potential “dawn of freedom” in which all people might be considered equal 
citizens before the law (The Souls of Black Folk 15). As DuBois also pointed out, 
however, quoting one of Abraham Lincoln’s secretaries of war, Simon Cameron, the first 
gestures of the federal government to integrate freed slaves into American society figured 
them explicitly as a “military resource” (Souls 16). The question of what status the 
federal government would choose to give freed slaves was part of a larger issue of the 
uncertain political ramifications of officially considering Southerners who fought for the 
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Confederates as citizens of another, belligerent country whose property, including 
“liberated” slaves, could legally be confiscated during wartime. At the same time, there 
were pragmatic reasons for confiscating the land and property of rebellious Southerners 
and federal policy on the issue changed rapidly during the War depending on the 
particular circumstance. As the military began to understand the freed slaves as a 
“resource,” people who had been considered “‘contrabands’ were welcomed as military 
laborers. This complicated rather than solved the problem, for now the scattering 
fugitives became a steady stream, which flowed faster as the armies marched” (Souls 16). 
Already in the last days of the war, collections of bodies formed into a mass along both 
geographic and political lines. The “path” of escape for the former slaves organized itself 
around their potential for labor in military camps and coalesced along military supply 
lines. The movement from Confederate “contraband” to universally accessible “resource” 
happened almost accidentally, as a result of immediate political exigency. Before the 
former slaves could be integrated into the military, however, they first had to be 
organized as a definable mass, made visible to governmental institutions as a population. 
Movement itself, made somewhat less strict under the confusion of battle, had to be 
redefined in order to control populations through institutions and their statistical 
apparatuses. 
 The “steady stream” of people would become after the war not an exigency, but a 
principle for the definition, analysis, and control of the nation as a whole by both the state 
and private institutions. In turn, the primary means by which those streams of people who 
had been made visible to the state as populations would be guided was the material 
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system of railways and its abstract metrics which were developed during Reconstruction 
and into the twentieth century. As Charles Francis Adams, Jr. put it, the American 
railway system was “thoroughly characteristic of the American people” in that it “grew 
up untrammeled by any theory as to how it ought to grow; and developed with mushroom 
rapidity, without reference to government or political systems” (Railroads: Their Origins 
and Problems 116). From its initial phase of construction in the 1830s, the railway 
system would grow at a steady but comparatively slow rate into the 1860s. With the help 
of the logistical requirements of the Civil War and then a rapid post-war economic 
expansion, however, its rate of expansion rose sharply. It would eventually span the 
continent with the completion of the trans-continental Union Pacific Railway in 1869, 
and reached a point of relative saturation by 1876. The development of the railway, 
according to Adams, was, at the same time, “founded on a theoretical error . . . that in all 
matters of trade, competition, if allowed perfectly free play, could be relied upon to 
protect the community from abuses” (Railroads 117). Armed with this faith, Americans 
“built roads everywhere, apparently in perfect confidence the country would develop as 
to support all the roads that could be built” (Railroads 118). As a result, “railroads sprang 
up as if by magic” (Railroads 118). The railway was more than simply a tool, created to 
achieve particular, pragmatic ends. Its shape and procedures were formed by capitalist 
“axioms” that preceded the reality they were supposedly in service of and surpassed those 
assumptions in scope “as if by magic” to produce effects beyond any single intention 
(Railroads 116). By the 1870s, the railway was “a thing sui generis – a vast and intricate 
formative influence, as well as a material power” (Railroads 81). The system of tracks 
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and train cars became more than the sum of its parts. Rather, over and above even 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s concept of the “ensemble” of heterogeneous technologies that 
made up the railway system, it became an overdetermined total train system 
(Schivelbusch 31). It was a collection of interconnected regimes of technological control 
over nature, social practices for the regulation of the circulation of people and consumer 
goods, and ideological assumptions about how societies naturally develop and understand 
their own historical movements. The railway became overdetermined in that it was the 
product of a culture that saw itself as guided by trans-historical laws whose principles 
produced the railway. At the same time, the railway itself proved the existence of those 
trans-historical laws and itself anthropomorphically represented society’s trans-historical 
principles of development. As an anthropomorphic tautology that was both the product 
and guarantor of American development, the railway became an essentially literary 
question, the features of the two halves of the comparison becoming increasingly 
interchangeable over time. 
 This project, then, first hopes to begin to trace in American literature the 
ideological development of a shifting relationship between the political space of the 
United States and the technologies that made that that political space possible from its 
origins as a totalizing system in the Reconstruction period into the twentieth century. 
More specifically, the ideology of linear social progress as divine fiat was increasingly 
grounded not in strictly theological terms but in the secularized discourse of scientific 
and technological certainties. The literature of the day, in its various efforts towards a 
“realist” or “naturalist” aesthetic, made claims to representing this social development in 
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its empirical reality that American literature previously had not. In literature, then, we see 
authors deal more explicitly with ideology as a material institution that grounds an 
abstract certainty. Because it was not entirely bound to reality, literature could more 
specifically articulate the ideological assumptions that precede any statement about 
reality. I call space “political” in this context because one of the most important effects of 
the railway system and the new speeds of circulation it created was to telescope space, 
warping the traditional ideas of distance and therefore political articulation between 
previously separate spheres of power within the nation. Because the railway was a 
technology, space and time could be instrumentalized for diverse human ends. Space and 
time were therefore revealed by the total train system to be more than simply a priori 
categories of perception. To the degree that they could be warped from a human 
perspective, the new limits of space-time became mobile, practical boundaries that could 
be put to work through technologies that exceeded the capabilities of human bodies. 
Because semi-autonomous from human action, the railway system could also operate 
semi-automatically, the principles of the system then becoming the limits for human 
movement and social articulation. Over time, the particular mode of instrumentalization 
of space and time offered by the total train system shifted from an uncertain, emergent 
phenomenon through the 1860s and 70s to a fully dominant ideological formation from 
the 1880s into the twentieth century. 
 Secondly, my project hopes to show the mutual reinforcement between the 
ideology developed by the total train system and a changing American racial discourse 
within which some thinkers were actively critiquing progressive ideology as it developed. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, black thinkers and writers were often the most perceptive and 
articulate critics of these developments even as they were occurring. As the railway 
system developed, both as a product of the rapidly expanding and solidifying space of the 
nation and its apparent guarantor, the period of its expansion also saw the political 
victories won for former slaves in the first few years after the war quickly eliminated. 
Ultimately, this process led to the institution of state-sanctioned segregation and 
organized violence against black citizens to replace the former state-sanctioned slavery. 
As Frederick Douglass described it in 1881, American racism still “fill[ed] the air” after 
the official end of Reconstruction in the South (Douglass 568). Although black 
Americans had “ceased to be the slave of an individual” by the 1880s, they had “in some 
sense become the slave of society” (Douglass 568). The “love of power and domination” 
to which Douglass attributed this new form of oppression had become not necessarily the 
function of a “money motive” at work for any one, malevolent individual (although that 
certainly continued in many forms) but a function of the particular mode of capitalist 
exchange that coalesced after the war, a mode that I argue was given its historically 
contingent shape in this period by the railway (Douglass 573). To trace the development 
of these abstract forces and their multiple interactions, I will examine the art and thought 
of four post-war American authors: William Dean Howells, Charles W. Chesnutt, Henry 
Adams, and James Weldon Johnson. Each of these authors sought to depict a moment in 
the technological reshaping of the political and literal space of the country. By following 
these thinkers in more or less chronological order, we can see the ossification of the logic 
of the railway as an ideology of historical movement. Additionally, we see how the 
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railway created a new, more technologically mobile sense of historical order compared to 
an antebellum racism that had been shattered in the war. 
The “love of power and domination” that Douglass identified as the source of 
racial and economic oppression after Reconstruction is a difficult concept in that it 
suggests two, seemingly opposite readings: the love that power distributes to those who 
are subject to it and the love of subjects for that power to which they are subjected. 
“Love,” in this context, should not be thought of as romantic love but a libidinal 
investment in a concept of law in which principles of exchange between its aspects are 
partially determined in advance. This libidinal relationship, in fact, breaks into three 
aspects: the abstract and absent law that distributes love unequally in history, the 
individuals who experience their subjection to that law as the ones who are loved and 
made present in history through that love, and the only implicitly present unloved who 
are separated out from the loved by the absent law. The split within history by trans-
historical principles of domination, given the unique history of state-sanctioned slavery in 
the United States, tended within the discourse of late nineteenth century American 
politics to be racialized and polarized into a simple “black and white” binary, despite the 
dialectic’s plasticity.  
My decision to attempt to trace the development of the total train system by way 
of two of the three traditional abstractions of identity formation (race, class, and gender), 
should not be construed as meaning that race and class are more important in some way 
than any other conceivable permutation of the three terms. Each permutation brings with 
it its own historical frame that emphasizes different aspects of the essential split between 
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the loved and unloved of American politics. As the discourse around lynching in the 
United States makes painfully clear, for example, any statement about one of the three 
terms always implicitly or explicitly involves the other two. A common justification for 
white mobs’ lynching of black men was a rhetorical plea for the safety of white women’s 
sexual purity. This rhetorical plea, however, was, in turn, simply a diversion from the 
economic and political motives those terror tactics actually supported. The relationship 
between class and race, however, was often the most obvious conjunction in the events 
surrounding the expansion of the railway and its ideological ossification. The battle 
around the Granger Laws in the American South and West that sought to curtail the 
political power of the railway companies in the 1860s and 70s, the Supreme Court 
decision in the 1890s that legalized segregation, and the continuing silence surrounding 
the common practice of lynching throughout the late nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth all explicitly tied practical technologies of movement to abstract racial 
assumptions in the American imagination. To begin to return to the material history of 
the perpetuation of American systems of oppression could just as easily begin there as 
anywhere else, with the knowledge that to imagine such a history as having a single 
origin is one of the first errors that should be acknowledged. 
The collapse of state-sanctioned slavery, in fact, revealed the abstract law of 
“power and domination” to operate as a tautology whose arbitrary character was not an 
accident or a failure of its concept, but the primary mechanism by which it functioned 
and perpetuated itself. Prior to the war, the power of Southern slave-holders perpetuated 
itself as a biological determinism that was evidence of divine right that, in turn, 
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determined biological difference. As Thomas Jefferson put it (importantly in his Query 
on the laws of the state rather than on its population in his Notes on the State of Virginia), 
the social order in the United States could be justified by a difference, “fixed in nature” 
(Jefferson 138). Slaves’ “own judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their 
preference of them,” hierarchically mirrored “the preference of the Oranootan for the 
black women over those of his own species” (Jefferson 138). After the war, this 
biological determinism remained in many ways rhetorically dominant – in a Social 
Darwinist discourse, for example. At the same time, a new form of power emerged to 
compensate for the failure of divine right to explain an American society that had just 
almost torn itself apart over the question. Power, rather than being “fixed in nature,” had 
to some extent become mobile through the systems of capitalist exchange, justifying 
itself through its own growth. As James Weldon Johnson put it in 1935, the “course of 
fate cannot be steered,/ By all the gods that man has made” (“Fragment” 70). There 
would be no way to begin American history again after the war in an effort to efface the 
history of the “Ten thousand thousand blacks” who, through state-sanctioned slavery had 
become “a wedge/ Forged in the furnaces of hell,/ And sharpened to a cruel edge/ By 
wrong and by injustice fell,/ And driven by hatred as a sledge” (“Fragment” 70). It “is 
impossible to choose one’s beginnings” when attempting to understand this history of the 
United States (For Marx 64; emphasis in original). Black Americans after the war had 
“contradicted the degrading qualities which slavery formerly ascribed” to them, and yet 
slavery’s “shadow still lingers,” functioning as an “atmosphere,” an assumed set of trans-
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historical principles of development, rather than a more direct property relation (Douglass 
573).  
 Although it is impossible to choose one’s beginnings, there is a great deal of 
plasticity to the terms by which particular writers represent those beginnings in retrospect 
as certainties to come. History’s guaranteed course could be rhetorically revised to 
account for new technologies as new mediating terms of domination, as both history’s 
product and guarantor. As technologies based on scientific certainties became new means 
of capitalist circulation, they did nothing to change the essential split between the loved 
and unloved in American politics. They did, however, change the terms of distribution 
and possibilities of exchange between its three aspects. These shifting terms, moving into 
the twentieth century, would largely be rhetorically justified by way of the assumed 
benefits of technological advancement. The loved and unloved were split in their 
symbolic relationship to that history and yet shared “one and the same human self-
alienation” (“Alienation and Social Class” 133). The loved experienced that alienated 
subjectivity as a property relationship between them and their own history that 
legitimized their form of alienation “as a sign of its own power” in that it possessed “the 
appearance of a human existence” (“Alienation” 133; emphasis in original). The myriad 
disruptions to everyday life ushered in by the railway, for those that experienced that 
history as for their own good, were reincorporated into a sense of linear progress as proof 
of its certainty. The unloved, however, felt “destroyed in this alienation seeing in it its 
own impotence and the reality of an inhuman existence” (“Alienation” 133). Race and 
class, as abstractions that describe two aspects of a fundamental ideological split between 
  14 
the loved and unloved, became mobile borders within the space of the nation with the 
advent of the railway. These two aspects of the same division that could alternatively be 
activated to justify oppression as based in eternal, now scientific, law. This initial split 
between the loved and the unloved functioned as the place reserved for the “Name-of-
the-Father in the promotion of the law” of American historical succession (Écrits 482) 1. 
For those “that violate/ The eternal laws,” according to Johnson, forgiveness “is an idle 
dream” because “God is not love, God is law” (“Fragment” 70-1). 
To relate technology to the abstract, political space of the United States as its 
borders were in motion is, at the same time, to question the terms of history itself or the 
law which grounds our certainties about the movement of history in its linking of cause to 
effect. With the advent of the railway, technology increasingly took on the role of the 
mediating copula in historical movement. In the final pages of his Personal Memoirs, 
published in 1885, former president of the United States and general of the Armies of the 
Potomac Ulysses S. Grant gave his predictions for the future of a country that had 
survived the war and a turbulent period of Reconstruction. Grant wrote that prior to the 
Civil War, 
the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. 
In fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against 
coming to want should they move among entire strangers. So much was the 
country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so 
that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak . . 
                                                 
1 The majority of my Lacan references are to the Bruce Fink translation – I will note when I’ve made 
alterations of my own using the French. 
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. Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of 
these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit of 
independence and enterprise. The feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from 
his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. There is now such a 
commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer 
localized to any great extent; the country has filled up ‘from the centre all around 
to the sea’; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, 
nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the students of 
geography . . . I feel that we are on the eve of a new era. (Grant 778-9) 
According to Grant, technological domination of space, the alterations in language that 
accompany that domination, and the general production of knowledge about the space of 
the nation that results from these shifts all contribute to the “new era” that the nation was 
entering. Intuitively, Grant understood the movement of history to be mediated through 
technologies after Reconstruction and, most importantly, through the railway. The 
railway inaugurated a conceptual exchange that Grant understood (not altogether 
unreasonably) to be a progression. Whereas prior to the war the United States had been 
“divided” by cultures, accents, idioms, and literal space, after the war the American 
public would learn to speak a similar language by necessity through their social 
intermixing in the space of the railway system. History, conceived of as a set of trans-
historical constants that organize contingent events into patterns of causes and effects, 
was no longer a self-evident concept in the wake of the total train system. More than this, 
the railway indicated that history had never been self-evident even when it had been 
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assumed as such. The social differences whose interaction provided a narrative of 
transmission from generation to generation were exchanged for a unity in language and 
practice that provided a basis for a new kind of knowledge about the nation that could be 
quantified and controlled. While the railway separated a generation from its local 
specificity, it unified the nation as a calculable, eternally “nearly perfect” population.  
At the same time, this shift in history’s mediating term was not as innocent as 
Grant hoped it to be. The expansion of the railway quickly eliminated the space of the 
frontier that had separated the civilized from the savage in the American imagination 
since the first European colonists in the seventeenth century. Rather than American 
society defining itself through the often violent negation of the savage, the borders that 
marked this difference were turned in on themselves and became the accelerating, mobile 
borders of the circulation of capital, borders between the developed and undeveloped (or, 
more ominously, underdeveloped) spaces of resources for exploitation. The spread of the 
railway and its pushing back of the savage spaces thus became proof of the moral and 
social development of the nation, the technological and social categories becoming 
confused because equated in people’s minds. The railway and its institutions would be 
able to redistribute savage space within the nation itself through its own material 
presence or absence, creating what Achille Mbembe has called “necropolitical” spaces. 
To the degree that access to the railway became a precondition for capitalist growth, and 
therefore “civilization,” the negative space created by the borders of the civilizing 
influences of the railway tracks became an “anti-economy” that structured the means for 
and justification of the killing of those only conditionally protected by the state, most 
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visibly in the American practice of lynching which flourished at the end of the nineteenth 
century (Mbembe 15). As Charles W. Chesnutt described it in 1899, the equivalence 
between different kinds of development often masked an inequality. Although “now we 
have steam and electricity and improved sanitation, and professions of human equality,” 
we would only be able to “work around to the fact of” that equality “in due course of 
time” (Essays and Speeches 112). The equivalence of two distinct meanings of 
“improvement” as increasing technical efficacy and increasing social ease through access 
to both necessary and luxury goods, as with all hasty equivalences, “prepares the way for 
eliminating one of them” (“The Problem of the Intrinsic” 469).  
Technology in the late nineteenth century became a response to a question that 
had not yet been definitively asked about history, as Grant’s historical intuition phrased 
in the prophetic mode suggests. It became the solution for the social problems it had itself 
created. In Grant’s national anamnesis, “what is at stake is not reality, but truth,” in that it 
reorders “past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come” 
(Écrits 213). The material structure of the railway provided the conceptual limit to the 
sense of historical necessity it apparently guaranteed. As the material system of the 
railway became more ubiquitous, it seemed only to reinforce the sense of its historical 
necessity as the basis for American political and economic growth. Only through 
rendering technology as historically overdetermined could Grant give it its new role as 
the engine of history, representing it as an inevitable progression when it had initially 
appeared as a radical break. “This is why the past is never opaque on an obstacle. It must 
always be digestible as it has been pre-digested” (For Marx 115; emphasis in original). 
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Sigmund Freud wrote as much in 1929 when he pointed out the possibility that “technical 
progress is without value for the economics of our happiness,” adding that if “there had 
been no railway to conquer distances, my child would never have left his native town and 
I should need no telephone to hear his voice” (Freud 88). One technology supplements 
the loss caused by another in an attempt to reassemble a previous social formation for a 
humanity who has not yet caught up to the change. The logic of the railway “pre-digests” 
its history in that it provides the terms of exchange between dissimilar social 
articulations, to an extent determining how they will be valued in their exchanges. What 
Grant understood intuitively, Freud begins to formulate theoretically: technology to a 
historically variable degree structures social value exchanges as its principles begin to be 
taken as trans-historical constants in the nineteenth century. The logic of the railway 
became dominant not simply as an increasingly ubiquitous mode of transportation in 
people’s lives. It was also dominant as a total train system in its conferral of necessity on 
the past that led up to it in that the logic of the train system became the means by which 
historical dominance itself was distributed, both literally and conceptually. 
What is at stake in the question of the social effects of the railway system is less 
the empirical truth of the history the railway system apparently guaranteed than the set of 
metaphors by which that history’s causal unity was assumed. As a metaphor for the 
society of which it was a part, the railway’s metaphorical status as a model for historical 
movement is essentially a literary question. In an anthropomorphism bizarrely shared by 
Karl Marx and Andrew Carnegie, after the world was literally connected by the railway 
system, society as a whole was made available in a more powerful way to a new kind of 
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biological determinism as a metaphor for its processes than it had been before the war. 
Society became a unified body not only in Thomas Hobbes’s analogical sense of the 
Leviathan, but in the more literal sense of the railway system that linked the separate 
spheres of the world together, but with particular principles of articulation unique to it. 
Whereas Hobbes began his most famous work with confidence that the human heart is 
“but a spring” and the “commonwealth, or state . . . is but an artificial man,” by the 
nineteenth century this had become something less and something more than a metaphor 
(Hobbes 3). These principles of growth and regulation through capitalism could be 
conceived of as the stochastic homeostasis of a mechanical body connected by the 
railway.  
Literary criticism of the past few decades has picked up on the essentially 
metaphoric means by which trans-historic principles are ideologically assumed and then 
used to explain historically contingent events. Critic Amy Kaplan’s often-cited The 
Social Construction of American Realism, for instance, takes “ideology” to be “those 
unspoken collective understandings, conventions, stories, and cultural practices that 
uphold systems of social power” (Kaplan 6). The new historicism, as distinct from an 
“antimimetic” post-structuralism, leads “critics to chart a more dynamic relation between 
social and literary structures, one that does not place the text outside society as an 
imaginative escape” but situates “realistic texts within a wider field of what has been 
called ‘discursive practices,’” which “reclaim the American novelist’s engagement with 
society” (Kaplan 6-7). Other important works on the period such as Walter Benn 
Michaels’s The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism and Eric Sundquist’s To 
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Wake the Nations, similarly take some form of “discursive practices” as a more accurate 
subject than any empirical “reality” that literature “reflects” in some way. Yet, as 
Kaplan’s description indicates, this new historicism may simply avoid the more pressing 
question of history as fundamentally metaphorical by implicitly retaining the reflective 
model that discursive practices “uphold” power structures along mimetic lines but by 
other means. These discursive histories often mask the ways in which discourse itself is 
material and historical. “Society,” in this form of “discursive analysis,” becomes an 
autonomous object that can be “engaged with” rather than itself being discursive and 
therefore fundamentally metaphorical. With the failure of human bodies to be vessels of 
historic meaning, history itself has been turned into a variety of analogical Leviathans by 
these critics for the same procedures of empirical analysis to be done at a higher level of 
abstraction, in the name of “discourse” which effectively substitutes for the same 
“reality.”  
Following Teresa Brennan, my own project takes as its starting point the 
ideological critique of Karl Marx by way of Jacques Lacan, whom I take to be a 
profoundly if perhaps fleetingly historical thinker, somewhat “against the grain,” as we 
say, of many assessments that associate him with a poorly defined and therefore often 
misunderstood, a-historical “post-structuralism.” According to Brennan, critics “under 
the sway of the Foucauldian antithesis” (which, through its retelling, often has little to do 
with Foucault), focus on a particular kind of “discourse analysis,” that does “not proceed 
propositionally” (Brennan 5). Those writers “are suddenly susceptible to the notion that 
the attempt to explain the whole is a mistake” (Brennan 5). Instead, they follow particular 
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genealogies of the rise of the idea of popular culture, or some other local discourse as an 
“alternative” to an overly general “history” (Brennan 6). Lacan, however, provides us 
with “a lever” which “approximates Marxism’s explanatory reach” but also “begins to 
bridge the applicability gap” that led a Marxism that had little to do with Marx and was 
“so plainly wrong in its industrial premises and centralized conclusions” toward a 
dogmatism that could not fully develop its own praxis (Brennan 6-7). Lacan “stresses 
psychical factors . . . in a way which makes the psychical into a material or, strictly, a 
psychical force which is at the same time cultural” (Brennan 7). If, according to Brennan, 
Lacan leads us to the conclusion that “the objectification of the other depends on 
establishing a spatial boundary by which the other by which the other and the self are 
fixed” that boundary in the late nineteenth century American ideological field was shaped 
by the railway and that split between the self and the other would be racialized through 
and through (Brennan 8). While I will disagree with some of Brennan’s conclusions 
about Lacan’s theories, I agree that beginning with Lacan’s idea of the materiality of the 
signifier can provide us with a framework to more fully understand a history in language 
that is simultaneously material and ideological. 
My first chapter, then, begins with the work of William Dean Howells, whose 
career almost perfectly follows the rise of the railway system from Reconstruction into 
the twentieth century. Howells is often used by critics as a straw-man whose promotion 
of American literary Realism negatively defines the supposedly more aesthetically 
ambitious and properly complex Modernism that proceeds it. At the same time, when 
taken on its own terms, Howells’s work was not a monolithic, coherent set of aesthetic 
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practices but a shifting problematic within an emergent ideology conditioned by the 
expansion of the railway and its logic. By following the evolution of Howells’s thought 
in his use of the railway as a metaphor for how societies function, I will argue that 
Howells identifies (almost despite himself) the essential problematic of the total train 
system from the dominant bourgeois point of view as it was developing. I use 
“problematic” here in Althusser’s sense of the word, a “particular unity of a theoretical 
formation” in its relation “to the existing ideological field” (For Marx 32, 62). As an 
emergent phenomenon within the existing ideological field, the total train system 
presented itself to Howells as essentially ambiguous, as a problem that had no obvious 
solution because it had not yet been fully imbricated into ideological certainties. In 
particular, the total train system presented itself as a problem to bourgeois consciousness 
as a disruption of the social field of which it was a product. As an emergent set of 
practices that attempted to ideologically adjust to the telescoping capacities of the 
railway, the total train system often appeared in Howells’s and other’s metaphors in terms 
of magic. This magic, however, I will argue, was a way to ideologically and aesthetically 
account for the “mythic thought” produced by the railway and its new modes of 
articulation, in Lévi-Strauss’s sense of the term. By telescoping time and space, the 
railway was able to literally juxtapose different political spaces in a previously 
unimaginable way. As such it combined and articulated previously distinct spaces and 
regimes of knowledge, creating a social effect that could only be understood by Howells 
as a kind of secular magic. By the twentieth century, however, Howells’s initial optimism 
about America had dissipated and the new politics made possible through technologically 
  23 
controlled space revealed itself to favor an oppressive American politics rather than its 
liberation. 
Whereas my first chapter attempts to define the total train system from within its 
problematic from the dominant, white, and bourgeois point of view, my second chapter 
takes the same problematic from a different angle, that of Charles W. Chesnutt. If it took 
Howells decades to identify the potentially oppressive aspects of the total train system, 
Chesnutt identified them almost as they happened. The “mythic thought” produced by 
technological system, as Chesnutt represented them in his novels particularly, was not 
random. Rather, it served to define and regulate the historical progress of American 
traditions which, in turn, often implicitly supported white supremacist political structures. 
As a critique of these structures, I argue that in his last two novel published in his 
lifetime, The Marrow of Tradition and The Colonel’s Dream, Chesnutt expands in 
literary form on an idea he only partially developed in his non-fiction, the idea of “the 
parallax view.” The “parallax view” is an attempt to speak historically but not from a 
position of certainty. Rather, the parallax view understands history to be essentially 
contested, but productively so. Viewing Chesnutt’s experiments with realism not as a 
failure to appropriately use its techniques as Howells defined them, as many critics have 
seen him, Chesnutt attempts to not only critique the empirical assumptions of a white, 
bourgeois society that assumes and benefits from a linear history, but goes beyond them 
to develop a perspectival approach to realist literary techniques. 
My third chapter moves to the work of the historian and occasional novelist, 
Henry Adams. By the time Adams privately published his two major works, Mont Saint-
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Michel and Chartres and The Education of Henry Adams in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the logic of the total train system had become a dominant rather than 
emergent ideological force in American culture. After his early journalistic work, 
histories of the administrations of Jefferson and Madison, and two novels published 
anonymously and pseudonymously, Adams rejected the progressivism he had at first 
worked toward in his criticism of the political abuses and corruption around the 
expanding railway system. Adams came to understand American and, indeed Western, 
history as having “snapped,” as he put it in his Education, around 1900 (The Education of 
Henry Adams 433). Whereas Howells and Chesnutt had been attempting to represent the 
changes brought about by the railway system in its emergent form, Adams described the 
fully dominant total train system as a new “empire of coal.” This empire would be a 
radical break from the Enlightenment tradition to which Adams, as an Adams, felt 
himself particularly beholden. While the empire of coal broke the diachronic progression 
of Enlightenment thought, it simultaneously instituted a new, synchronic unity by way of 
capitalist circulation. The new “empire of coal” created a distinct form of subjectivity in 
the modern era for Adams, one that would incorporate the principles of technological 
articulation into its own functioning. This new subjectivity would be essentially spatial 
and historical rather than grounded in a prime mover that structured history from the 
outside. More than the other three writers I discuss, Adams was a world-traveler and 
nearly as intimate with European society as with American. Black Americans seemed to 
have made almost no impression on Adams, ever the Boston Brahmin, after his 
antebellum childhood. Rather than taking black Americans as his figure of the racial 
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“other,” in the second half of his career Adams developed a virulent anti-Semitism that, 
as other critics have argued, largely stemmed from his intimacy with Europe and its own 
struggles over racial difference. Adams’s anti-Semitism is often dismissed as Adams 
simply being “of his time” or explained away as an unfortunate bitterness he developed 
later in life. I argue, however, that Adams’s anti-Semitism is, in fact, related to his 
spatialization of politics by way of the empire of coal that was now global and therefore a 
structuring influence on global anti-Semitism as well as the more local obsessions 
specific to American race prejudice. The figure of the “ghetto” as a space apart from 
capitalist circulation (like the spaces of lynching in the American South I discuss in the 
next chapter) takes the place in Adams’s mind of biological determinism as the 
justification for racial difference in Adams’s thought, marking a shift that would only 
become even more important in the twentieth century. 
Finally, my last chapter looks at the work of James Weldon Johnson, the poet, 
novelist, anthologist, diplomat, scholar, and early leader of the NAACP. Focusing on his 
only novel, The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man, first published in 1912, I argue 
that Johnson’s lifelong battle against the American practice of lynching can best be 
understood as a reaction to the political space of the total train system as it had 
ideologically ossified by the beginning of the twentieth century, and as Adams described 
it. The political terror against black citizens that reigned in the American South after 
Reconstruction was essentially “necropolitical” in that it separated political space along 
racial lines into spaces of safety and spaces where the suspension of the state was 
conceived of by some as essential to its health. This American necropolitics was all the 
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more terrifying in that it followed the mobile and accelerating borders made possible by 
the railway system, creating a calculus rather than geometry of spaces of racial violence 
that could expand or contract almost randomly from the point of view of any one 
individual. I read Johnson’s novel as a revision of Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography in 
that it revises Franklin’s early association between American identity as geographically 
situated but for a modern environment dominated by the total train system. Similarly, any 
resistance to specific tactics of domination against a particular race would, necessarily 
also require resistance to a particular mode of Capitalist circulation. Resistance, in other 
words, would “not begin by choosing among” different abstract modes of 
subjectification, but by “no longer choosing” at all (Écrits 65). 
By taking Lacan as a historical thinker, his ideas help me understand a different 
kind of causality than is typically assumed, “in silence,” as Henry Adams put it, by 
historians who “had never supposed themselves required to know what they were talking 
about” when faced with a “wholly new” force such as the railway (Education 362-3). 
When one looks for it, it is, in fact, surprising the degree to which scholars from a variety 
of disciplines assume the principles of Newtonian mechanics to accurately and 
completely describe all kinds of causality. I would identify one “lever,” as Brennan put it, 
that Lacan offers us in his own explicitly stated attempt to rethink causality. Lacan gives 
us a form of causality closer to what Werner Heisenberg has called, following Aristotle, 
potentia. These are the places where typical (which is to say Newtonian) causal relations 
do not hold. They are causal relations that are simultaneously material but within a mode 
of materiality that is only constituted in the act of observing it. With this in mind, turning 
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to these four writers working within a changing ideological field offers us not 
“alternative” histories but at least the possibility of alternatives within the “history of a 
life lived as history” (Écrits 366). 
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Chapter 1: 
 
An Agent Universally Applicable: William Dean Howells and Technological Space 
 
“Denken? Abstract? – Sauve qui peut! Rette sich, wer kann!”  
G.W.F. Hegel, “Wer denkt abstract?” (1807)  
 
“It is conjecturable that democracy as we have realized it, and as that mistaken American 
author has studied and painted it, has a repulsiveness which the ideal does not wear. It 
looks ordinary, commonplace, uninteresting, as one's face and figure are apt to look in the 
glass when not made up for the ordeal. This, however, one may very well feel, is not the 
fault of one's self, but of the glass, and then one does well to smash it, or if not quite that, 
to impeach its veracity.”  
           William D. Howells “The Physiognomy of the Poor” (1903) 
 
“Some day I should like to write the tragedy of a man trying to escape his circumstances. 
It would be funny.”  
William D. Howells to William C. Howells, October 7th, 1888 
 
An Absurd Poetry: The Total Train System 
When the last spike of the first trans-continental railway in the United States was 
driven into the ground in May of 1869, the track’s completion performed both an 
economic and a political function. As one of the dignitaries claimed just before the 
ceremonial golden spike was driven into the ground, the railway would now “span the 
continent,” “wed the oceans,” and dictate “the pathway to commerce” (“The Pacific 
Railroad”). In case anyone in the audience had missed the connection between the 
expansion of the material infrastructure of the nation and its political unity, another 
speaker went further. The New York Times reported him as saying that the “Great Benton 
prophesied that someday a granite statue of Columbus would be erected on the highest 
peak of the Rocky Mountains pointing westward, denoting the great route across the 
continent. You have made the prophecy to-day a fact.” (“Pacific”). Just two days later, 
“inaugurating the over-land trade with China and Japan,” the “first invoice of tea” was 
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sent (“Pacific”). In the minds of those who constructed it, the Union Pacific Railway was 
an expression of the continuing effort of the United States to find “India” in the 
Orientalist mode. These speakers imagined the railway to be part of the inevitable 
expansion of the United States as both a political entity and an economic system, the 
latter providing the conditions of existence for the former. Political unity after the Civil 
War and the fulfilment of the nation’s destiny were transformed from a prophecy into a 
fact through the filling out of geographic space by a railway system which now quite 
literally spanned the continent. 
The railway was for those who controlled it the fulfilment of a process that had 
begun with the first European colonists in the Americas. Citing Christopher Columbus 
rather than the Plymouth Colony is apt here in its emphasis on the economic, which is to 
say the more explicitly rapacious, colonial narrative of American expansion. The promise 
of expansion was achieved, however, by unexpected because previously un-dreamt of, 
technological means. Because the destiny of the nation was fulfilled in an unexpected 
way, the ideology that justified that expansion had to change to account for the realities 
of history and to reconcile prophesy with fact. The railway system, as a realization of the 
promise of the United States, weakened one aspect of the dominant American tradition 
while it reinforced another in a kind of conceptual exchange. These two aspects divide 
along the lines of what Raymond Williams called the “stronger” and “weaker” senses of 
tradition (Williams 116). Toward the weaker sense of tradition as a romanticized “point 
of retreat” after a radical shift in practice, the railroad was a disruptive force (Williams 
116). The dream of “India” would no longer be fulfilled by isolated frontiersmen working 
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to cultivate their own properties, in the Jeffersonian mode. Rather, The West would be a 
fully integrated part of Eastern business concerns, which would, in their turn, benefit 
from the resources of the West. At the same time, and as the inaugurators of the railroad 
hoped to convince the public, the train continued another tradition in the stronger sense of 
the word. The railroad was also evidence of American ingenuity and innovation. 
Expansion, as an abstraction meant to fulfill a destiny, had shifted its mediating term for 
the inaugurators of the railroad. It would now be grounded not in the creation of 
individuals who carry with them the spirit of the American prophesy but in the cultivation 
of a technological system that was itself the culmination of the American prophesy. As an 
expression of American ingenuity, the railway system became a way for Americans to 
recast this disjunctive experience as a continuity between a past, a present, and a future at 
a higher level of abstraction. What appeared to be a radical break with the past, could 
therefore be reintegrated into a totalizing conception of the political domination of space 
that guaranteed the linear progression of social and economic growth. As the railway 
worker and union organizer Eugene V. Debs put it in 1899, to be a railroad worker in the 
nineteenth century was more than simply a job. When one piled “in the fuel to create 
steam to speed a locomotive along the iron track” one was also speeding along “progress 
and civilization” at the same time (Debs 232).  
 If there was a single author who seemed to promote this stronger sense of 
tradition that gave Americans a feeling of participating in a progressive destiny, it was 
the novelist, playwright and magazine editor William Dean Howells. In his most often 
remembered formulation of what constitutes a specifically American literature, Howells 
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claimed that American authors “concern themselves with the more smiling aspects of life, 
which are the more American, and seek the universal in the individual rather than the 
social interests” (Criticism & Fiction 62). This quotation, absent of its context, is 
typically the only statement of his that is included in general overviews of the period and 
is sometimes taken by critics dedicated to the study of Howells’s work as a synecdoche 
for all of his thought on the subject. Selecting Howells as an emblem of American 
progressive ideology makes a kind of sense from this single quotation. One can already 
see the ideological compromise Howells at times attempts between the two aspects of 
American tradition. He claimed to “seek” in the “individual” a way of accessing an 
unspecified “universal” that is somehow dissociated from “social interests.” These social 
interests, then, are a diversion from the unfolding of the Jeffersonian destiny of America, 
which can only be found in individuals. Howells hoped to claim for art the place of a 
mediating term between the individual and the universal, bypassing the social. Thus, 
through art, Americans could represent to themselves their relationship to a common set 
of trans-historical values that would not be subject to the vicissitudes of a social history 
that was not always an obvious unfolding of the presumed destiny of the American 
people. American artists, in turn, do not choose to represent these aspects of life over 
others as a conscious decision, but as a tendency stemming from American “conditions,” 
a word which in this context attempts to dissociate the American environment from its 
historically contingent features (Criticism & Fiction 62). 
Although he was a dominant figure in American literature at the end of the 
nineteenth century, by 1930 many writers and critics considered Howells’s unwarranted 
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optimism to be irredeemably old-fashioned. Sinclair Lewis, for instance, took his own 
Nobel Prize in literature that year as an indication that the United States was a “nation 
come of age” culturally (Lewis). As opposed to the Victorian era of “Howellsian 
timidity,” writers like Theodore Dreiser and Eugene O’Neill chose to include subjects 
that were “terrifying, magnificent, and often quite horrible,” in the manner of “the 
tornado, the earthquake, the devastating fire” (Lewis). While Howells “had the code of a 
pious old maid” and sought to “guide America into becoming a pale edition of an English 
cathedral town,” the new art of Lewis and Dreiser would include more “passionate and 
authentic” depictions of America made by artists who refused to be “genteel” and were “a 
little insane in the tradition of James Joyce” (Lewis). This criticism of Howells as a 
complacent and conservative figure in the English mold is a common one. At the same 
time, this criticism is strange in that Howells himself launched this complaint against 
other artists as early as the 1870s in the name of a new and vibrant American art that he 
saw himself as promoting. Additionally, by the twentieth century, Howells’s art and 
criticism had lost much of its earlier optimism, making any summary statement about his 
place in the American tradition as its representative optimist more problematic. 
 Howells’s changing understanding of his own artistic project, in fact, followed a 
trajectory that mirrored his political shift from a largely benign faith in a utopic American 
destiny to a more circumspect concern about the disparity between the reality of 
American life and the rhetoric with which it was justified. I argue that by following the 
image of the railway in Howells’s work, we can trace his changing attitude toward the 
abstract ideal of American politics from a progressive destiny to a hesitation over an 
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impossible decision brought about by its own contradictions, a “lethal factor,” as Jacques 
Lacan put it. Through Howells’s attempts to incorporate the railway into his art, we can 
see the ideological impact of that technological system as an emergent force in the 
American imaginary. The shift did not occur in a single stroke and never took the form of 
a coherent theory. Often, in his later work, the optimist and the pessimist in Howells live 
side by side. Yet, after the 1880s, a new strand of Howells’s thought emerges in which he 
attempts, if ultimately unsuccessfully, to reconcile the internal contradictions of 
American technological progressivism. In purely contingent terms, the work of William 
Dean Howells is perfectly situated to register the ideological shift caused by the railroad 
system. His career followed the railroad’s post-war economic and political expansion as 
well as the general ideological ossification of the assumptions that apparently naturalized 
modern technology as an abstract historical force, roughly from the end of the Civil War 
in 1865 to the end of the century. The railway presented a problem to Howells’s realist 
project in that it was both changing the material conditions of American life that Howells 
hoped to represent semi-empirically through his realist techniques and was also changing 
the concept of the social in the abstract, how the material conditions would articulate 
social spaces. Despite the “real” in the term “realism,” when it came to the railway’s 
ability to telescope distances to create new juxtapositions of objects and social spheres, 
many writers, including Howells, had difficulty treating it as “real” and could only liken 
the train system to magic.  
 In Howells’s first novel, Their Wedding Journey, published in 1872, he was 
already incorporating the railway into his writing at the level of content. That novel 
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(which is really more a series of loosely tied-together sketches) describes the honeymoon 
travels of the Marches, the characters he would later use in one of his most celebrated 
novels, A Hazard of New Fortunes. In one chapter, entitled “A Day’s Railroading,” the 
majority of the action takes place in a moving railway car. As Howells represents it, the 
observations of the Marches are to a large degree conditioned by the total train system as 
both a social space in which strangers come together and a technological space of a car 
moving at comparatively great speeds through a landscape. These two aspects of the train 
system already play their disruptive role toward the weak sense of American tradition and 
a normalizing role, anxiously guaranteeing the stronger sense. In his attempt at 
reconciliation between the two aspects, Howells describes the railway from a variety of 
perspectives which forces him to write largely in the conditional mood. The railway as a 
social space was not generically available to Howells as such but only through a rhetoric 
of either partialities or potentialities. The Marches, “in the spirit of ordinary American 
travel,” had “deliberately rejected the notion of a drawing-room car as affording a less 
varied prospect of humanity” (Their Wedding Journey 52-3). Rather, they choose the 
“common passenger-car,” which was “in all respects an ordinary carful of human beings, 
and it was perhaps the more worthy to be studied on that account” (Journey 53, 55). The 
greater variety of passengers on the “common” car are both accidental in their potential 
differences yet normalized at a higher level of abstraction, as objects of contemplation for 
narrating subjects describing their plausibly common features. The interior space of the 
train is one of “complacency” and “comfort” that routinizes the act of viewing variety 
(Journey 53). From within, potentially destabilizing chance is thus regulated by 
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bourgeois perception of a static quasi-domestic space, a “very amusing world” the 
narrator goes on to describe almost entirely in the conditional mood (Journey 55). 
Because a space in which variety is normalized through statistical concepts, the “common 
car” is not just described in the conditional mood, it is ideologically experienced by the 
Marches in the conditional mood. 
 The railway, as Howells points out in the first section of this passage, offered the 
realist artist a new kind of social space, that of the “average” collection of Americans. 
These social spaces, because made up of strangers whose particular connections to local 
environments were no longer obvious, normalized an “American type” in general that 
could be studied as such and converted into aesthetic, realist principles of representation. 
Rather than a concept of the self-fashioned, idiosyncratic American of Benjamin 
Franklin’s generation, the new American type would be necessarily thinkable because 
there was nothing left outside of the political reach of the nation that could be essentially 
different and therefore unintelligible. The railroad helped inaugurate the rise of this new 
kind of knowledge that compensated for the disruption the railway caused to the 
presumed differences between Americans. As Ian Hacking has argued, the nineteenth 
century saw the “erosion of determinism” and the ascendance of “a new type of law … 
analogous to the laws of nature, but pertaining to people” which were “expressed in terms 
of probability” (Hacking 1). An “avalanche” of numbers for the measurement and study 
of populations necessitated the invention of “normalcy” by the institutions that created 
them to describe those populations (Hacking 5). Normalcy became a convenient concept 
for seemingly disparate spheres of activity such as “manufacture, mining, trade, health, 
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railways, war, [and] empire” to control populations and implicitly require that certain 
behaviors be preferable amongst the people in order to maintain the power of the state in 
an accelerating world (Hacking 5). Jason Puskar has argued that, extending Hacking’s 
insight, Howellsian realism can be read as a reaction to the rise of insurance companies in 
the United States. These institutions sought to quantify, naturalize, and normalize the 
effects of large-scale accidents caused by new instruments for the production and 
circulation of commodities. Howells’s realist project in this argument fosters “social 
cohesion and communal interdependence” by imagining realism as “a kind of insurance” 
which allows “writing, like underwriting, to participate fully and unashamedly in 
capitalism’s markets while still working to construct communities of interdependent risk” 
(Puskar 30). Rather than the “accident” being an unpredictable event that was caused by 
forces outside of the human realm, the new techniques for creating “normalcy” 
incorporated the idea of accident into human society itself, making it seem a shared 
burden of all people. As such, even disruptive events could be rationalized as the result, if 
unfortunate, of humans in general but not any humans in particular. Howells was aware 
of this attempt at homogenization through quantification when he commented that 
Americans are “all, or nearly all, struggling to be distinguished from the mass, and to be 
set apart in select circles” (Selected Literary Criticism 70). Howells at the beginning of 
his career saw the United States as offering exactly this kind of non-determinative yet 
still certain historical change fueled by a struggling, fluid social structure that was 
increasingly given its shape by technological systems. 
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While this normalizing tendency of the railway provided Howellesian realism 
with a vocabulary to describe populations, it also was disruptive on the order of the 
narrative of the nation’s history. Although the interior, quasi-domestic space of the 
railway becomes normalized for the aesthetic gaze of its bourgeois passengers, the 
exterior view, which the Marches “struck an hour after leaving the city,” becomes more 
confused (Journey 53). As they left the city, the Marches “cast an absurd poetry over the 
landscape” that passed them through the window and “invited themselves to be reminded 
of passages of European travel by it,” placing “villas and castles and palaces upon all the 
eligible building-sites” (Journey 54). The landscape, like the interior space of the train, 
cannot be experienced as such, despite the apparent immediacy of the perception. Rather, 
the Marches run through a series of conceptual frameworks which attempt to place the 
blur of countryside into some kind of intelligible order. Sensing the unseemly foreignness 
of his initial imaginative frame, Mr. March “patriotically tried to reconstruct the Dutch 
and Indian past of the Mohawk Valley,” for Mrs. March in order to explain what it was 
that they were looking at (Journey 54). In doing so, “he was foiled by the immense 
ignorance of his wife, who, as a true American woman, knew nothing of the history of 
her own country, and less than nothing of the barbarous regions beyond the borders of her 
native province” (Journey 54-5). The plurality of potential points of view on the 
countryside become a confusion of historical and literary precedents through which the 
Marches attempt to understand or misunderstand their experience. The telescoping of 
distance cannot be experienced by the Marches as such, but rather must be filtered 
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through the concept of the nation and its history, conceived of as a difference between the 
“barbarous” and “civilized” regions that the railway had already collapsed.  
The exterior space of the railway, then, is also normalized but in a different mode, 
that of contingent history rather than statistically average populations. When it comes to 
history, however, this normalization is less successful for the Marches. As the sexist aside 
about the inability of American women to understand history indicates, the desire of 
linking this landscape to an American history attempts to guard the patrilineal 
progression of property that makes up traditional historic sequence against a “barbarous” 
chaos. Representing the train in literature, then, required for Howells several 
simultaneous epistemological frameworks that attempt to respond to the perceptual 
problems created by the material capacities of the machine’s movement through space 
and the social spheres that are partially conditioned by that movement. These frameworks 
are juxtaposed in sometimes mutually exclusive discourses that must be reconciled to 
maintain the dominance of the bourgeois perspective’s assumption of development-in-
time as well as that assumption’s guarantee, if uneasy in this example, of progress both in 
the sense of a statistically regulated group and that group’s uneasy historical continuity.  
 The two epistemological functions that compete with each other in Howells’s first 
train scene are the statistical, normalizing tendency of the interior space of the train car 
and the difficulty in maintaining a sense of historical development-in-time for the scenery 
outside of the train car. Although Howells did not always have an exact vocabulary to 
encompass the idea, Howellsian realism sought to capture the social atmosphere of the 
United States not as a static set of observable facts, but as a dynamic process in which 
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any stability can only be relative. As Howells put it, when “realism becomes false to 
itself, when it heaps up facts merely, and maps life instead of picturing it, realism will 
perish” (Criticism & Fiction 15). Realism, then, is an attempt to find imaginative and 
narrative (which is to say causal) links between facts that are more or less faithful to 
some kind of real world. Whether consciously understood by Howells or not, the very 
political formation that determined bourgeois consciousness’s experience of empirical 
“fact” was itself rapidly changing as a result of technological systems. The railroad 
became for many a historical expression of the abstract force of the nation’s narrative of 
“progress.” As one contemporary of Howells’s put it, progress is “is derived from 
motion” and is therefore a universal principle of nature rather than a willed activity of 
individual humans (McPherson 11). Howells’s reaction to the implications of the railroad 
participates in a much broader shift within the dominant American ideology toward a 
fully bourgeois concept of knowledge and its presumed foundation in universal 
principles, a shift that, perhaps ironically, would undermine the very assumptions that 
motivated it.  
As Donald M. Lowe has argued, the shift from a pre-modern to a fully bourgeois 
society required certain assumptions about the ways in which knowledge worked. The 
most important of these was the introduction of “development” and, more specifically, 
secular “development-in-time” as a basic formal element of knowledge (Lowe 18). With 
the displacement of oral communication in favor of typography as a guarantor of 
knowledge, knowledge became dissociated from particular, speaking individuals as 
vessels of truth. Rather than the contingent perceptions of individuals, the perceptive field 
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in the abstract, guaranteed by institutions, became the ground of truth. The various 
political and social institutions surrounding the production and maintenance of scientific 
knowledge are perhaps the most obvious examples of this broad historical trend. Because 
dissociated from particular individuals, knowledge can thus appear to develop over time, 
semi-autonomously, as an abstract apparatus rather than a lived experience. As a result, 
development-in-time came to be seen as an abstract but necessary quality of knowledge 
and the truth it expressed. 
The relationship between the railroad system and an imagined totality of United 
States society was more than a convenience or a historical accident in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. The railroad became an objective correlative for a new idea of 
how societies necessarily change and grow. Despite the economic instability that shook 
the country through the post-Reconstruction years in which Howells was writing, Peter 
Townsend Austen was still able to claim in a popular essay from 1890 on the changing 
nature of American manufacturing that we “all agree that human society is never at rest 
and that we must all either go forwards or backwards – i.e. progress or retrogress” 
(Austen 137). Austen attempted to reassure the public about the long-term effects of 
economic instability, claiming that “dishonest trusts and combinations will pass away” 
because they will be “prohibited” once their “true nature” is revealed to the American 
people (Austen 137). We must all agree to this proposition because, according to Austen, 
while the “progress of truth” may be misapplied when it is at first incompletely 
understood, this is only a misidentification of truth (Austen 137). In the long run, the 
truth is inherently convincing and therefore ensures its own progress. We know truth to 
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be progress because all progress is necessarily true in Austen’s tautological reasoning. He 
finds proof for this faith in linear progression in the interconnectedness of business 
concerns, whose elements are attached to one another as parts of a single “organism” 
(Austen 137).  
The railway system was more than simply a new mode of saving human labor. It 
was also the best example of the development and interconnectedness of the social 
“organism” whose principals were grounded in abstract nature itself. As Logan G. 
McPherson, a lecturer on transportation at Johns Hopkins University, wrote in 1907, the 
railway “performs the function of transportation” which is to say it “generates motion” 
(McPherson 11). All “progress is derived from motion” just as “atoms unite in 
molecules” (McPherson 11). These claims are so obvious to McPherson that the “motion 
effected through human agency which we designate as transportation furthers and 
continues this progress is not difficult to perceive” (McPherson 12). Cause and effect, in 
this argument, are immediately obvious to human perception in the bourgeois mode 
described by Lowe. Although McPherson’s analytic argument is shot through with 
logical fallacies and platitudes, he expresses the odd situation clearly. The railroad system 
had become both a historically contingent product of American society and the proof of 
its trans-historic conditions of existence. The total train system participates in 
fundamental universal laws that cannot be altered but can be harnessed for human 
purposes. As a total system the railroad was an expression of a continual progress of 
natural development and increasing complexity. “Total” in this context does not mean 
completed or static; just the opposite, in fact. The railway is a “totalizing” system within 
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this ideological formation because of its plasticity. It is totalizing in that it attaches itself 
to all other spheres of the productive “organism” as the motor for their development. 
As Karl Marx pointed out, the start of the Industrial Revolution was not “the 
machine” as such but specifically James Watt’s invention of the double-acting steam 
engine. This motor was distinct from regular tools or other “prime movers” such as the 
water-wheel in that it was “of universal technical application” (Capital 499). The 
“genius” of Watt, according to Marx, was less the machine itself than Watt’s patent for 
the machine which specified the engine “not as an invention for a specific purpose, but as 
an agent Tho in industry” (Capital 499). The steam engine, then, aids in all aspects of the 
production and circulation of commodities. As a system of exchange, Capitalism’s 
essence cannot be understood through any one example of exchange. Rather, is asserts 
itself in the movement of all exchanges taken together as a whole, or the “the 
metamorphosis of commodities through which the social metabolism is mediated” 
(Capital 199). The steam engine makes a fully capitalist exchange possible not through 
any single exchange but as a motor that intervenes at all points of production and 
exchange, which affects all exchanges formally and as an acceleration of the rate of 
exchange in general. The train, then, both fragments previous formations of mercantile 
exchange in that it accelerates the expansion of Industry’s replacement of pre-Industrial 
production and it unifies new formations in that it gives more economic power to the 
cities and their factory systems as concentrations of capital. The “total train system” 
signifies both the ubiquity of the material train system and the formal, conceptual shift 
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brought about by the accelerated rate of exchange in general that is now economically 
required at the formal level. 
By the late nineteenth century, Austen was willing to put forward a general 
principle of social progress within capitalism that was widely shared: “science will enable 
the members of a community not alone to exist, but to provide themselves with articles 
both of necessity and luxury without the application of their whole time to the labor of 
production” (Austen 138; emphasis in original). “Science” may therefore underwrite 
capitalism. Taken together, scientific certainties and the technologies based on those 
certainties must and will govern the rate of expansion of capitalism as a stable, totalizing 
organism in the long run. Capitalism defines society’s parts’ relationship to the whole 
while the rate of exchange between and expansion of those parts is governed by a techno-
scientific system which develops in parallel. This techno-scientific system, in turn, 
guarantees that capitalism’s expansion will ultimately progress in a straight, if sometimes 
unpredictable line towards a bourgeois utopia of the combination of necessary and luxury 
goods for all, produced by an ever diminishing amount of direct human labor. In Adam 
Smith’s writings from the eighteenth century, the principles of capitalism were 
guaranteed by the “propensity of human nature” to “truck, barter, and exchange one thing 
for another” (Smith 117). Exchange was a function of a human nature taken to be a trans-
historical constant that limits the horizon of possibility for particular events. With 
Austen’s assumptions about the expansion of the United States, however, the trans-
historical base of capitalist exchange had shifted. Scientific and technological progress 
rather than “human nature” are now figured as the principles of a mechanical, historical 
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development that guarantees the means and rates of human exchange. Rather than a 
social system that uses technology for its own ends, The United States was now imagined 
as a technological system that occasionally required humans to invoke, manage, and 
hopefully profit from its inevitable development.  
The shift from the assumption of historical progress as a function of human nature 
to that of a techno-scientific principle reimagines the relationship between economic base 
and cultural superstructure. As Bernard Stiegler defined it, a technological system 
constitutes a “temporal unity. It is a stabilization of technical evolution around a point of 
equilibrium concretized by a particular technology” (Stiegler 31; emphasis in original). 
The standardization in technique and use of a particular technology effectively anchors 
further progress around certain technologies assumed to remain more or less constant for 
a period of time. In the case of the railroad, this concretization takes on an extremely 
complex form involving both literal, mechanical unities such as the complementarity 
between the railroad and the telegraph systems as well as the cultural superstructure 
brought into being by those technical possibilities, the plethora of social practices that 
changed to accommodate the new possibilities in transportation. Whereas a technological 
system, abstracted from the concrete history in which it develops, can be seen along 
Stiegler’s lines as a “point of equilibrium,” Howells emphasizes, almost despite himself, 
that that equilibrium only occurs in the abstract. From the point of view of a lived history, 
the equilibrium at the level of technological systems also brings with it a series of 
uneasily reconciled epistemological divisions that manifest themselves as “mythic 
thought.” This mythical thought, in turn, expresses itself magically from the point of view 
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of the individual. In Howells’s particular formulation of that magic, representing the new 
techno-social spaces would require two complementary conceptual tasks. Technologies 
such as the railway operate materially, creating conditions for new perceptive experiences 
that provide the content for representation. At the same time those experiences have a 
disruptive effect on apperceptive categories, requiring a new syntax in which that content 
would be expressed. 
 
Organized Lifelessness 
William Dean Howells had a problematic and shifting relationship to this 
ideology of unlimited progress that found its fullest expression in the railway system. To 
a certain degree, he endorsed it as a secularized version of Christian millennial thinking. 
After the Civil War ended in 1865, efforts to reconstruct the South in part crystallized 
around an ideology of messianic progress for which the railway system was an objective 
correlative. Southerners hoping to rebuild their fortunes and Northerners hoping to put 
the antagonisms of the past few decades behind them turned to railroads as a means to 
begin the economic expansion that would guarantee a united nation. As historian Mark 
Summers put it, no “traveler in the postwar South could have missed the so-called 
railroad mania . . . Villages with no railroads had to have one, and those with one wanted 
two” (Summers 32). Fraudulent practices of private businesses, federal mismanagement 
of money under the Johnson and Grant administrations, and financial bubbles, however, 
caused economic instability associated to varying degrees with the expanding railroads 
through the 1870s. Spectacular economic crises (to which I will return in my chapter on 
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Henry Adams) such as Jay Gould and James Fisk’s 1869 attempt to manipulate the gold 
market and the Crédit Mobilier scandal of 1872 undermined the perceived messianic 
quality of economic and technological expansion. By the close of official Reconstruction 
in 1877, the United States had not accomplished the utopic hopes for a radically changed 
South but it had put in place, for better or worse, a system of railways that spanned the 
entire continent. 
 In a review of Max Nordau’s Degeneration from 1895, Howells seemed to 
endorse the Millennialism common to late nineteenth century American bourgeois 
consciousness in opposition to Nordau’s bleak view of the fin-de-siècle. Nordau argued 
in Degeneration that the “disposition” of the end of the nineteenth century was “curiously 
confused, a compound of feverish restlessness and blunted discouragement, of fearful 
presage and hang-dog renunciation. The prevalent feeling is that of imminent perdition 
and extinction” (Nordau 2). Howells commented, however, that when one reads Nordau’s 
book, “you are not sure that Dr. Nordau is altogether sober” (Selected Literary Criticism 
203). While rejecting the value Nordau attributed to Western Society, Howells remained 
within Nordau’s linear, epochal logic. According to Howells, the world “in its thinking 
and feeling, was never so sound and sane” because “knowledge and greater knowledge 
are the cause and effect of all that [society] has done in the arts as well as the sciences” 
(Selected 205). He added that if “we stand at the end of things, we also stand at the 
beginning.” (Selected 205). Howells partially agrees to the possibility of a disastrous 
millennial thinking but concludes that even if that were the case, there must be something 
better after it, better because guaranteed by bourgeois “knowledge.” Rather than 
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attempting to establish final ends, Howells claims that art cannot be “final,” for if an 
artist “forces himself to be final in things that do not and cannot end here, he becomes 
dishonest, he becomes a Nordau” (Selected 206). Howells rejects Nordau, not because he 
thinks the world may develop in a harmful way, but because no one harmful development 
can be the end of the development as such. Any instability can only be contingent, a step 
along the way to “knowledge and greater knowledge.” Howells does not dispute Nordau 
on the basic assumption that bourgeois development-in-time is a feature inherent to 
reality. He, in fact, takes that assumption one step further than Nordau. Rather than a 
“degeneration,” Howells, in true bourgeois fashion, imagines a future with a “widened 
prospect” that signals the shift from what Donald M. Lowe calls Christian eschatology to 
bourgeois society’s idea of “progress.” Whereas millennial time comes to an “abrupt, 
unexpected end,” “the idea of progress presupposed immanent temporality, and provided 
a rational vision of the future to its bourgeois beliefs. No one within this progressive 
development could leap beyond time. Thus, as the future widened its prospect, the 
temporal horizon became more immanent” (Lowe 46). If Howells is overly “optimistic” 
as many critics have claimed, his optimism is not his own but that of bourgeois society as 
a whole. 
The railroad, because it was a totalizing system that governed forms of exchange 
in addition to being an increasingly ubiquitous material network, often occured in 
Howells’s writing obliquely. Its function as an object for characters’ contemplation or a 
background against which human actions occur reveals the way in which the railroad was 
structural as well as material in Howells’s imagination. In his novel A Hazard of New 
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Fortunes, published in 1890, for instance, the Marches return, a little older and a little 
more jaded about the world. Years after the description of their honeymoon, Mr. March is 
an amateur writer living in Boston who makes his living as a relatively unambitious 
insurance salesman. When let go from his job, the Marches decide to take up the offer of 
a friend for Mr. March to help start a new magazine in New York City. After arriving in 
New York, Mrs. March professes an “infatuation” with the city’s elevated railway, “the 
ideal way of getting about in the world” (A Hazard of New Fortunes 64). As it winds its 
way through the city, the track “found and lost itself a thousand times in the flare and 
tremor of the innumerable lights” (Hazard 64). Its path connects the different parts of the 
city into a whole but seems to follow no pattern for any particular individual. When 
observing unused train cars at the Central Depot, the objects “waited there like fabled 
monsters of Arab story ready for the magician’s touch, tractable, reckless, will-less – 
organized lifelessness full of a strange semblance of life” (Hazard 65). Like the 
inaugurators of the trans-continental railroad, the metaphors that seem to lend themselves 
to descriptions of the railway in this case are Orientalist as well as magical. Magic, here, 
as a metaphor, attempts to reconcile seemingly antithetical processes at work at the same 
time. Despite the disorienting structure of the train system, traveling through the city on 
the elevated track gives its passengers a “fleeting intimacy” with “people in the second- 
and third-floor interiors” that had a “domestic intensity” (Hazard 64). This domesticity, 
however, is only scopophilic. It is not a fully dialectic relationship between two or more 
individuals but a “drama” that is “better than the theater” (Hazard 64). At stake in these 
descriptions is the concept of “life” itself with its simultaneous meanings of social and 
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biological life. The railroad has disrupted both, giving the agency of vivifying change to 
the “organized lifelessness” of the material structures of the railroad and bringing 
previously separate spheres of private and public life together in a perverse but attractive 
“intimacy.” These unexpected juxtapositions seem magical because they bring spheres of 
signification assumed to be separate not only into contact with one another but effectively 
abolish the line between them, revealing them to have never been natural distinctions at 
all.  
The train as a material means of both literal and conceptual displacement brings 
together what Claude Lévi-Strauss referred to as a “heterogeneous repertoire” of systems 
of thought which bear “no relation” to each other but are “defined only by [their] 
potential use” – in other words the “bricolage” of “mythical thought” (Lévi-Strauss 17-
8). The steam engine as such has no particular use. It is, as James Watt already knew, “an 
agent universally applicable.” It does, however, provide a system of signification, that of 
the infinite potential of industrial capitalism to attach itself indiscriminately to and 
therefore articulate other systems of signification. From the point of view of Howells’s 
characters, this is not a simple claim. The track dismembers the compartmentalized, 
private spaces of the city. The railway system then reassembles those spaces along the 
lines of its own logic, creating juxtapositions that are, in effect, magical for the bourgeois 
consciousness that has not yet fully accepted the change that has already occurred at the 
level of material process. Although Lévi-Strauss was discussing so-called “savage 
thought” in systems that, for the purposes of scientific study, he took to be more or less 
analytically stable, the same formal properties (as Lévi-Strauss also pointed out in 
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passing) hold for the aspects of “modern” (which is to say capitalist) societies but are 
constantly shifting terms for capitalism’s perpetual revolution of its own means of 
production. The addition of steam power and the technological systems that they 
engender creates exactly these kinds of hybrid forms that appear in some sense magical 
from the point of view of the individual. 
Howells, like his own characters, was unable to satisfactorily describe the new 
juxtapositions created by the train system using the vocabulary of previous social 
formations. In an introduction to A Hazard of New Fortunes, written years after its 
publication, Howells confessed as much. The New York he had attempted to represent in 
his novel from 1890 was, by 1909 when he wrote the preface, “wonderfully, almost 
incredibly different” (“Bibliographical” 5). The “transitional public that then moped 
about in mildly tinkling horse-cars is now hurried back and forth in clanging trolleys, in 
honking and whirring motors; the Elevated road which was the last word of speed is 
undermined by the Subway, shooting its swift shuttles through the subterranean woof of 
the city's haste” (“Bibliographical” 5). Although the spirit of that “material city” may be 
more or less “parallel” between 1890 and 1909, the changes wrought by technological 
systems made it unrecognizable in both its material and demographic forms 
(“Bibliographical” 5). Repeatedly in Howells’s work, technological systems such as the 
railroad have the double effect of guaranteeing progress but rendering the progressing 
object unrecognizable. The now subterranean “organized lifelessness” of the railway had 
become the condition of existence for the life aboveground but has also changed the 
means by which that life expresses itself as such. 
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Technology often, as in the cases of Their Wedding Journey and A Hazard of New 
Fortunes, plays the role of a background against which the action of the plot occurs in 
Howells’s work. Yet, that background also plays a significant role in the determination of 
the plot. I agree with Amy Kaplan that Howellsian realism presents social change not as a 
“background which novels either naively record or heroically evade” (Kaplan 9). I 
disagree, however, that understanding his realism simply to flip the binary, making social 
change the “foreground of the narrative structure of each novel,” is particularly clarifying 
(Kaplan 9). When considering a phenomenon like the railroad, which functions as a 
setting that structures possible actions, the difference between foreground and 
background is of limited use. The material structure of the railroad to a large degree sets 
certain conceptual limits for the social interactions that occur within it. The perception of 
space, in both its material and political sense, is warped by this technology and the 
apperceptive categories by which space was discussed in the nineteenth century were 
being actively revised in Howells’s literature as a result. Howells is unable to avoid the 
possibility that, in addition to structuring material relationships, the railroad also 
structured historical and ideological relationships. The means of regimentation introduced 
by technological systems create not a static space but a techno-political space that 
juxtaposes mutually exclusive regimes of knowledge in a sometimes disorienting way. As 
Kenneth Burke pointed out, to describe literary form in terms of a “background” or 
“scene” is already to activate a kind of materialist thinking in which the “paradox of 
substance” (a term to which I will return) is made visible (Burke 21). The scene and 
agents in the scene are imbricated “into a corresponding articulacy” that comprises an 
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event within this framework (Burke 7). To isolate this dynamic imbrication into a 
“background” and “foreground” in which one of the categories conceptually precedes or 
hierarchically supports the other is to in one way or another miss the dialectic between 
them. Technology, as a tool that is both a result of human intent and a semi-autonomous 
actor, in Howells’s work mediates and partially controls the scenes and agents in a way 
that was impossible before the expansion of the railway. 
The question of the relationship between the “foreground” and “background” of 
Howells’s literature often has been taken up in other terms by his critics, and most often 
as an implicit question of the status of the “individual,” in several senses. Thinking what 
Kenneth Burke called the agent-scene ratio as a dialectic has often been missing in 
criticism of Howells, which, in its early stages, tended to focus on the artist himself as an 
individual, historical actor. Almost all of the critical work done on Howells before the 
1970s consists of biographical studies that sought to find personal analogues, either in 
terms of brute historical facts or more evanescent “sensibilities,” for the fictional work of 
an author who, as one critic put it, “even more than most writers, was made by and 
helped to make his age” (Carter 13). Although formulations such as this one gesture 
toward a materialist dialectic, they often result in simply pointing out that Howells did, in 
fact, live in a time where other things were going on and his literature did, in fact, 
occasionally refer to them. Depending on the particular critic’s politics, these studies tend 
to figure Howells as a heroic genius or heroic failure who either does or does not 
mimetically capture what each critic considers to be the most important element of 
Howells’s historical epoch. Howells as a historical figure shaped his culture by bringing 
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parts of the previously existing social scene to the foreground for literary representation. 
Howells, for instance, was a “quiet rebel” for Robert Hough, who championed 
progressive causes by more or less accurately representing the plight of the poor in 
general to a middle-class audience through fictionalized particular cases. In an 
anthropomorphic metonymy, the spirit of an age could be explained in terms of a 
representative individual and vice versa.  
After these early critics, the question of Howells’s “realism” would often be cast 
in terms of faithfulness to an individual’s experience, both in terms of its fidelity to 
historically contingent reality and empirically in terms of its fidelity to trans-historic, 
“scientific” concepts of perception. Techno-political spaces are more often than not 
partial phenomenon in literature in that they do not directly act but imbricate other 
relationships. The dialectic between scene and actor that Howells often employs to 
describe the articulacy of “mythic thought” structurally required by the ideology of 
modern technologies has been difficult to study for critics of Howells who often take the 
term “realism” at face value. Various criticisms launched against Howells have largely 
been a result of a lack of vocabulary to describe this kind of ideological formation as in 
motion, as actively changing. As far back as Roman Jakobson, critics have lamented the 
ubiquity of “realism” as a term, which often “has more in common with causerie than 
scholarship” (Jakobson 19). He points out that although realism makes a claim toward re-
presenting material objects, what one is often left with after any patient consideration is 
simply its “ideogram,” the ghostly image of a material object (Jakobson 20). Critics have 
often vacillated between a generic history and a-historical empiricism to conceptually 
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ground the question of realism. Eric Sundquist claimed that Howells’s realist project 
“failed case by case . . . to renounce romanticism” and therefore could not establish itself 
as a “stable force” in American literary thought (Sundquist 8-9). Michelle Kohler, on the 
other hand, finds the individual act of observation to be the “stable core” of Howells’s 
realist techniques (Kohler 194). Both Sundquist and Kohler hope to ground realist 
techniques in some concept of stability, either the historically consistent use of generic 
tropes that are formalized after the fact or from empiricist-analytic categories of 
observation that are taken to be trans-historical. What Burke’s comment points out, 
however, is the historical and ideological articulation of an individual expression cannot 
be reduced either to history or empiricist categories but is an articulation of the two. Both 
history and material reality are contingent along parallel lines and are both scenically 
related to particular, subjected actors. Neither the history of genre (at least in its 
traditional sense) nor the empirical act of seeing can be extricated from ideological 
formations, but are in one way or another inflected by them within particular, historically 
contingent moments. 
What is at stake in the lack of dialectic in much of the criticism of Howells is the 
ways in which the “individual,” either as an obvious locus for the synthesis of empiricist 
categories or an individual who unproblematically wills the course of history, comes to 
uncritically ground aesthetic and political judgments about Howells’s work. Although 
realism has been promoted or dismissed from a variety of critical frameworks, the very 
ubiquity of the term “realism” seems to betray a certain ideological attractiveness to the 
concept. It seems to designate some kind of responsibility toward real social conditions, 
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even if this is simply a reaction against a perceived solipsistic, unprofitable production of 
fantasies that has haunted literature in the era of capitalism. On the one hand, empiricism 
is often the logic by which literature has sought to justify itself to capitalism since the 
nineteenth century. Empiricism requires objects referred to or implied by literary texts to 
have some kind of “real world” correlative that can be established through historical 
documentation. On the other hand, realism often justifies itself to “high art” as a 
subjective stability which requires a more or less rigorous set of rhetorical rituals for 
establishing artistic authenticity as an honest observer of the real world that is then 
generalized to a universal process of aesthetic experience. As critic Michael Davitt Bell 
notes, when attempting to schematize Howellsian realism within these contending 
allegiances, one is faced with a “fundamental weakness” that may lead one to “smile” 
and “make allowances” (Bell 21). Although, while some of this “weakness” may 
certainly be attributed to Howells’s unsystematic way of thinking, it must also be 
recognized to be inherent in the realist project itself, as a thoroughly historical category. 
Like Sundquist and Kohler do implicitly, Bell’s endorsement of the claim that Howells’s 
realism is “weak” because it is not trans-historically “true” as an a priori category betrays 
the assumed connection between truth and that which is outside of history but still 
somehow accessible to an individual, a connection that Howellsian realism cannot 
support, despite his own, “smiling” version of that claim. 
Another common mode by which critics attempt to justify art to capitalism, 
though one that is ultimately subject to the same structural problem, is through the 
politics of the development of the individual. Regarding his mid-career novel A Hazard 
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of New Fortunes, critic Cynthia Stretch argues that his attempt to represent the public 
space and politics of a labor strike was the “limit case testing the viability of the public 
sphere, the author’s authority therein, and the possibility of realism itself,” adding that 
none of these categories “stands up to Howells’s anxious scrutiny” (Stretch 234). Hazard 
“interrogates the impossibility of the realist project itself as it comes face to face with the 
intractable conflicts that were the inevitable results of capitalist modernization” (Stretch 
245). And yet, Carrie Tirado Bramen argues about the same novel that Howells’s 
interaction with urban landscapes, both personal and literary, forced Howells into a 
“multivalenced response toward modernity” that “most intriguingly engages our own 
postmodern sensibilities” (Bramen 85). For Bramen, Howells is an “inveterate flâneur” 
who took the formlessness of the city as the form for his novel, a common critical 
position toward A Hazard of New Fortunes (Bramen 84). Both Bramen and Stretch begin 
their interrogations of politics from the perspective of the individual, either caught within 
a riot that is a symptom of a larger, “political” event, or as a consumer, enjoying the 
apparently disjointed (but disjointed only when taken from the point of view of an 
individual) objects to be found in a major metropolitan area. Yet to take “individual 
perspective” as an unproblematic position from which true statements can be uttered, 
misses the dialectic between scene and actor that Howells often employs. 
Amy Kaplan, attempting to escape from the individual in favor of generalized 
discursive practices, argues that Howells’s realism attempts to claim for literature a 
bourgeois authority to “possess and dispense access to the real” by exploring and 
bridging “the perceived gap between the social world and literary representation” 
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(Kaplan 13, 9). The desire for social unity was now the product of heterogeneous 
“powers,” including the “social power of fiction,” that interact on the discursive plane to 
form the illusion of unity but strictly from a bourgeois point of view (Kaplan 17). In the 
case of Howells, this bridging occurs in the potentially democratizing effects of mass 
media to “construct a shared world” for either antisocial or healthy, productive purposes 
depending on the case (Kaplan 17). Yet, Kaplan’s formulation of realism as “an 
enormous act of construction to organize, re-form, and control the social world” tends to 
repeat the previous generation of critics’ assumption about the literal shaping of the 
world by a generalized individual will or an aggregate combination of individual wills 
(Kaplan 10). Again, what is missing in all these arguments, is the essential partiality of 
the individual within the scene-actor ratio. Put another way, Howells’s train scenes offer 
us moments in which the subjectivity who wills “has no relation to the real, but rather to a 
syntax which is engendered by the signifying mark” (Écrits 38). The railway imbricates 
the syntax of previous social formations, multiplying the potential range and speed with 
which interactions occur. We cannot say of any act of signification brought into relation 
to a system of signification marked by the railroad that it “must be or not be somewhere” 
but rather that “it will be and not be where it is wherever it goes” (Écrits 17). 
 
Just Hair 
Recently, Frederic Jameson commented that literary realism will always be weak 
in a way that will lead some critics to dismiss it, as has largely been the case with 
Howells. It is a difficult concept for critics in that it seems to claim access to a reality 
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they assume in one way or another to be eternal, like the laws of Newtonian mechanics. 
At the same time, and to critics’ disappointment, realism also always passes away 
historically. The constellations of received and emergent practices for legitimizing ways 
of viewing society are constantly being revised and challenged both from within their 
own logic and from a changing material reality. Both socially articulated practices of 
viewing and material objects being viewed, taken together in the dialectic between the 
material and the historical, precondition the limits of any possible subject position within 
a historically contingent moment of that dialectic. The dominant order must change in 
order to remain dominant over a historically contingent set of emergent political 
problems. Although usually taken as a set of empirical givens by those who employ them, 
aesthetic categories such as realism are invoked in name and revised in fact as an indirect 
reaction to changing social and political formations. Each reintegration of a new problem 
into a dominant discourse serves as evidence for those in power of the trans-historical 
unity of their dominant assumptions. Yet, as Frederic Jameson notes, realism does not 
represent universally valid acts of observation on a historically contingent object, either 
objectively or subjectively. To take authors at their word that their realism should be 
considered objectively empirical or subjectively authentic misses the ideologically 
determined selective process of any claim of access to reality. Rather, realism is an 
overdetermined desire. It is invoked from within the conditions of the passing away of 
social formations that govern observation in its simultaneously perceptive and 
apperceptive modes. Despite its claims to empiricism or authenticity, realism “wobbles” 
in one’s metaphorical view whenever one attempts to think it analytically (Jameson 1). 
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Realism in general is a “hybrid” concept in which “an epistemological claim (for 
knowledge or truth) masquerades as an aesthetic ideal” (Jameson 5). Although Howells 
and others often phrase their attempts at realism in the language of the ideal, these claims 
are always at the same time a response to new social problems whose very nature has not 
fully developed to be integrated into the assumptions of the dominant bourgeois culture. 
In other words, realism is an essentially ideological category, but justifies itself not 
simply from the ideal, but from the material as well. 
The term “ideology” is a notoriously slippery one. Ranging from some kind of 
“false consciousness” that maliciously misrepresents the world to simply the fact of 
subjects being interpolated into a language system, ideology has a bewilderingly complex 
set of possible meanings. The railway, however, was ideological in that it seemed to set 
material limits to social practices. It thus seemed to justify the abstract political 
assumptions of the United States through a supposedly self-evident, material structure 
which acted as the substantive copula between the historically contingent givens of a 
particular mode of circulation and the eternal truths of abstract, natural law. The railway 
engendered a kind of “mythic thought” when it brought together previously separate 
modes of thought as they were expressed through particular social and material 
formations. Throughout his career, Howells wrote a series of plays that attempted to 
exploit these new material and social formations created by the railway, typically for 
comic effect. Each play is distinct from the others in that it takes a different space of the 
railroad system as its scene. The Albany Depot tells the story of the misidentifications and 
misunderstandings engendered, unsurprisingly, by the space of a depot waiting room. The 
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Parlour-Car is a romance between two young people that takes place in an empty car. 
The Sleeping-Car tells the story of misidentification while taking an overnight trip on a 
crowded car. The action of each play takes the terms by which misidentifications happen, 
which is to say the terms by which normal, bourgeois politeness do not function, from a 
different kind of social and material articulation made possible by the total train system. 
No one play may be exhaustive of the logic of the train system because it is not an object 
as such. Rather, it is an “ensemble” of objects, as Wolfgang Schivelbusch put it, whose 
relations are governed partially by this new logic of the train, which can only be 
represented partially (Schivelbusch 31). 
The play that most extensively exploits the new potential of the railway as a plot 
device, however, is The Sleeping-Car. There are several thematic elements which the 
play repeats in variation. Briefly, it is the story of a trip taken by Agnes Roberts, her 
small child, and her aunt from Albany to Boston. Mrs. Roberts is hastily returning to 
Boston to meet her brother, Willis, who is himself returning to Boston from California 
after having spent many years there in an attempt to make his fortune. Mid-way through 
the trip, they are joined by Mrs. Roberts’s husband who attempts to surprise Mrs. 
Roberts, and eventually by Willis himself. The action of the play is taken up with a series 
of comedic misunderstandings and misidentifications. The main characters lose and find 
their child amongst the identical compartments several times and repeatedly misidentify 
various passengers as possibly the brother of Mrs. Roberts who has been away from 
home long enough to have changed appearance to some degree. The precondition for the 
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kinds of misunderstandings that occur, however, is the political space created by the 
sleeping-car and the divisions it has introduced that must be navigated by the characters. 
The play opens with the niece asking her aunt if she always prefers to take her 
hair down when she sleeps on a train. The conversation that follows is deceptively 
complex and will therefore be produced in full: 
AUNT MARY: No, never, child; at least not since I had such a fright about it 
once, coming on from New York. It’s all well enough to take down your back hair 
if it is yours; but if it isn’t, your head’s the best place for it. Now, as I buy mine of 
Madame Pierrot— 
MRS. ROBERTS:  Don’t you wish she wouldn’t advertise it as human hair?  It 
sounds so pokerish—like human flesh, you know. 
AUNT MARY: Why, she couldn’t call it inhuman hair, my dear. 
MRS. ROBERTS, thoughtfully:  No—just hair. 
AUNT MARY: Then people might think it was for mattresses.  But, as I was 
saying, I took it off that night, and tucked it safely away, as I supposed, in my 
pocket, and I slept sweetly till about midnight, when I happened to open my eyes, 
and saw something long and black crawl off my bed and slip under the berth. 
Such a shriek as I gave, my dear! “A snake! a snake! oh, a snake!” And everybody 
began talking at once, and some of the gentlemen swearing, and the porter came 
running with the poker to kill it; and all the while it was that ridiculous switch of 
mine, that had worked out of my pocket. And glad enough I was to grab it up 
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before anybody saw it, and say I must have been dreaming. (The Sleeping-Car 
243; emphasis in the original) 
This conversation, while apparently a comic digression to introduce the audience to the 
idiosyncratic ways of thinking of our characters, also sets the theme of misidentification 
and the terms in which misidentification occurs for the rest of the play. The terms of the 
conversation are overdetermined by the material and political situation of the train at 
more than simply the level of content (the fact that they are talking about habits relative 
to railroad travel). There are four distinct misidentifications in the conversation: having 
“one’s own hair” on one’s head or not, hair in general being “human” hair or not, the hair 
as either an object or animal in the car, and the misidentification of the hair as a material 
object or dream-object. Hair, as an object requiring explanation in the space of the train, 
is overdetermined by these misidentifications. Each is a potential answer to the implicit 
question posed by the impossibility of having “just hair.” For the hair to be neither 
“pokerish” nor “frightening” as an object separated from the body it must be articulated 
within another system of signification – either the biological human body, the exchange 
of commodities, or even dream-logic – but it cannot exist on its own and be intelligible. 
Not just the content of this conversation but the struggle they have with form itself are 
conditioned by the railroad and the more general ideological formation that it articulates. 
The overdetermination of hair in this scene stems from the hair’s simultaneous 
status as an unidentified material object that is also a signifier in search of a system of 
signification, a particular chain of signifying differences that triangulates the object 
within symbolic meaning. In other words, it is an example of Kenneth Burke’s point 
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about the essentially dialectic relationship between the concept of a thing and its “scene,” 
between a “container and a thing contained” (A Grammar of Motives 3). Burke’s point 
anticipates an observation by Jacques Lacan, made roughly a decade after Burke’s, about 
how signs work to imbricate subjective relationships from within an environment. The 
signifier, Lacan claimed, is a “unique unit of being [unité d’être unique] which, by its 
very nature, is the symbol of but an absence” (the phrase could also be translated “the 
unit of being unique”) (Écrits 17). There is seemingly a paradox in Lacan’s definition of 
the signifier as both present and absent that mirrors Burke’s observation about scenes. 
Describing the signifier in this way, however, Lacan points out the dual meaning of 
“unité” as a kind of being which is both a “unit” and “unity” in English. It is a distinct 
element that is itself a unified structure of distinct elements. In other words, the signifier 
makes use of what Burke would call the etymological “paradox of substance,” that “the 
word ‘substance,’ used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word, designating 
something that a thing is not” (Grammar 23). When we talk about what something is, we 
necessarily, implicitly are talking about what supports that thing as a consistent object 
through a chain of differences from what it is not. Because the signifier is essentially 
absent in its being, eternally “not in its place,” which is present from the point of view of 
the subject (Écrits 17). The misidentification of hair within the physical space of the 
railway is not, then, a result of the hair’s lack of meaning but its overdetermined 
abundance of potential meaning as an essentially absent signifier. This meaning, in turn, 
is not simply a “social convention,” but is also determined by the signifier’s status as a 
“unit of being,” as a material object within a material setting whose being is absent. 
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Any one social frame within which the hair can gain a particular meaning is 
confused by the context of the total train system. From within its material articulacy, the 
train system juxtaposes and breaks down the barriers between different chains of 
signification from which dissociated hair can gain meaning. It is the displacement of the 
signifier, its essential absence, which activates the signifying chain that creates meaning 
through difference, and that  
determines subjects in their acts, in their destiny, in their blindnesses, in their 
success and in their fate, notwithstanding their innate gifts and their social 
acquisitions, without regard to their character or sex, and that, whether you like it 
or not, follows the train of the signifier like weapons and baggage (Écrits 40). 2  
The material signifier determines the “destiny” of the subject whether he or she “likes it 
or not” in that it sets concrete limits on the signifying chain within which the subject is 
interpolated as an individual. Being is the “sub-stance,” as Burke would put it, of the 
essentially displaced signifier (Burke 22). The signifying chain does not determine the 
acts or destiny of the subject, but determines the subject in those acts and in its destiny, 
as a mediating middle term between an individual body and its social environment. Aunt 
Mary’s subjective experience, her desire to be seen by others as not insane for her 
misidentification of hair, in other words, is inflected by the material structure of the total 
train system in its articulations of both material and social relations. As a material scene 
that is ideological, the total train system inflects the “language” (rather than discourse) in 
                                                 
2 I’ve altered Bruce Fink’s translation closer to the original here as there are quite a few questionable 
choices of translation. My alteration is significant enough that I’ve cited the French text. Whereas Fink 
translates “le déplacement du signifiant détermine les sujets dans leurs actes,” for instance, as “the 
signifier’s displacement determines subjects’ acts,” I would argue that the “dans leurs” Fink elides is 
essential to Lacan’s point. Fink’s translation is on page 21 of that text, should the difference interest you. 
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which “our message comes to us from the Other and . . . in an inverted form” (Écrits 3). 
The hair is hair only to the degree that it is imbricated in an intersubjective, symbolic 
order that determines the limits of what hair can and cannot be. As the problem about hair 
that the two women encounter indicates, however, these limits are not a priori truths, but 
historical through and through. 
Like Howells’s characters in A Hazard of New Fortunes as they gaze on the 
unmoving trains in the train yard, the central question, the “problematic” as Althusser 
might put it, that both unifies the content of the conversation between the aunt and her 
niece and provides the terms of misidentification in the passage is the question of “life” 
itself as an active process from within the “organized lifelessness” of the train system. 
There are two sets of binary oppositions that the characters struggle to reconcile from 
within the articulacy of the various systems of signification created by the railway: the 
binary of life and death and that of human and inhuman. On the one hand, the question 
occurs relative to the human body and its prosthetics. The women consider hair to be a 
part of the body that also can be worked on by Madame Pierrot, semi-autonomously from 
the body proper, to be eventually placed within the system of capitalist commodity 
exchanges. As they note, one can wear someone else’s hair for a price. Hair is both 
human and inhuman in that it grows from the body but is objectified and separated 
aesthetically from the organic whole as an object. On the other hand, as an object 
separated from the body in motion, as a metonym for the “human” as a whole, the hair is 
the inhuman part of the human. The live human carries around and wears the dead hair of 
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live humans in order to fill out the normalized total image of a human with a certain, 
aesthetically determined amount of hair.  
The situation of the train in which the women feel comfortable enough to go 
through the rituals of sleep but not comfortable enough to do them as they would in their 
own homes creates additional problems. Whereas these binaries also exist outside of the 
context of the train, the addition of that setting puts these two binaries into a new relation 
with one another. Because of the railway system and its loosening of bourgeois etiquette 
in the name of pragmatic conditions, the functioning of hair becomes less determined but 
more meaningful. Within the train, hair “will be and not be where it is wherever it goes” 
(Écrits 17). On the train, the wig can be a snake and a dream at the same time. As Aunt 
Mary’s story unfolds, the train created the potential for the misidentification of something 
dead as something alive along certain lines whose stakes are increased by the train as a 
social space of surveillance. There is, of course, nothing specific to the railroad in these 
two sets of binaries. Rather, the total train system operates as an articulacy of content 
within a particular form. In this case, the questions of life and death and the human and 
the inhuman are modulated by both its literal setting on a train and the logic of the train 
system. There are two distancing maneuvers in this passage, one coming to the rescue of 
the other. The misidentification of dead hair as a live snake is, ultimately, explained away 
by Aunt Mary as only a dream. By recasting the alienated perception caused by the scene 
of the railway in terms of a dream, the alienating effect of dreams naturalize and 
compensate for the alienated perception within the social situation of having to explain 
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herself to others. Both alienations, however, rely on the fundamental instability of the two 
sets of binary categories. 
I use the term “modulated” to describe the often difficult relationship between the 
signifier and the signified from within the emergent ideology of the total train system as 
Howells attempted to represent it. Although there is a “fundamental distinction between 
signifier and signified” as “two networks of nonoverlapping relations,” for Lacan what 
“dominates” is “the unity of signification, which turns out to never come down to a pure 
indication of reality” (Écrits 345). Whereas the signifier is “the synchronic structure of 
the material of language,” the “second network, that of the signified, is the diachronic set 
of concretely pronounced discourses, which historically affects the first network” (Écrits 
345). Signification “only comes about on the basis of taking things as a whole” and 
“Dialectic derives new strength” from the two “foundations” of signification (Écrits 345). 
Because humans are social, there is no “pure indication of reality” possible from within 
the sub-stance of “the material of language.” Reality is essentially partial from within 
language, and partial in a historically contingent way that affects its own being to the 
degree that it is a part of human sub-stance. Signification, then, the process of creating 
meaning is fundamentally material and historical for Lacan and those two terms operate 
dialectically in any act of signification. It is not “only the subject, but the subjects, taken 
in their intersubjectivity, who queue up” along the signifying chain (Écrits 40)3. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that critics of Howells vacillate between the empirical and the 
historical. And yet, without paying attention to the dialectic movement between them 
there will always be something insubstantial to this history. 
                                                 
3 I’ve altered Fink’s translation again here and have cited the French. 
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The train has not, then, created a new division. It has not killed something that 
was alive in this context nor has it brought to life, magically, something that was dead. 
Instead, and perhaps more importantly, it has made a new division that showed the 
previous formation to have been a formation rather than a naturally given, inviolable fact. 
Hair is both alive and dead, human and inhuman. The functioning of the joke at the 
beginning of the play rests on the two different, already existing problems being 
juxtaposed by the total train system. The wig and its institutions of production, 
distribution, and advertising already exist as do the social conventions of their use. Yet, 
when on board a train, the interactions between these conventions shift partly as a result 
of the material conditions. Doing oneself up is more challenging, and between the two 
women there is a general acknowledgement of the loosening of the social conventions 
around this material act. For these women, whether or not to take one’s hair down is a 
genuine question, a problematic, that presents itself to them as an uncertainty that must be 
resolved to maintain the illusion of proper etiquette, or, in other words, to maintain a 
proper imago within a fluid ideological framework. While the hair functions as both alive 
and dead, it must be decided as either alive or dead given the ideological situation. 
Sigmund Freud had, by the late work Civilization and Its Discontents, also 
noticed the railroad’s peculiar ability to remap conceptual divisions as a result of new 
material relations. Registering a certain “factor of disappointment” in the disparity 
between the promises of new, technologically dominated progress and the individual’s 
experience of that progress, Freud notes the possibility that “technical progress is without 
value for the economics of our happiness” (Freud 88). The railroad and telephone in 
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particular perform a kind of conceptual exchange to supplement a loss. If “there had been 
no railway to conquer distances my child would never have left his native town and I 
should need no telephone to hear his voice” (Freud 88). The telescoping of distance 
alternatively brings previously disparate elements together while, at the same time, 
putting others at a remove. Previous regimes of causality and value, the value of presence 
and absence against the easy circulation of people throughout a geography in this case, 
are shattered. The remnants of those old regimes are then reassembled along the lines of 
the technological system. Technologies such as the railway, the telephone, the telegraph 
and other systems for the telescoping of space fundamentally rearrange the relationship 
between the perceptive apparatus and any individual’s expectations of the objects that are 
being perceived. In literary terms, terms that Howells either consciously or pre-
consciously used to his advantage, the shifting relationships between space and time that 
Freud noted are represented through distinct “chronotopes,” in the terminology of 
Mikhail Bakhtin. If, as Bakhtin had it, the chronotope is “the intrinsic connectedness of 
temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” and this 
connectedness has an “intrinsic generic significance,” then “The Sleeping-Car” combines 
several of these chronotopes in a single scenario (Bakhtin 84). Genre is an abstraction 
that serves to group particular literary works both for critics and writers of fiction 
themselves. They are then, within literary terms, the abstraction through which traditions 
of representing practices of viewing assert themselves, both in order to achieve 
intelligibility for a particular audience, and to break away from tradition and create new 
forms by contrast for writers.  
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When Lacan claims that language (rather than discourse) is material, he means 
precisely that it is chronotopic in general. It mediates various sub-stances which 
“thicken,” as Bakhtin put it, into specific, historically contingent relations (Bakhtin 84). 
Language mediates the displacement of the absent signifier which gives order to the 
experience of space-times in language. Technologies such as the railway, as Howells 
demonstrates, are therefore the material limits to the possibility of the thickening in 
language of space-time into particular, historically contingent chronotopes. The setting of 
the play on a train car presents particular difficulties for identifying anything but partial 
thicknesses. There are three different “thickenings” of political space which interact with 
each other as the play progresses. Firstly, there is the relatively static space of the 
domestic sphere. The plot within this chronotope involves the misidentification and 
misplacement of members of the family. This plot is static in the sense that within the 
train car itself there are a finite set of elements that only change when the train comes to a 
halt. For much of the play the characters are literally trapped with one another and only 
able to solve problems by combining elements in different ways. Both the brother of Mrs. 
Roberts and her child, for example, are regularly misidentified or misplaced. Secondly, 
the placement of the scene within a sleeping car divides the domestic space into 
compartments of semi-autonomous domestic spaces. Although the scene of the railway 
car attempts to replicate the domestic space of the home for the convenience of the 
travelers, it also multiplies and juxtaposes many domestic spaces for each of the travelers, 
whose lines of demarcation become unclear. Thirdly, the car as a whole, the domestic 
scene and its juxtaposed, alternate domestic spaces, are all in motion themselves. This 
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domestic play is also, in a sense, a travel narrative. These three chronotopes are not 
isolated elements, but fused together as a result of the material basis of the train system 
itself. The rates of interference between one and another are determined by the schedule 
of the train as passengers change places and exit or enter the car. Characters anticipate an 
arrival in Boston, porters enter and exit to ensure the proper running of the train, and 
characters, notably Mr. Roberts enters the train halfway through the play, multiplying the 
number of misidentifications along already established lines. The mixing of these distinct 
chronotopes creates a new dynamic of technologically defined political space that 
produces “mythical thought,” the juxtaposition and interaction of heterogeneous forms of 
signification. 
The chronotope of the domestic sphere requires a division between culturally 
defined spaces. As a fairly standard play in many respects, “The Sleeping-Car” has the 
traditional unity of time and place required of actual people acting out a script on a stage. 
The main characters and their difficulties navigating the train form this initial, domestic 
aspect of the play’s chimeric chronotope. Much of the play’s plot is, in fact, an effort to 
maintain the demarcations between the private conversations between Mrs. Roberts and 
her aunt from the public space of the other passengers, hidden from both the audience and 
the characters in the private spaces of their sleeping births on the stage. Mrs. Roberts is 
attempting to return to Boston from Albany before her brother, Willis, because she 
worries about his introduction to her husband, whom the brother has not met. Rather than 
the railroad as a technology to bring together disparate populations into a single, 
American people, Mrs. Roberts’s concern is that her brother’s time in California will 
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render him unrecognizable, using words such as “‘reckon’ and ‘ornery’ and ‘which the 
same’ just like one of Bret Harte’s characters” (The Sleeping-Car 243). The integration of 
the family into a coherent political unit, then, has been disrupted by the train, as Freud 
feared it had. Not only has Mrs. Robert’s bother’s physical appearance changed in the 
intervening years, the social signifiers have changed as well in their “articulacy.” 
An initial division of cultural practices, particular linguistic idioms in this case, is 
a precondition for integration into a social unit. The play’s anxiety about the loss of any 
family unit as an active connection between humans must be repeatedly staged as less 
threatening misidentifications to constantly reaffirm the importance and immediate 
presence of family ties as a significant determinant of social relations. The play ends, 
however, with a joke on the popular literary convention of the lost family member 
returning to solve plot problems. As Amy Kaplan has argued, Howells’s writing on the 
status of art can be seen as an attempt to normalize literature for the bourgeoisie as a 
productive practice. It, in a sense, may train individuals who are sensitive to its messages 
in new ways of seeing the world and a more liberal, democratic understanding of a social 
totality. At first glance, the end of “The Sleeping-car” functions in precisely this way. 
Throughout the play, the main characters are repeatedly thrown together with someone 
who, until the very end of the play, is simply referred to as The Californian. At one point, 
Mrs. Roberts had even suspected that he might be Willis. Of course, The Westerner is not 
Willis and has no connection to the main characters beyond having been accidentally put 
in the same sleeping car as them. This man is simply another passenger who, seemingly 
through random chance, is put in the path of the plot of the play. He is precisely the 
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caricature of a Westerner that Mrs. Roberts’s Aunt Mary fears Willis has become. Yet, at 
the end of the play, the main characters “adopt” him for the help he has provided them 
when he offered to fight the other passengers on the car who were annoyed by the plot 
and volume of the play and voiced their concerns as a disembodied chorus hidden behind 
curtains in their compartments (“The Sleeping-Car” 253). He has been so helpful, in fact, 
that the family invites him to share in a family dinner when they reach their destination.  
The comedic impact of the “adoption” of the Californian in the play’s final 
moments comes from the chorus of voices from the berths of the sleeping car. When 
Aunt Mary attempts to question the Californian about his family and his connections, 
hoping to find some kind of blood tie to complete the trope, the chorus responds by 
enumerating all the possible connections between the Roberts family and the Californian. 
He is alternately a lost “son,” “baby boy,” “wife,” “brother,” “early friend,” etc. (The 
Sleeping-Car 253). This joke plays two functions. It mocks the conventions of the 
melodramatic plot and provides an alternative at the same time. By expanding the 
definition of “familial” to include the Californian, the play attempts to reconcile the 
traditional divisions of familial life and behavior to include the possibilities created by 
railway travel. At the same time, it also does away with those distinctions. If everyone 
can potentially be a part of the same family in the new, democratic space of the railway, 
the use of the distinction has been effectively disposed of. In attempting to choose 
between democratic space and familial connection within the space of the train, one loses 
both. 
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And – The Children’s Graves? 
The train does not create, it juxtaposes. And yet, these juxtapositions create new 
formations of previous social codes. The conceptual divisions between life and death as 
well as between family and strangers are loosened on the train, if only slightly, only to be 
quickly dismissed under the pretext of having dreamt them or adopted them. What is at 
stake, however, in these dismissals that hide the new form of instability of their binaries 
is what Lacan called “the lethal factor [le facteur létal4],” the impossible choice in which 
the selection of one option precipitates the loss of both (Quatre concepts 237). The scene 
of the train creates the demand for answers to certain questions. Given the presence of a 
foreign object, and the necessity of deciding both what it is and what it means, no partial 
answers are acceptable. Once Aunt Mary has made her cry for help, she is required to 
account for herself to the authorities, in this case the porter who has come to aid her. It is 
precisely in the fluid ideological space of the train that material objects are revealed as 
essential ideological in that they require explanation to the authorities. Previous divisions 
that were assumed to be natural have, within the conjunctive influence of the train, 
become less certain. New conjunctions of social codes create new problems for bourgeois 
society. 
 By the 1880s, as the total train system started to shift from an emergent to a 
dominant role in American politics, Howells’s initial optimism about America’s destiny 
                                                 
4 This is a pun by Lacan. “Facteur” in this context means both something close to the English “factor” but 
in French also means “mailman.” Like his joke on unité, the “lethal factor” is both an element of the whole 
but also is indirectly determinative of the whole. In this case, the question of whether or not hair is alive or 
dead is on the one hand absurd and seemingly insignificant relative to the more important issues at hand. 
Yet, with an odd regularity, the impossibility of that choice inflects the other elements of the scene, 
distributing the terms by which difference is established. 
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began to change after the combination of the Haymarket Affair of 1886 and the death of 
his daughter, Winny, around the same time. Howells became one of the most outspoken 
critics of the United States government amongst the writers of his generation. The 
Haymarket Affair was a violent episode in the continuing struggle between Labor and 
Capital throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century. During a rally in Chicago, 
held mainly by a loose association of anarchist groups in support of the efforts of labor to 
establish an 8-hour work day, the police arrived to break up the peaceful demonstration. 
After a still-unidentified person in the crowd threw a homemade explosive at the 
advancing line of police, killing and injuring several officers, the authorities opened fire 
indiscriminately into the crowd of anarchists and passers-by. As a result of the violence, 
eight prominent anarchists, none of whom seemed to have anything explicitly to do with 
the bomb other than being anarchists, were arrested, tried, and four of the eight were 
executed by the state. Although Howells was anything but an anarchist, his previously 
optimistic view of the nation changed as a result of the trial. As he put it, the Chicago 
Anarchists were “condemned to death upon a principle that would have sent every ardent 
antislavery man to the gallows,” and he hoped through his outspoken opposition to the 
execution to “save the American people from allowing an injustice to be done in their 
name” (qtd. in Kirk 489). Of course, Howells’s opposition did nothing for the verdict, 
leading him to question the political basis for a state that would lead humans to be 
“doomed” not because of anything they had done, but for “their opinions’ sake” (qtd. in 
Kirk 491). Thought itself had become a potentially capital offense. 
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In the later years of his career, Howells wrote a very strange essay for Harper’s 
Monthly (and, incidentally, an essay typically left out of collections of Howells’s work 
since the 1950s), now referred to as “The Physiognomy of ‘the Poor,’” which dealt with 
judgments of art in this new political environment. In that essay he could not help but 
include explicitly political statements that mirror the personal shift he had undergone in 
the 1880s. This essay registers on the theoretical level the issues he had been attempting 
to represent in perhaps his two most famous novels, A Hazard of New Fortunes and The 
Rise of Silas Lapham. The subject under question, provided by a reader of the magazine 
in a letter to the editor, was the depiction of the poor in literature. More precisely, the 
reader called for “more” and “better” criticism of literature that precisely defines the 
method by which the “human documentation” of literature may be identified as sufficient 
to its aim (“The Physiognomy of ‘The Poor’” 342). Howells recasts the question by 
claiming that the “physiognomy of the poor varies from land to land and from age to age. 
It expresses patience, and despair, or oblivion everywhere, but in our country there is 
conjecturable also a certain surprise, the bewilderment of people who have been taught to 
expect better things of life, and who have fallen to the ground through the breaking of a 
promise” (“Physiognomy” 343). Such a statement from Howells effectively describes the 
shift in his attitude toward realism and politics after the execution of the Haymarket 
anarchists which understood the poor “falling to the ground” differently. The “breaking 
of a promise” he describes demonstrates the degree to which the “progress” that seemed 
guaranteed by techno-scientific capitalism had begun to reveal its own contradictions and 
pass away as a lived reality although it might remain in the rhetoric used to justify it. This 
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passing away, in turn, has a concomitant effect on aesthetics as Howells had imagined it 
previously. “The poor” in this formulation are the statistical average that the bourgeois 
consciousness understands them to be as a class, as an aggregated economic category of 
human. Howells cannot break away from this model but also registers its inadequacy as a 
category describing “the real.” 
 Howells responds to the question of representing “the poor” in terms that would 
surprise the critics that labeled him America’s resident optimist. He replied that it “was 
the glad delusion of the Easy Chair[, Howells’s regular column in Harper’s Monthly at 
the time,] . . . that the reader could be persuaded to ask nothing better of the writer than 
the truth about the facts. But this was a radiant error; the reader, in his immense majority, 
asks nothing worse of the writer” (“Physiognomy of the Poor” 344). Howells continues 
that it  
is conjecturable that democracy as we have realized it, and as that mistaken 
American author[, Howells himself,] has studied and painted it, has a 
repulsiveness which the ideal does not wear. It looks ordinary, commonplace, 
uninteresting, as one's face and figure are apt to look in the glass when not made 
up for the ordeal. This, however, one may very well feel, is not the fault of one's 
self, but of the glass, and then one does well to smash it, or if not quite that, to 
impeach its veracity. (“Physiognomy of the Poor” 344) 
In this formulation of despair in the face of an “ideal” which has not only passed away 
but left a trace of its former promise as an “ordeal” that must be dealt with, Howells 
expresses the position of the United States from within the new techo-political space. 
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Simple reflection, such as that of a mirror, the standard metaphor for representation since 
Narcissus, is no longer felt as adequate to the task of representation and, in fact, only 
enacts its own anguished incapacity. Representation, in this particular social formation, 
can no longer be understood as mimetic in the traditional sense of the word, the “radiant 
error” upon which his “realism” had been based. And yet, Howells is unable to think 
beyond the idealism of mimesis towards a truly dynamic sense of the social whole that he 
elsewhere made rhetorical gestures towards. Politically, this leads to the simple smashing 
of the glass, the destruction of the social order, the “lethal factor,” that had been 
engendered by the total train system. 
 Whereas in “The Sleeping-car” Howells exploited the formal elements of the train 
system and took it as its explicit content, the implications of the railway for his concept 
of space are also legible in moments that have a less explicit connection to that system. In 
Howells’s work the total train system is in its first stages of becoming structural for the 
dominant American ideology.  As a “total train system,” the kind of mythic thought it 
engenders and the “lethal factor” that it made available became imbricated in ideas of 
American political space more generally. Two of Howells’s most famous novels, The 
Rise of Silas Lapham and A Hazard of New Fortunes, share a similar moment that occurs 
to two almost identical characters in which a “lethal factor” occurs in the same way as 
Aunt Mary’s troubles on the train, which is to say with a significant hesitation about the 
nature of technologically motivated “progress.” These moments, however, are decisions 
brought about by the total train system as a whole, the new concept of political space as 
warped through the train system, rather than the train as a figure at the level of content. 
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Silas Lapham and Jacob Dryfoos both make their fortunes not in finance but in 
manufacturing and the mining of raw materials. Lapham and to larger degree Dryfoos 
benefit from the opening up of the West by the railroads as a space for economic 
exploitation. The ressentiment both feel towards the East, whose cultural existence both 
the millionaires see themselves as financially supporting through their business, is created 
by the economic complementarity but social inequality of the two economic parts of the 
nation.  
 Both these novels are at least in part stories of successful businessmen. Silas 
Lapham from The Rise of Silas Lapham (published in 1885, the year before Haymarket) 
and Dryfoos from A Hazard of New Fortunes (published in 1890, three years after the 
execution of the anarchists) are almost identical characters in terms of their social type. 
Both could just as easily be characters in a Horatio Alger novel, having come from poor, 
rural backgrounds and created fortunes for themselves through hard work. Both, 
similarly, attempt to integrate into the high society of Eastern cities, Boston and New 
York respectively, only to find the social codes too strict to allow for their Western 
mannerisms. At the same time, the two characters share a peculiar detail that Howells 
added to their narratives: both have moments of hesitation about the position of 
graveyards within their personal histories. For both characters, their family graveyards 
become symbolic residue of the past that has been ushered away by the railroad. 
Although the characters are almost identical, they have the opposite reaction to their 
family plots. The graveyard, in effect, becomes in Howells’s literature the symbolic 
obverse of the railway. The graves register the railway’s symbolic power and precipitate 
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a crisis for each character in which the lethal question posed by the new political space of 
the United States must be answered. 
The Rise of Silas Lapham, perhaps Howells’s most famous novel, begins with a 
conversation between the journalist Bartley Hubbard and the titular Silas Lapham, at the 
height of his financial success as a producer and seller of paint. Their conversation 
revolves around an attempt to construct an intelligible narrative of Lapham’s life up to 
that point for a “Solid Men of Boston” series in a newspaper (The Rise of Silas Lapham 
3). As such, there are two questions at stake: placing events of Lapham’s life into a 
sequence and giving that sequence a causal relation. The rest of the novel deals with the 
unraveling of Lapham’s life and requires a careful evaluation of the initial terms set forth 
to come to any conclusion about the meaning of the novel as a whole. When first 
introducing the subject of Lapham’s life, Lapham asks a seemingly naïve question: “you 
want my life, death, and Christian sufferings do you, young man,” to which Hubbard 
responds that that is precisely what he wants (interestingly misunderstanding Lapham’s 
statement), “your money or your life” (Lapham 3). Lapham ponderously responds that 
Hubbard “wouldn’t want [Lapham’s] life without the money” (Lapham 3). This joke 
anticipates Jacques Lacan’s use of it as a demonstration of alienation as an essential mode 
by which subjects are formed. The question’s significance, besides breaking the ice, of 
course, is to present an impossible choice at the outset of the conversation. If one chooses 
life, one chooses to live without the money, a “reduced life [une vie écornée5]” (Quatre 
                                                 
5 This is a play on words, in typical Lacanian fashion. “Écornée” has the meaning of “reduced,” 
“diminished,” or “damaged” in a metaphorical sense but also signifies the folding or damaging of the 
corner of a page in a book. The “loss,” then, is more than simply lacking but actively marked as lacking. 
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concepts 237). To choose the money would lead to the loss of both the life and the 
money. The only reasonable response to the question is the one given by Jack Benny 
when he was posed the same question: “I’m thinking it over” (Jack Benny Program). In 
response to the lethal factor, the only possible action is a hesitation. The conversation that 
follows this joke has another significant hesitation that repeats the form of the impossible 
choice but explicitly within the context of the changing political space of America in the 
age of the railway. 
Ironically, Lapham had not made his fortune by going West, despite being cast in 
the mold of the Westerner. Instead, unlike the rest of his family who had moved West 
when their Vermont family had effectively broken up, Lapham “hung on to the old farm,” 
“not because the paint-mine was on it, but because the old house was – and the graves” 
(Lapham 7). Although Lapham attempts to protect the tradition that had created him, his 
family has been fractured by the shifting economic conditions caused by the telescoping 
space provided by the railway. He at one point had attempted to gather the disparate 
elements of the family but could only successfully do so once, the only memento of 
which is a photograph that he keeps in his office. This photograph showed faces that were 
“a mere blur” because “some of the younger children had twitched themselves into 
wavering shadows, and might have passed for spirit-photographs of their own little 
ghosts,” the kind of “standard family-group photograph, in which most Americans have 
figured at some point or other” (Lapham 8-9). Like Aunt Mary with her hair, the question 
the photograph poses within the context of the social significance of Lapham’s life is the 
                                                                                                                                                 
The material conditions of writing and its transmission are also imbricated in the system of signifiers that 
alienate a subject within the symbolic. 
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question of life and death, in both its social and biological meanings. The railway 
dissociates social life (the family, in this case) only to reassemble it along its own lines. 
Like the Marches and their complex relationship to the railway, the family photograph 
can only imperfectly reconcile two competing epistemological modes; the family 
members are a “blur” that is at the same time a “standard.” Whereas the railroad was the 
mechanical means for guaranteeing faster and more certain exchanges, the camera 
provides the sepulchral means of doing the opposite, apparently capturing a single instant 
and guarding it. And yet, the difference between the two is presented as an impossible 
choice. Life, here, is figured and being not entirely dead. The children are already their 
own ghosts from within the anamnesis of Lapham’s “solid” life. The difficulty Lapham 
has in giving a causal significance to his life is, like the structure engendered by the 
railroad system, overdetermined. He cannot give a casual structure to it because it is a 
losing choice between two semantic systems, one of progress and the other of 
conservation. The two traditions of the railroad in its weaker and stronger senses cannot 
be fully assimilated without the loss of meaning at both ends of the dialectic. 
Jacob Dryfoos in A Hazard of New Fortunes faces a similar problem to Lapham 
but in an inverted way. Throughout the novel, Dryfoos is figured as a typical robber-
baron of the Carnegie-type, having been instrumental in the breaking up and suppression 
of unionizing efforts both of his own workers and attempts by labor to advocate for its 
interests in general. Toward the end of that novel, however, he and his wife have a 
conversation that seemingly has nothing to do with the plot which but which complicates 
him as a villainous figure in the novel. After having returned to New York from a tour of 
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his holding in the West which included a visit the old family farm, Mrs. Dryfoos enquires 
if he was “out at the old place” (Hazard 204). Dryfoos responds that he had been and 
approvingly notes that his men are “sinking the wells down in the woods pasture” 
(Hazard 204). Yet, the change in the landscape brought about by industrial cultivation of 
land and the manufacturing that requires it brings unintended but necessary secondary 
effects. His wife then asks “and – the children’s graves,” to which Dryfoos responds that 
they “haven’t touched that part. But I reckon we got to have ‘em moved to the cemetery” 
(Hazard 204). This, for Dryfoos, is not a significant event as it “ain’t the fashion anymore 
to have family buryin’ grounds; they’re collectin’ ‘em into the cemeteries all round” 
(Hazard 205). And yet his wife maintains that it still seems “too hard that they can’t be 
let to rest in peace, pore little things” and that she “wanted you and me to lay there too, 
when our time come, Jacob” (Hazard 204). The “fashion” of burying the family follows 
the expansion of capitalism in the age of the steam engine. Rather than the patrilineal 
history being marked and conserved as evidence of progress, the graves of families are 
consolidated, to make way for an expanding agricultural base for the circulation of capital 
in the United States. Before and after Haymarket, then, the choice for the consecration of 
family is a simple inversion between fixing blurred children and moving eternally fixed 
children. Whereas Lapham attempts to be a bulwark against the exchange of spaces as a 
romantic “point of retreat” for tradition, Dryfoos embraces it as simply the inevitable, 
progressive change of social practices. The expansion of the railroad that nominally 
underwrote the political space of the United States has also undermined its historical 
contiguity. History itself has become another commodity. In attempting to have it both 
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ways, to ensure the contiguity of history as a patrilineal continuity in time, Dryfoos and 
Lapham have lost both, with only ghosts or eternally exchangeable graves remaining. 
Howells’s depiction of the railway, even in these two novels which are commonly 
considered by critics to be the height of his realist techniques, already bear the traces of 
the political change he underwent throughout his career. There is, however, another 
dimension to the “lethal factor” that Howells struggled to represent through the railway 
system, that of the racial division being systematically redefined and newly enforced in 
the United States after Reconstruction. In a review of Charles W. Chesnutt’s novel The 
Marrow of Tradition, Howells strikes a similar tone to that of “The Physiognomy of the 
Poor,” and indicates another form of the “lethal factor,” a racialized one, that would play 
an essential role in the historical movement of the nation in the final years of the 
nineteenth century. Of Chesnutt’s novel, which follows the story of a race riot, Howells 
claimed that Chesnutt, as an author of fiction, was also “fighting a battle” against racism 
in America, “and it is not for him to pick up the cheap graces and poses of the jouster” 
(“A Psychological Counter-Current in Recent Fiction” 882). Although Howells had 
“nothing but admiration” for Chesnutt, at the same time, he found that within “the 
republic of letters where all men are free and equal” the book is “in fact, bitter, bitter” 
(“Counter-current” 882). Although most critics only quote that summary judgment, 
Howells continues that “there is no reason in history why it should not be so . . . One 
cannot blame him for that; what would one be one’s self? If the tables could once be 
turned, and it could be the black race which violently and lastingly triumphed . . . what 
would we not excuse to the white man who made the atrocity the argument of his 
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fiction?” (“Counter-current” 882). Howells here recognizes his own limitations, his own 
subjective position from within the dominant bourgeois consciousness, which, at this 
time, is always also racialized. The task of more fully articulating the critique of the new, 
technological progressivism that Howells only began would fall to Charles W. Chesnutt. 
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Chapter 2: 
As If By Magic: Charles W. Chesnutt and the Parallax View 
Reality, n. The dream of a mad philosopher. That which would remain in the cupel if one 
should assay a phantom. The nucleus of a vacuum. 
 -Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1911) 
 
And if the writer has any preconceived opinions that would affect his judgment, they are 
at least not the hackneyed prejudices of the past – if they lead to false conclusions, they at 
least furnish a new point of view, from which, taken together with other widely differing 
views, the judicious reader may establish a parallax that will enable him to approximate 
the truth. 
 -Charles W. Chesnutt, “The Future American: What Race Is Likely to Become in 
the Process of Time” (1900) 
 
Les deux principaux mouvements sont le mouvement rotatif et le mouvement sexuel, dont 
la combinaison s’exprime par une locomotive composée de roues et de pistons. Ces deux 
mouvements se transforment l’un en l’autre réciproquement . . . C’est par l’usage de 
cette combinaison de valeur magique que la situation actuelle de l’homme est déterminée 
au milieu des éléments. 
 -Georges Bataille, “L’Anus Solaire” (1927) 
 
“In These Reactionary Days” 
  In 1940, W.E.B. DuBois chose to look back on the final years of the nineteenth 
century. From that vantage point, he remembered the close of the last century as “a day of 
Progress with a capital P,” adding that “invention and technique were a perpetual marvel 
and their accomplishment infinite in possibility” (Dusk of Dawn 26). In this retrospective 
assessment, DuBois summarizes not necessarily the reality but rather the feeling of 
Progress as many writers in the last years of the nineteenth century experienced it. 
DuBois continues that this experience of technologically driven Progress “was as though 
moving on a rushing express, my main thought was as to the relations I had to other 
passengers on the express, and not to its rate of speed and its destination” (Dusk 27-8). In 
the economically and politically turbulent atmosphere of the late nineteenth century, the 
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“fight on the moving car had to do with my relations to the car and its folk, but on the 
whole, nothing to do with the car’s own movement” (Dusk 28). By way of this metaphor, 
DuBois articulates several broad ideological tendencies of the period through the image 
of the express train. The confidence in technique and invention and their implications for 
the future of American society was such that historical progress could be compared to the 
ineluctable workings of a complex machine. The parts and relations of this machine had 
already been established and its steady operation was assured by a complex of 
prearranged maintenance procedures. Historical change in the American mind was no 
longer a “course of human events,” as Thomas Jefferson put it. Rather, it was seen by 
those within it as an automatic process already established and to a large degree outside 
of human control. Like a car moving along a railway track, it could be predicted and 
maintained but its course and speed were outside of the control of its passengers. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, DuBois had moved beyond thinking of 
history as strictly subject to individual will and toward an understanding of history as also 
guided by abstract forces. In other words, DuBois’s metaphor leads us toward what we 
would now call a structural critique of social relations. In order to assess social relations, 
one must not only pay attention to the historical accidents of who happens to be thrown 
together within a particular space at a particular time. Additionally, one must pay 
attention to the terms by which that “thrown-togetherness” occurs at all, or what 
conditions the possible set of relations. And yet, DuBois’s metaphor reveals other 
potentially problematic assumptions made possible by this kind of critique. With his 
training in the social sciences and work towards the development of an empirical science 
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of history, DuBois was perhaps too eager to accept the automism of technological 
relationships as an unproblematic, analogous model for social change. Within this 
automism there occasionally lies not a strict materialism but an idealism expressed in the 
vocabulary of materialism in DuBois’s thought. In accepting a linear model of history in 
which cause and effect are guaranteed along the lines of the connections between parts of 
a machine, DuBois also accepts that there can be a truth to history in a roughly similar 
sense to the truth of the laws of mechanical motion. 
 Another, perhaps less well known, contemporary of DuBois, however, saw the 
analogy between society and a machine as problematic and points us in another direction. 
For the novelist Charles W. Chesnutt, who was considered to be the first major African-
American novelist even in his own lifetime, the social sciences and their ambitions 
toward empiricism were a much more suspect set of tools for the analysis of something 
like American racism as it existed at the turn of the century. As Chesnutt put it in 1899 in 
a speech in the Nietzschean mode on the issue of race in America, the American people 
had listened for too long to preachers who have “neglected the world unduly” in favor of 
an ideal elsewhere (Essays and Speeches 112). Chesnutt hoped for a new future in which 
“men finally waked up to the importance of the life here, and now we have steam and 
electricity and improved sanitation, and professions of human equality,” we would 
hopefully be able to “work around to the fact of” that equality “in due course of time” 
(Essays 112). Here, technological systems, rather than guaranteeing the “fact” of social 
relations, are the means by which claims about equality are rhetorically justified as self-
evident. By 1899, Chesnutt considered himself to live in “reactionary days” (Essays 101). 
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State-sanctioned slavery had been forgotten in its reality and was starting to be 
romanticized as the “ideal relation of capital and labor” by writers primarily (though not 
exclusively) in the South (Essays 101). Even as it was occurring, the progress ushered in 
by technological development, while certainly contributing to the improvement of basic 
needs for significant portions of the American people, did not automatically lead to the 
progressive passing away of social inequality or the assumptions that led to that 
inequality. After the war, the victory of Northern economic models and their technologies 
of circulation as necessary preconditions for liberal ideology became a self-evident truth, 
hiding ways in which they became complicit with white supremacist ideology. The 
rhetoric of progress through the trope of technology, when taken as self-evidently 
beneficial to all, served only to silence any critics of American society and its economic 
base. 
This chapter will not argue that there is a necessary, causal relationship between 
American racism and technology as such. Rather, I will be arguing that the railroad and 
its technological systems of control became important tropes for discussing how social 
regulation operated in post-Reconstruction American society. In particular, I will be 
focusing on Charles Chesnutt’s use of the railroad as a trope to demonstrate how two 
regimes of control, technology and racial difference, mutually reinforced one another 
and, in their pairing, helped perpetuate a white supremacist concept of linear history. At 
times, Chesnutt uses these two systems as DuBois does, as an analogy in its most 
innocuous sense. Chesnutt, a black author writing literature with an explicitly “ethical 
purpose,” described his own work in his early years as an attempt to enlighten a primarily 
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white American audience about the severity of racial prejudice and its violent 
consequences in their own country (“To Be an Author” 171). Part of his attempt to do 
this involved a simple, analogical use of the technological trope. He to some degree 
attempted to explain a phenomenon that his white readers were ignorant of, racial 
prejudice from the perspective of the oppressed, in terms of something they felt confident 
they understood, technological systems. At other times, however, the trope of the railroad 
plays a more complex role in Chesnutt’s literature and thought. Rather than simply 
attempting to explain one system of regulation in terms of another, he implies that 
technological systems inform the modes of social regulation available to Americans. 
More than just an explanatory scheme, the assumed qualities of technological systems 
become a part of racial thinking through their metaphoric quasi-equivalence. As 
transportation technologies changed from novelties that were understood as expressions 
of the abundant American energy and industriousness to systems that were assumed to be 
an integral part of society, guaranteeing economic and social progress, technology to a 
greater degree became a model for ideal systems of regulation. This ideal of necessary 
and assured progress, for Chesnutt, rather than liberating individuals, shaped how 
injurious prejudicial traditions were perpetuated from generation to generation. 
As an essayist, novelist, school teacher, stenographer, public speaker, and trained 
lawyer, Charles W. Chesnutt faced a peculiar set of contending forces when he began his 
literary career. As a part of the first generation of black Americans who “never saw a 
slave,” as he put it, the very nature of what constituted political life was in question 
(Essays 25). As the old political order built on state-sanctioned slavery reorganized itself, 
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there was a great debate about what the country and its people were to become as a result 
of the military defeat of the South and the at least nominal inclusion of former slaves as 
full citizens in the nation’s political institutions. Chesnutt thought of himself as belonging 
to a people “without a past” whose only political option for survival in America would be 
to build a new future (Essays 58). This new future, however, would have to contend with 
a rapidly changing political landscape after the Civil War that saw massive 
reconfigurations of both the population and concentrations of capital in the nation. 
Despite the state’s efforts through the Freedman’s Bureau as well as those of private 
interests to rebuild the South, the political and social reform that some antebellum 
abolitionists had hoped for did not come to pass. The lack of social reform, however, did 
not prevent the United States government from solidifying its control over the North 
American landmass through the rapid expansion of railroads, telegraph wires, and other 
technologies for the circulation of consumer goods and information. It was also a time 
that saw what Alan Trachtenberg called the “merger movement” of corporations that 
owned these technological systems (Trachtenberg 4). The growth of private corporations 
through their consolidation in the United States accomplished a “major realignment of 
economic power,” consolidating the ownership of wealth in the nation into fewer and 
fewer hands (Trachtenberg 4). By 1904, “about three hundred industrial corporations had 
won control over more than two fifths of all manufacturing in the country” and by 1929 
“the two hundred largest corporations held 48 percent of all corporate assets . . . and 58 
percent of capital assets” (Trachtenberg 4). As DuBois pointed out, and Chesnutt 
witnessed, however, this expansion and consolidation of economic and therefore political 
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power was, more often than not, built on the “struggles of the massed millions” in the 
final analysis (The Souls of Black Folk 3). In a society dominated by a growing economic 
and political inequality that was in many ways hostile to his political life, Chesnutt was 
forced to imagine what a new politics might be, not only as it was coalescing around him, 
but as it might be in the future. As he put it in his novel The Marrow of Tradition, the 
new age was that of “the crowd” created by new, technologically driven systems of 
regulation (The Marrow of Tradition 81). Old concepts of self-sufficient individualism 
were no longer applicable to a political world dominated by masses of people whose 
actions were governed by technologically dominated political spaces. 
The three primary terms I will use to describe the society Chesnutt attempted to 
portray in his fiction are “prejudice,” “technology,” and “the parallax.” The first two of 
these terms are, of course, entirely too broad to be practically useful in any analytical 
sense. Here, however, I will be using them in more specific senses than they usually 
encompass. Both terms describe ways in which specific human practices are justified by 
way of abstract principles of force. In the case of “prejudice,” the concept that Chesnutt 
most often takes as the primary political target of his work, particular prejudicial 
practices are conceived of as the expression of the abstract force of tradition. Tradition is 
often metaphorically described as a kind of weight of previous generations on the current 
one or a compulsory behavior established by previous generations that may be resisted 
but can never be denied by the current. As Chesnutt put it, it consists of the “habits” of 
“doing injurious things because others do them” that are passed from generation to 
generation (Essays 223). “Prejudice,” therefore, is a tradition that regulates the behavior 
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of individuals to one another through the abstractions of social valuations that have 
already been assigned. What is “always at stake” when considering the transmission of 
these kinds of valuations from generation to generation through language is “the 
agreement between the subject and the verb,” as Jacques Lacan put it (Écrits 371). From 
the point of view of the prejudicial individual, his or her actions are always done in the 
name of someone else, splitting the acting subject historically, and confusing the 
agreement between subject and verb in actions in the present. From within the tortured 
logic of prejudice, present prejudicial actions are often done in the name of preserving a 
continuity with an imagined past in order to bring about a future that is both the repetition 
and realization of the past. The present, therefore, is always a moment of crisis in 
historical continuity from the prejudicial point of view. Economies of valuation are 
regulated in the abstract from the prejudicial point of view by an often racialized concept 
of a society whose force of tradition defines the individual. The prejudicial individual 
imagines himself or herself simply as the vessel for a regulatory, trans-historical principle 
of imagined continuity that is anthropomorphized into a pure “people.” The continuity of 
this people (both a singular and a plural from within the tortured logic) must be 
maintained for the principles of historical development to remain the trans-historical 
principle they are assumed to be. 
“Technology,” similarly, stores and regulates abstract energy for human ends. It is 
the mechanical means by which humans control the mode and rate of the expression of 
potential energy. As Robert E. Baynes put it in a textbook on thermodynamics in 1867, 
energy is “the power of doing work” (Baynes 3). Even this most basic definition of 
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energy betrays the first steps of an anthropomorphism. Technology, as an apparatus 
designed to automate and standardize certain processes of human work, regulates the 
potential energy of material objects for human ends. As Martin Heidegger put it, modern 
science “pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces” with its 
technologies (Hediegger 21). Technology creates nothing but transforms inchoate energy 
into human work along prearranged lines. By the turn of the century, the two versions of 
force, the mechanical and social, were confounded in many people’s minds as having 
similar characteristics that control the development of the observable world. For 
Chesnutt, “prejudice,” and “technology” both participate in a concept of historical 
movement, each becoming a mutually reinforcing model for how social and literal energy 
may be regulated through human (which is to say “political”) means. 
My third term, “parallax,” Chesnutt suggestively if briefly develops himself in his 
essay “The Future American.” The “parallax” is a constitutive conceptual gap. It does not 
lead from two self-evident truths to a third, necessary conclusion as with syllogistic 
thinking. Rather, it takes positive statements themselves to be essentially ironic and 
develops lines of thought that can function as asymptotically true. Whereas technology 
and tradition, from an ideological point of view, invoke a rhetoric of continuity in history 
to legitimize themselves, the “parallax” assumes history to be essentially discontinuous. 
Continuity, from the parallax view, is the illusory effect of taking a vantage point on 
history rather than inherent to it as a concept. Linear history requires, for Chesnutt, the 
act of taking a stand, or putting in stasis (from στάσις, “standing” or “setting”), certain 
questions about historical causality in order to make a claim with the certainty of a 
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syllogism. The parallax does not refute syllogistic thinking but is, in fact, a precondition 
for it; it is a hesitation before the positing of the major and minor premises. Whereas both 
“prejudice” and “technology” attempt to guarantee a single historical line of progress for 
the dominant American ideology, a parallax view on that history will begin from the 
ambiguities that necessarily arise from the assumption of certainty and lead to a 
perspectival understanding of history conceived of as essentially contested. “The 
parallax,” as it is understood in terms of binocular human vision, is the illusion of depth 
created by the disparity between the positions of the eyes that became socially 
regimented through the historical naturalization of the Cartesian coordinate system. With 
that coordinate system, an essential gap, whose differential creates the illusion of three 
dimensionality, becomes empirically true rather than subjectively convenient to the 
degree that it can be mapped through an arbitrary system of differences. Chesnutt argues 
the value not of ignoring that relationality is ultimately based on an illusion, but that the 
illusion itself is the value and must be treated on its own terms.  
More recently, the term “parallax” has been developed by Slavoj Žižek and Kōjin 
Karatani. As Karatani put it, the parallax is not an equivocation between thesis and 
antithesis but an emergence of a position “in the form of antinomy, which exposes the 
fact that both thesis and antithesis are nothing more than ‘optical delusions’” (Karatani 
3). As such, unified subjective positions are always plural in that they rely on the 
“perspective of the other” within their own logic (Karatani 2). Race itself functions as a 
parallax, for instance, in DuBois’s formulation of the “Negro . . . born with a veil, and 
gifted with second-sight in this American world” (The Souls of Black Folk 8). Reliance 
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on the metaphor of sight in this case is more than a simple, arbitrary analogy. It reveals 
the subject to be essentially plural in that it is essentially partial and perspectival. 
Chesnutt was more circumspect than DuBois about the degree to which this color-line 
might allow anyone the transcendental possibility to “merge his double self into a better 
and truer self” (Souls 9). Rather, Chesnutt’s work often understands the visual to itself be 
constituted doubly. In effect, the color-line doubles a double in order to take a new 
position on the supposed initial clarity of the “American world.” While DuBois’s 
comments on racial division have been extremely productive for thinkers of what it is to 
be racialized within American society, Chesnutt may offer us a new position on DuBois’s 
formulation, one that sets that being within a dialectic, historical movement rather than 
DuBois’s tendency toward a static idealism. 
Technological systems such as the railroad have been essential in the historical 
establishment of particular parallax relationships as empirical certainties (rather than 
truths). The introduction of the Cartesian coordinate system and the painting techniques 
of Early Modern Europe, the “battle of geometers vying to make us forget the ‘high’ and 
the ‘low’” in favor of “a vanishing-point,” had regimented a particular set of arbitrary 
systems that guaranteed the certainty of human vision as Paul Virilio has argued (Open 
Sky 1) The introduction of the consumer train, however, had the opposite effect. As 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch has pointed out, the blurring effect in human vision produced by 
new speeds of travel revealed to the passengers that their vision was not a medium for the 
conveyance of external truths, but an apparatus that registers “a relationship of light” 
(Schivelbusch 49). The train did not directly cause a destabilization in the assumed 
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certainty of vision. It revealed it to have always been unstable, but unstable along specific 
lines that could be systematized through mathematical models. It is no accident that the 
railway plays such an integral role in the thinking of a writer such as Chesnutt. In the 
American context, the association of the perception of skin color had long been a 
justification for the creation and regimentation of social distinctions. The regimentation 
of sight and racial difference are therefore necessarily linked for Chesnutt. As the train 
reveals the fundamental instability of sight, its grounding of racial difference similarly 
became unstable. And yet, to point out the illusory quality of the regimentation of 
particular relations, as Chesnutt is quick to qualify, does not take any of its power away, 
but, in fact, can make its power even more certain. 
Over the span of Chesnutt’s career, the author saw the victories made for the 
political rights of black Americans in the last years of the Civil War and the early period 
of Reconstruction overturned by an intransigent Southern legal system at the state level 
and compromising political deals at the federal level. As popular historian Jerrold M. 
Packard put it, “the end of Reconstruction” in 1877 “represented a catastrophe of 
incalculable magnitude” for African-Americans (Packard 62). After an initial period of 
relative inclusion for former slaves in the political system, “whites began to map out a 
new master-servant relationship, one they hoped would look as much as possible like the 
old” (Packard 41). Initially, one form this effort took was the so-called “Black Codes” 
which “often required public transportation to segregate facilities for blacks or even to 
bar them entirely from trains, carriages, and omnibuses” (Packard 42). Spaces of 
consumer travel were particularly targeted by white legislators because only “on public 
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transportation did whites and blacks merge in perceived social equality, the state that so 
aroused white fears” (Packard 70). To limit the political control possible for newly freed 
slaves, Southern legislators understood the ability to move freely about the country as a 
threat to the established political order. It was not until late in the late nineteenth century, 
however, that the “Black Codes,” a collection of state-level legislation and unwritten 
social agreements, became federal law with the institution of Jim Crow. 
A decisive shift towards the establishment of truly systemic segregation came in 
1896 in the form of the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson which 
established as federal law that “states and their agencies were free to use racial 
categorization to segregate public places, as they had been doing and would continue to 
do” until it was overturned in 1954 with the Brown v. Board of Education ruling (Hoffer 
1). More than simply setting the legal precedent for segregation laws in the United States 
for decades to come, the Plessy v. Ferguson case clearly articulated an influential version 
of the problematic parallax of racial difference as it existed at the time. The case involved 
Homer Plessy, a black man “of mixed descent, in the proportion of one-eighth African 
blood,” who sat in the section of an inter-state passenger train designated for whites only 
by Louisiana state law (Plessy v. Ferguson 1). He was then “ejected” from the car “for no 
other reason than that the petitioner [Plessy] was of the colored race” (PvF 1). The case 
was eventually taken to the Supreme Court. The council for Plessy, including the 
novelist, lawyer, and friend of Chesnutt, Albion Tourgée, argued that the Louisiana 
segregation law violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in giving unequal 
treatment to blacks and whites. In the majority opinion, Justice Henry Billings Brown 
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dismissed Tourgée’s arguments, claiming that laws “permitting, even requiring, [the two 
races’] separation, in places where they are liable to be brought into contact, does not 
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other” (PvF 3). If any difference was 
perceived in the treatment of races, Justice Brown claimed, it is “not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it,” adding that if “the two races are to meet upon terms of social 
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s 
merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals” (PvF 6). Ironically, in introducing racial 
terminology into the legal record, the arguments made by Tourgée in fact assured that 
racial difference, that a uniquely “African blood” existed, could and would be considered 
by the court as an argumentatively viable category at the federal level.  
In an aside, however, Justice Brown revealed in even more detail the strange 
parallax thinking employed in this prejudicial ruling. He pointed out that the “power to 
assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine which race the 
passenger belongs,” which he recognized as difficult at best (PvF 5). He avoided the 
question, however, “since the only issue” he had to deal with was “as to the 
unconstitutionality” of the Louisiana law (PvF 5). In an oblique extension of this 
problem, Justice Brown continued that “in any mixed community, the reputation of 
belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is ‘property,’ in the same 
sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property” and can therefore be subject to 
suits for damages if a white man is deprived of his rights by being seated in a non-white 
carriage (PvF 5). At the same time, if a black citizen were to be assigned to the same 
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carriage, “he has been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the 
reputation of being a white man” (PvF 5). The “circular reasoning” of Brown’s argument, 
rather than simply a contradiction stemming from ignorance or carelessness, was a 
necessary ambiguity arising from racial thinking (Hoffer 128). In Justice Brown’s ruling, 
two parallax concepts are related, “property” and “race.” “Whiteness” becomes the 
presence of property while “blackness” denotes its absence. Effectively, according to 
Justice Brown, only the white race can claim the “inheritance” of presence in the 
American legal system. Class and race in the American legal system were explicitly 
articulated as two aspects of the same relationship to the signifier. Both race and property 
are simultaneously present in that they create real effects and are embedded in material 
relationships and yet are ontologically absent in that they have no material substance 
themselves, in any typical sense. They are both signifiers in Lacan’s use of the term I 
described in my previous chapter. Given the requirements of the Louisiana law, as Brown 
points out, any one conductor would be placed in the impossible position of deciding on 
the race of every passenger and also in the position of deciding property or non-property 
as a corollary. Sight, in this example provides the kairos for these parallax concepts in 
which neither the thesis nor the antithesis of the presence of race-property are correct. 
The determination of race requires “reputation,” or reputatio, being the subject of 
reflection for the Other. The power of the conductor’s ability to assign race rests on it 
being initially, essentially ambiguous. Which decision the conductor makes does not 
matter in general. It is only important that the decision be made in every case to 
repetitively maintain the presence and authority of property. 
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The right to establish and enforce an arbitrary (but not random) system of 
differences within the American context is not obviated by the illusory nature of the 
system but guaranteed by it. It is this form of political complexity that Chesnutt is 
particularly aware of and articulate about, although to a large extent this dimension of his 
thinking has been neglected by his critics. The literary criticism of Chesnutt’s work has 
mainly fallen into two categories, the normative and non-normative. The chronologically 
first, normative trend is the important political work done from the 1940s into the 80s of 
securing a place for Chesnutt and other black writers like him within the academic 
tradition at all. Many of these works focus on arguing for the inclusion of Chesnutt’s 
work as of sufficient literary quality to merit being discussed at all by academics. Often, 
these arguments adopt the aesthetic categories of the dominant tradition and attempt to 
demonstrate the degree to which Chesnutt himself is a “master” of certain literary 
techniques considered by academics to be aesthetically preferable. Typically, critics 
argue that his works are acceptable to an aesthetic dominated by Modernist values of the 
density and complexity of tropes and a sufficient skepticism of “politics” that is limited to 
explicit statements of allegiance to contemporary political organizations or the adoption 
of a political vocabulary associated with a specific issue of the moment. While drawing 
academic attention to black authors in general and Chesnutt in particular is an important 
political gesture, those critics tend to argue the degree to which the political and aesthetic 
values they assign to Chesnutt do or do not match their own. A major Chesnutt scholar, 
Joseph McElrath, for instance, rejects Chesnutt as a “realist” in the mode of William 
Dean Howells and Theodore Dreiser, for having too Modernist a technique, while critics 
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such as Dean McWilliams criticize Chesnutt for not being Modernist enough in his 
“overly didactic” moments (McWilliams 166). By and large this trend in criticism 
oscillates between taxonomizing Chesnutt into various literary traditions whose defining 
terms are vague enough to prove or disprove any thesis on the subject. 
The second strand of literary criticism attempts essentially the opposite of the 
first, to demonstrate the degree to which Chesnutt’s work is or is not radically subversive 
toward the dominant political order. These works often focus on various historical trends 
Chesnutt was subject to or literary techniques that Chesnutt’s develops from a 
specifically African-American tradition, and particularly the conjure story. They also tend 
to reproduce Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s point about the importance of “signifying” in the 
African-American tradition. In particular, they argue for the complex and systematic 
deployment in Chesnutt’s work of strategies of resistance to the dominant ideology that 
allow writers that identify as black, as Chesnutt did, to maintain their authentically black 
identities and offer critiques of the dominant, white supremacist ideologies they are 
engaged with while not exposing themselves to the possibility of violent retribution by 
their primarily white audiences. For example, Sally Ann Ferguson claims that Chensutt’s 
work is simply “race propaganda” for an explicitly assimilationist position, and not 
sufficiently subversive to be applauded (“Failed Future American” 82). Richard E. 
Baldwin, on the other hand, considers Chesnutt’s conjure stories to participate in a 
tradition of “subterfuge, indirection, and the manipulation of whites” as a “survival 
strategy” (Baldwin 387). While these arguments are all undoubtedly correct to a degree 
and identify important elements of Chesnutt’s work, they often resort to a simple flipping 
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of a binary one way or another. Whether or not any one political act is “subversive” or 
“assimilationist” varies depending on each critic’s more or less reasonable standard for 
appropriate political behavior toward some pragmatic political end. 
While these two main trends in the literary criticism of Chesnutt have been 
important in understanding Chesnutt’s work, both seem to avoid directly addressing 
Chesnutt’s complex attitude to more fundamental ideas about social progress and 
historical change. They are complex in that they are necessarily incomplete and often do 
not imply a total political theory that will produce a particular kind of future society. 
Chesnutt’s own statements are at times indicative of a more complex relation to history 
that may resist any concept of a “true” history at all. Like the question of “realism,” the 
question of history is often divided by assumptions about the correct way in which 
subjective and objective viewpoints of human events may be represented. Chesnutt, 
however, is suspicious less of the divide between the objective and the subjective than the 
idea of history itself as a strictly empirical category. Chesnutt offers the trope of the 
railroad as a way of understanding the manifold problem of race prejudice in America. 
The Parallax, rather than a positivistic grounding, is a tension or gap. The difficulty, as 
posed by Chesnutt, is, rather than deciding to what degree either of one’s eyes is the 
“correct” one, to understand the reality that is created by the disparity as an essential 
illusion and treat it as such. 
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“Don’t You See that He Is?”: The Railroad and Race 
 Martin Heidegger once commented about technology that it is a kind of question 
one can pose to the world, a challenge one can offer nature. Each question, in turn, 
creates its own path. We experience the act of questioning as a kind of beginning, or a 
first attempt. However, by employing a certain set of concepts, based in language, to 
interrogate a phenomenon, one has already created a “way” that one is committed to 
follow if the train of thought is faithfully pursued (Heidegger 3). In this sense, technology 
is inherently perspectival in that it establishes a copula between the latent energy found in 
material objects and a socially defined end or use for that energy. Particular technologies 
create specific political possibilities by initially limiting material possibilities. By 
conjoining the material to the social through the technological, one has already assumed 
technology to translate the potential of the material into social ends. Technology, then, is 
more of a modality than a thing in itself, a mode by which the material and the social are 
related by way of an apparatus that transforms and distributes energy. Technology, as it is 
taken by both Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford for example, is often defined by the 
automation and acceleration of work traditionally done by people. The social effects of 
this automism, rather than a simple substitution of one human actor for his or her 
mechanical counterpart, are often surprising in their diversity and unpredictability.  
As the Plessy v. Ferguson case demonstrates, the relationship between technology 
and the social relationships it affects is a dynamic rather than static one, as part of the 
debate over that case involved the partial reconciliation of the unique instability of a new, 
technologically defined public space with the essential instability of race. Technologies 
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create possibilities in excess of what is initially considered useful about them and the 
results of the unexpected effects of latent energy must then be reincorporated into a social 
end in one way or another if the dominant ideological path is to be maintained by those 
who benefit from it. The mediation of energy and political ends through technology thus 
operates anthropomorphically within the imaginary of United States politics. Human ends 
are projected into the means themselves to maintain the naturalization of race as a 
category. Thus, as Justice Harlan put it in his famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the railroad’s “locomotion” can actually create social mobility for Americans 
(PvF 9). And yet, because the material itself resists any totalizing anthropomorphism by 
producing effects in excess of the assumed intention, the mediation between the material 
and the imaginary operates dialectically, sometimes with disastrous results. 
In the last two novels published by Charles Chesnutt in his lifetime, The Marrow 
of Tradition and The Colonel’s Dream, Chesnutt demonstrates the way in which the 
dynamic relationship between technology and the imaginary that constitutes the social 
were mutually regulating one another in America after Reconstruction officially ended in 
1877. Chesnutt offers in these novels a complication to the traditional reading of 
American space and its habit of shaping prejudicial attitudes. The often-cited work of 
Frederick Jackson Turner remains the dominant explanation of the expansion of 
American political space. In The Frontier in American History he attempted to explain 
American development through the “existence of an area of free land, its continuous 
recession, and the advance of American settlement Westward” (Turner 1). Although 
Turner assumed the psychology of the pioneer in breaching borders as the most important 
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feature of the history of American expansion, his analysis is shot through with another, 
structural means by which “advance” occurs, namely “railroads, fostered by land grants” 
(Turner 9). As Paul Virilio put it, this “trans-appearance” of the American frontier, its 
presence that only marks its state of continually passing away, can only be understood as 
the experience of the rate at which borders move rather than a solid boundary to be 
breached by those willing to do it (The Information Bomb 21). As a means by which the 
“universal disposition” of white Americans to expand their boundaries, the “really 
American” part of history according to Turner, technology structurally regulates the rate 
of that expansion. (Turner 4, 7). Technology effectively regulates the rate at which 
ideological space expands over a specific period of time in this American context. For 
Chesnutt, theses such as Turner’s are correct to the degree that they describe the 
dominant ideology of white America. From the position of those who understand their 
relationship to that expansion as an object of control, however, the railroad plays a much 
more ominous role. 
The mutual reinforcement of technological and ideological expansion that 
simultaneously creates the space of the nation and dominates it raises a question for 
Charles Chesnutt. More specifically, Chesnutt implicitly asks a question that later would 
be explicitly reformulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. in his famous “Letter from 
Birmingham Jail”: why “didn’t you [King] give the new administration time to act” in 
order to redress political injustices caused by prejudice (King 87). King responded that 
there cannot be a political action supporting civil rights that is “well-timed” from the 
point of view of those who most benefit from current structures of power (King 87). 
  107 
From the position of the oppressed, change occurs too slowly. From the position of the 
oppressor it happens too quickly. In other words, justice, the addressing of a wrong, 
would always be untimely in some fashion. For Chesnutt, however, this question is 
inherent in the term “prejudice” itself and its relationship to the increased speeds of 
action made possible by the railroad. A central question of Chesnutt’s art and thinking 
asks in what time prejudice operates and by what mechanisms, both literal and 
metaphorical. Any prejudicial act must be fundamentally unoriginal in that it has already 
had its path laid down before the moment of action itself. In the years following the 
official end of Reconstruction, the question of race relations (often referred to 
erroneously as “the negro question” at the time) revolved around the observation that 
American prejudice had (and has) a tendency to repeat itself over and over again in total 
resistance to arguments about the illusory nature of race itself or the injustice in a 
democratic sense of a dominant social group’s oppression of a minority. As Chesnutt put 
it, the legal equality of black Americans’ right to vote, for instance, was obviously 
“foreclosed” by 1903 (“Disfranchisement” 79). What fueled the institution of Jim Crow 
was the “defiance” of the constitution by intransigent southern Whites unwilling to accept 
or incapable of accepting their military and ideological defeat in the war and their 
repetition of racist behaviors carried over from antebellum social formations 
(“Disfranchisement” 81). Chesnutt identifies the difficulty of understanding racism as 
both an act of individual will and as a repetition of previous acts. After Reconstruction, 
American racism was dialectic in that it was inextricably tied to the prior history of 
racism in America and yet presented something wholly new at the same time. Chesnutt, 
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however, was quick to make a distinction between the actual mechanisms by which 
prejudice operates as a deployment of literal force and the rhetorical justification given 
for the existence of prejudice from the white supremacist point of view. He points out 
that the technologies that circulate power and the rhetoric that justifies that power to any 
resistant member of society are dialectic in the sense that they were a confluence of 
mutating ideas about how linear history, expressed in material social practices, were 
ideologically justified as trans-historical principles of development. 
Three important scenes from his novels The Marrow of Tradition and The 
Colonel’s Dream serve to demonstrate the way in which Chesnutt understood technology 
and social space to dialectically support a specific idea of historical development. More 
than this, the dialectic between the material system of the railway and the ideology of 
racial division in America mutually reinforce one another as systems for the demarcation 
of political spaces of relative safety. The plot of The Colonel’s Dream follows the 
homecoming of Colonel Henry French, a white Southerner who had fought for the South 
in the Civil War. He had made a fortune during the Reconstruction period in New York 
City through the rapidly expanding Northern economy. In returning to the South, French 
hoped to help revitalize both his ailing son in warmer Southern climates and the South 
itself by reproducing Northern, technologically driven progressivism in his native town. 
He assumed that reproducing more efficient labor practices and introducing new 
technologies into the South would help to correct the moral and economic errors of a 
formerly slaveholding society that had not fully reorganized its ideological assumptions 
after the war. Toward the end of The Colonel’s Dream, however, a series of events occur 
  109 
which changes French’s understanding of what is politically possible in the post-
Reconstruction South. While outside at play, French’s sickly child is warned by his 
elderly black companion, Peter, a hired for him by his father, to keep “‘way f’m dat 
railroad track, honey” (The Colonel’s Dream 322). It is “as dange’ous as a gun, and a gun 
is dange’ous without lock, stock, er bairl: I knowed a man oncet w’at beat ‘is wife ter def 
wid a ramrod” (Colonel 322). According to Peter, each element of a gun is as dangerous 
as any other part or combinations of parts to the degree that they are within the 
ideological formation in which an end, killing, is attached to a means, the machine of 
killing, and therefore made available to human intention, the will to kill. Not only can a 
gun kill, but it kills in the name of a certain kind of intention whose features are to a 
degree dissociated from the person who pulls the trigger. 
Technologies shaped by industrial capitalism such as the gun and railway are not 
simply tools like any other. 6 As I argued in my previous chapter, these technologies are 
always imbricated dialectically in multiple sets of signifying systems, both material and 
ideological. They allow for a set of possible actions but those actions are, in turn, shaped 
by the socially predetermined limitations of the technology. Objects are not inert in 
Peter’s analogy. Each technology, as a mediation between nature and the human, 
dialectically shapes the object for the subject and the subject for the object. They are the 
material structures by which the distinction between subject and object is “applied in act” 
                                                 
6 It is not essential to this project, but it is interesting to note that many of the industrial techniques for 
“mass production” that were so linked with the expansion of the railway were first developed as a means of 
solving the problem of producing firearms with perfectly exchangeable parts. A rendition (one ultimately 
favorable to the robber-barons, it should be added) of the relationship between mass production and 
firearms can be found in Charles R. Morris’s popular history, The Tycoons, which is fairly readable if not 
particularly scholarly. 
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(Four Fundamentals 62). In other words, “man thinks with his object” and that thought is 
also structured by historically contingent ideological formations (Four Fundamentals 62). 
It is no accident that the anecdote told by Peter as an example of the danger of guns is 
precisely that of domestic abuse. An essential part of the “gun” as a material mediation of 
dominant ideology, is its status as the kind of tool with which “man leaps the frontiers of 
his domain” (Four Fundamentals 62).  From within its effective firing range, the gun 
establishes spatial boundaries of control by way of the ability to distribute death. The gun 
as a material signifier allows a husband, in this case, to think out loud, so to speak, 
whether the gun is fired or not. In other words, guns are the power of the sovereign made 
mobile, infinitely reproducible through capitalist production, and subject to regimes of 
knowledge. The abuses that regulate certain power relationships are to a degree a matter 
of moments of decision, but also a matter of the technologies that set the terms of 
decision-making at all. Who happens to get the gun in the struggle for it is a local tactic 
given form by the general possibilities of the technology itself. Because the very design 
of the gun is expressive of a certain range of possible human intentions, the “gun” as a 
technological system betrays the first steps of a technological anthropomorphism made 
mobile by capitalist production. The gun is material made in the shape of a human 
intention. Effectively, Peter’s point is that guns do not kill people, anthropomorphisms 
do.  
The train, then, is like the gun in that it is a technological apparatus that produces 
effects far in excess of any single intention. Those excessive intentions, however, are still 
limited by the material formations of the technology that are themselves ideological to 
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the degree that they make a certain range of power relationships more easily accessible. 
Not only do technological apparatuses such as the gun express ideological formations, 
such as the terms by which killing can happen in the case of the gun, but may easily kill 
in excess of any intention, as with the railway. Although the gun and the train express 
different “lethal factors,” as Lacan put it, they both set the terms for a specific kind of 
impossible choice that creates the subject positions which wager their safety whether they 
like it or not. 
Despite Peter’s warning, the child chases a cat, whom he has been told is magic 
and therefore capable of speaking, onto the tracks after a train has come to a halt on them. 
The child sees “nothing but the cat, and wished for nothing more than to talk to it” 
(Colonel 322). French’s child had already at this point in the novel been cast in the mold 
of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Little Eva from Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a quasi-angelic figure of 
forgiveness and Christian charity. Even this brief summary of the scene illustrates the 
ways in which the narrative might function as a kind of modern parable about the 
intractability of social mores, its grim conclusion already fairly obvious. In this 
straightforward reading, the destruction of the child could illustrate the ambiguity of 
technologically driven progress as the means by which the Northern mode of capitalist 
circulation comes at the expense of the unity and security of the family. Thus, the cost of 
“revitalizing” the South could be said to be too high a price to pay in its current 
condition.7 The actual events of the child’s death, however, confound a simple, 
                                                 
7 There are many casual assessments of the novel that boil down to claiming it to be the dramatization of a 
simple moral of being careful what one wishes for in introducing Northern economic principles into an 
intransigently racist South. Matthew Wilson, for example, considers this scene to be the “melodramatic” 
twist in a “sentimental plot” of a novel about “the racist undergirding of the New South ideology” that 
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allegorical reading of the novel. As a total train system, the railway in this scene is more 
than simply an example of “progress.” The specific way in which it has remapped 
political space is narrated by Chesnutt’s narrator in detail. The train is more than a 
symbol of progress, and its features have come to define progress to a significant degree. 
The railway system, as a technological system, is like a gun – it is material that 
has been shaped along ideological lines. In this scene, the train physically and 
metaphorically remaps the concept of “safety” along the lines of its own operations. As a 
means of dividing space by lanes of controlled motion, the railway is a series of 
interconnected vectors of safety for Peter and the child, vectors whose navigation is 
anything but simple or obvious, as Peter already knows. In an effort to save the child 
before a mechanic starts the train on its way, Peter stumbles on the cat and lands in the 
path of the railway car along with the child. The mechanic, not seeing Peter or the child 
in his concentration on procedures for starting the train, sets it in motion after switching 
the track. Another mechanic, however, seeing Peter, pulls “a lever mechanically, but too 
late to stop the momentum of the train,” which is “not equipped with air brakes, even if 
these would have proved effective to stop in so short a distance” (Colonel 323). Carol B. 
Gartner accused Chesnutt of being inartistic for dipping “lavishly into sentiment” for 
scenes such as this one, in a remark that has been repeated from Chesnutt’s own time to 
                                                                                                                                                 
simultaneously “doubts the efficacy of fiction to affect instrumental reform” (Wilson 148, 174). 
McWilliams similarly argues that the point of the novel is self-contradictory in that French himself 
somehow “embodies” efforts to remove the Southern elites while in fact perpetuating their elitism 
(McWilliams 167). McWilliams, however, makes the error of avoiding a conceptual ambiguity by claiming 
both elements as ontological necessities and leaving it at that. To claim that fictional characters “embody” 
certain abstract categories misses how ideology structurally determines certain the terms of abstract 
decisions prior to their occurrence. 
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our own (Gartner 155).8 Yet, apart from the simple dismissal of the scene as sentimental, 
at stake here are the preconditions for a relatively new, technologically overdetermined 
idea of political spaces of relative safety in the post-Reconstruction American 
imagination. Although the purpose of the train is to run regularly and, thus, predictably, 
the calculation of that predictability by any one individual relies on an interplay of 
vectors of vision and reaction speeds. The processes of deciding and acting between the 
two mechanics on the same machine are not sequential but parallel in the technological 
system and make up distinct orders of time whose dissymmetry creates the possibility of 
disaster in the scene.9 
The added irony of the child’s death, however, is that the train is, in fact, initially 
stationary on the track and, even then, potentially dangerous when decision and action are 
so far removed from one another in parallel procedures performed by multiple 
mechanics. The mechanic operating the train does not take on the attributes of the train 
which he controls as in vulgar Marxist alienation. We have not become metaphorical 
cogs in the capitalist machine of production and circulation as in the spectacular scenes 
from Fritz Lang’s Metropolis. Instead, the machine has become us in that it regulates our 
relations in political space. The mechanic pulls the lever “mechanically,” both 
                                                 
8 John Chamberlain had criticized Chesnutt in 1930 for plots that “hinge on such advantageous 
circumstances that the works of Thomas Hardy seem the very soul of the natural by comparison” in order 
to achieve heightened, sentimental effects (Chamberlain 134). Both McWilliams and Wilson repeat this 
concern in the 21st Century without adding much clarification as to why sentiment is so abhorrent a literary 
trait. Additionally, any perusal of newspapers from the period will reveal that such deaths were fairly 
common, leading one to wonder what kind of resistance-repression is at work when literary critics hope to 
dismiss such scenes as “advantageous” in their obvious fictionality. 
9 Effectively, the felix of the child’s relationship to the cat, which attempts to prolong fantastical desire is 
brought into disastrous conjunction with the structure of the machine’s desire to interrupt. This scene can 
function as an objective correlative to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s comment that the “desiring-machine is not 
a metaphor; it is what interrupts” (Anti-Oedipus 41). 
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automatically and in the manner of a mechanic. The disaster happens at a speed that no 
longer accounts for the time of human thought, but is an effect of a perceptive gap 
between the regular operation of the machine and its emergency safety procedures. 
Safety, in the world created by the total train system, is no longer a matter of the safety of 
a community as a whole or even the safety of the individual from forces outside the 
community. Rather, safety is a matter of procedural vectors of sight and force that protect 
spheres of action created by technological complexes of machines which utilize massive 
amounts of energy.  
Safety in any one instance can only be regulated at close to the speed at which it 
occurs. That speed, in turn, creates a gap in the assumption of continual human 
perception. Human perception, in this scenario, not only occurs within a particular space 
and time but at a certain speed, the ratio of the two. One mechanic is preoccupied with 
his own safety in operating a potentially dangerous machine. The other is able to predict a 
disaster and initiate a procedure to avoid it. The independent regimes of the two safety 
procedures, however, ultimately cannot control the energy of the train and the disaster 
becomes almost inevitable, or, what is perhaps the more damaging option, predictable. 
Peter’s initial warning to the child is therefore prescient in that it is not the “lock, stock, 
er bairl,” the material components, of either the gun or the train that are dangerous. It is 
the complex of technological anthropomorphisms that treat each piece as potential energy 
for human ends that create the possibility of disaster. Disaster, therefore, is no longer an 
accident in the sense of an unpredictable event or an intercession by the gods (dis-aster). 
It is rather the normal expression of energy within human systems that occurs in the gaps 
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created by safety procedures that work slower than the machines they regulate. The 
political space created by the total train system, then, has no “inside” or “outside” but 
discrete vectors of variable safety. Any individual’s safety is no longer a right granted by 
the state, but a function of the individual’s perceptibility to the vectors of regulation of 
the technological system. 
Not only would technology separate out political space into mobile vectors of 
relative safety, the logic of the division of spaces of safety created by the railway would 
in turn be unequally distributed along racial lines and extended to political space of the 
community as a whole. The disastrous death of the Colonel’s son and companion take on 
an added significance when the two come to be memorialized. Previously in the novel, 
the Colonel’s son had made the Colonel promise that if the son were to die, he should be 
buried alongside his companion, Peter. The Colonel does, in fact, attempt to honor his 
son’s wishes and buries both his son and Peter in the family’s plot of the town cemetery. 
In reaction to this, however, some citizens of the town, dominated by a “mob spirit,” dig 
up Peter’s coffin and return it to the Colonel’s porch (Colonel 346). The spatial 
regulation of race, Chesnutt indicates, extends even and perhaps especially to the 
consecration of the dead. Regulation, in this case, operates at both the levels of the 
perceptible and the imperceptible. The hidden body violates the townspeople’s concept of 
the purpose of the graveyard as a monument to a community whose social coherence and 
linear continuity relies on the control of the space of the community through racial 
division. As they put it in a note nailed to the coffin: “take notis . . . Niggers by there 
selves, white peepul by thereselves, and them that lives in our town must bide by our 
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rules. By order of Cummity” (Colonel 346). As critic R. J. Ellis pointed out, this note 
may have been inspired by one of the lawyers in the Plessy v. Ferguson case Albion 
Tourgée’s famous novel A Fool’s Errand from 1879 in which a similar note is delivered 
to the protagonist of that novel by “The Regulators.” In both cases, the assumption of the 
white supremacist townspeople is that an abstract tradition determines an ontological 
racial difference that must be historically enforced by “cummities” and “regulators” to 
keep it ontological. The “mob spirit” in this instance, rather than an uncontrollable 
desiring, is a bureaucratic desire with a set of arguments, procedures, and rules to go 
along with it. The relative “safety” of the community’s linear progression, consecrated in 
their ideologically “pure” graveyard, must be maintained by doing violence on any 
foreign element that attempts to change it. The mob themselves are not the vessels of 
their linear concept of history, but the protectors of its anxiously autonomous, linear path. 
Even without an obvious “technology” to mediate the mob’s ideological assumption, 
history itself, monumentalized in the graveyard, has become in a sense a technology, a 
material mediation of ideological ends, for the dominant white supremacist tradition. Just 
as the railway guaranteed the continuity of American history into the future, as I argued 
in my previous chapter, the graveyard works along the same principles but in the reverse, 
guaranteeing that linearity’s connection with the past. 
Both the killing of Peter and the child and the rejection of their consecrations are 
in this sense “pre-judicial” in that the loci of decisions to act, the subjective positions 
created by technologies, remain categorically outside of the moment of action. For the 
mechanics, this means the manipulation of predetermined safety procedures for a literal 
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machine. For the white mob it also means the manipulation of safety procedures but this 
time bureaucratic procedures determined by white supremacist assumptions about 
racialized trans-historical principles of historical progression. The terms of both the 
mechanics’ and the mob’s decisions, the “lethal factor” specific to the ideological 
formation, had already been determined and their outcomes rely solely on the degree to 
which humans manage the necessary effects of the primary causes efficiently. The 
expression of race hatred is not a judgment in the strictest sense within the white 
supremacist logic Chesnutt narrates. Rather, the white supremacists are mechanics – they 
attempt to regulate history through the appeal to trans-historical principles of progression 
and can therefore considered to govern “natural” development. The expression of that 
race hatred, the mob, occurs, in a sense, in a predictably unpredictable manner. 
In The Colonel’s Dream, the pre-judicial act of expelling Peter from the 
graveyard rather than the death of his son is the cathartic moment of the narrative, the 
moment where the Colonel decides the only reasonable course of action is to leave the 
South. By the writing of that novel, Chesnutt’s early hopes for rhetorically persuading his 
primarily white audience to sympathize with the people whose oppression was at least in 
part due to the pre-judicial assumptions held by the majority had all but evaporated. As 
he put it in a letter to his publisher, he began to “suspect that the public as a rule does not 
care for books in which the principal characters are colored people, or with a striking 
sympathy with that race as contrasted with the white race” (“To Be an Author” 171). It is 
Chesnutt’s immediately previous novel, The Marrow of Tradition, however, in which the 
author most fully develops the logic of the railway as an exemplary figure for the 
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maintenance of racial division in American thought. Compared with The Colonel’s 
Dream, the railway plays numerically smaller part in that only a single chapter of the 
novel takes place on the train, and, other than that chapter, it is only mentioned sparingly. 
Yet, that chapter and the other mentions of the railroad play a structural role in the logic 
of the narrative that demonstrates the degree to which technological thinking regulates 
racial modes of thought and vice versa. 
In The Colonel’s Dream, the repetitive maintenance of the same in the 
consecration of the graveyard is the conceptual ground for the forward motion of 
historical change from the white supremacist point of view. In a sense, it identifies the 
forward motion of the railway as a potential model for social change but represses it by 
naturalizing the circular motion that creates the effect of the linear (as the wheels rotate, 
the train moves forward). In The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt creates his most 
systematic example of the power and ubiquity of this kind of thinking by combining 
racial and technological systems in a single scene rather than separating them as he does 
in The Colonel’s Dream. In a chapter early in the novel, one of the primary characters 
through which the narrative is focalized, Dr. Miller, a black doctor, takes a train ride from 
the North to his home in the South. During the trip, Virilio’s “trans-appearance” of 
political boundaries occurs in which the politics of racial segregation are not immediately 
applied as boundaries are breached, but come into being incrementally and at an 
increasing rate. Initially, Miller has a pleasant conversation with a white colleague to pass 
the time. As the train moves further southward, Dr. Miller’s racial stigma changes for the 
other people on the train. To the “American eye” of the white conductor, Miller becomes 
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“black, or, more correctly speaking, brown; it was even a light brown, but both his 
swarthy complexion and his curly hair revealed what has been described in the laws of 
some of our states as a ‘visible admixture’ of African blood” (Marrow of Tradition 49). 
The narrator in this passage ironically describes the perceptive problem of racial thinking 
within the techno-political context of the moving train. Combining legal definitions and 
the vagaries of the perception of color, Chesnutt, here, specifies the problem of the 
impossible decision required of the railroad employee in a reductio ad absurdum. From 
the position of authority over the regulation of the train required by law of the conductor, 
no partial statements are allowed. This decision, however, requires a complex mixing of 
heterogeneous terms, a “mythic thought” as I argued in my previous chapter, to the point 
of absurdity. Eventually, the conductor does ask Miller to leave the car, causing a verbal 
dispute between Miller’s white friend and the conductor.  
Addressing Miller’s white colleague, the conductor inquires if Miller “is with 
you” to which Miller’s companion, setting the terms for the dispute through a negation, in 
turn asks the conductor: “Don’t you see that he is?” (MoT 52). The conductor explains to 
Miller that “this is a day coach, and is distinctly marked ‘White,’ as you must have seen 
before you sat down here. The sign is put there for that purpose” (MoT 54). Critic 
Elizabeth Abel takes the letters “white,” painted in white in the whites only car, and 
“black,” painted in black in the blacks only car, to play a “mimetic” function, which 
“effects a silent translation from the polite social term to its aggressive underside” (Abel 
41). The “blurring” of the “distinction between those African Americans who had 
garnered a modicum of status and the underclass usually designated by the blunt color 
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label black” (Abel 41). As the details of this scene demonstrate, however, the mimetic 
function of the relationship between color and its signifier is only superficial, a corollary 
justification of the power structure of which it is a symptom. The sign is a chain of 
“letters” in Lacan’s sense of the word, “the material medium [support] that concrete 
discourse borrows from language” (Écrits 413). There cannot be a “translation” between 
the polite and the aggressive, as the polite function of the sign is itself aggressive in a 
different modality. It repetitively marks the authority of the “American eye” of the 
conductor as already divisive. The conductor, because is placed in the authoritative 
position cannot “see” that Miller “is” because it is precisely the gaze of the conductor that 
determines presence in this ideologically imbricated situation. Whether that division is 
enforced “politely” or “aggressively” is beside the point. Within the American context, an 
individual’s relationship to perceptibility in general has already been marked as racial in 
that it assumes division that has already been caught up in a power differential of which 
race is an expression. As with the Plessy v. Ferguson decision by Justice Brown, racial 
distinction is considered natural to the degree that the conductor is there to act as a 
guarantor of property in general. As the conductor himself notes to Miller and his friend, 
he has already been chastised by his own superiors for not enforcing the racial 
segregation laws and has “a family to support” (MoT 54). Chesnutt’s sarcasm on this 
topic is palpable. The signifier “white” in this case does not simply designate a color, nor 
does it simply designate a privileged position relative to the consumption of commodities 
such as rail travel. Rather, it is a repetition of the signifier as an essentially absent 
presence. The property of race legally established by Plessy v. Ferguson can only be 
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asserted as present through a repetition of the ritual of ejecting people from its space, by 
making them absent. Miller “must have seen” the sign because he did not need to see it at 
all. 
The conductor is not, however, the final arbiter in this scene, although his 
enunciation of the rule is determinative of the political division that is enforced in this 
particular instance. The conversation between Miller, the conductor, and Miller’s friend 
is imbricated within a series of hesitations and gazes that condition the terms of the 
discourse. When the car reaches Virginia, knowing the terms in play more than others on 
the car, Miller already stands for “a moment hesitatingly” before sitting (MoT 52). The 
conductor “paused at the seat occupied by the two doctors” and “glanced interrogatively 
at Miller” but moves on (MoT 52). Miller “nevertheless followed with his eyes the 
conductor” while the conductor speaks with another passenger who “turned his head and 
looked back toward Miller,” and, after speaking with that passenger, the conductor 
“retraces” his steps to confront Miller (MoT 53). The passenger the conductor consults is, 
in fact, Captain McBane, a white supremacist leader in Miller’s hometown, who, as a 
holder of the property of “whiteness” according to the conductor, is able to activate the 
system of authority that the conductor represents. The system of hesitations and gazes 
around the expression of power that occurs more through than by the conductor are 
equally important to the structure of prejudicial expression in the scene. These gazes and 
hesitations structure moments of “intersubjective communication,” as Jacques Lacan put 
it, where “everything is a trap” (Four Fundamentals 93). Both Miller and the conductor 
are, as Marx put it, “self-alienated” within the structure of gazes that constitutes them as 
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subjects from the position of the Other as endowed or not with the authority of property 
as a signifier (“Alienation and Social Class” 133). Yet, they experience that alienation 
differently in that, from the position of the conductor, he “feels satisfied and affirmed in 
this self-alienation, experiences the alienation as a sign of its own power” whereas Miller 
“feels destroyed in this alienation, seeing in it its own impotence and the reality of an 
inhuman existence” (“Alienation” 133; emphasis in original). In this moment of 
intersubjective communication, the structure of race-property constitutes the individual 
on the train in an “imaginary relationship” (racial difference) to “their real conditions of 
existence” (property) (“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” 162). The conductor 
is able to rule on color and property as a corollary because of their initial ambivalence. 
Power differentials established by the train and its procedures occur at a particular rate 
of “trans-appearance” determined by the hesitations of the glances that are a result of the 
movement of the train. 
If Althusser could claim that ideology “has a material existence” and must go 
through sometimes painful contortions of argumentation to make his point, Chesnutt 
already knew this through his experience of American racism (“Ideology” 165). 
Furthermore, Chesnutt understands that this materiality now becomes socially determined 
through perspectival gaps created and maintained by technological systems. The trope 
through which Chesnutt attempts to represent this perspectival gap in the literary mode in 
this passage (and, in fact, the novel as a whole) is irony. As Kenneth Burke points out, 
irony may easily substitute for the concept of “dialectic” in general (“Four Master 
Tropes” 503). Put in Burke’s terms, Chesnutt’s distortion of color in this scene and its 
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ideological ramifications parodies its substitution for racial difference as such and 
“clearly reveal[s] the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise” from within 
the white supremacist discourse itself, forming an interplay of ambivalences (A Grammar 
of Motives xviii). Scenes such as this one led critic Werner Sollers to write that he 
believes “Chesnutt’s historical imagination, paired with his sense of irony, made him an 
unusually perceptive witness of his own time” (Sollers 3). Sollers is correct in identifying 
irony’s relationship to history as one of the essential qualities of Chesnutt’s contribution 
to American thought, but to frame this relationship in terms of the author’s own, personal 
role as a “perceptive witness” to history misses what is essentially ironic in Chesnutt’s 
thought. The “visible admixture” of race upon which the law is based, stresses not the 
“admixture” but, instead, the “visible” aspect of the situation. It does not matter to what 
degree the signs of race are mixed. If the blackness is visible at all, it is necessarily mixed 
from that point of view. 
Yet, in terms of the legal definition of race, the conductor is activated by Captain 
McBane as what Lacan calls le sujet supposé savoir, the subject supposed to know. As 
was avoided in the Plessy v. Ferguson decisions, the legal status of racial difference was 
left to conductors to decide in the moment of enforcement of separate cars for different 
races. Both the majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions on this acknowledged 
the impossibility of this decision yet avoid including this aspect of the situation in their 
decisions as it falls outside of the realm of the language of the law they were adjudicating 
upon. Yet, as Chesnutt’s novel points out, this is an essential moment in the assumption 
of racial difference and its regulation. What is at stake is not the “correct” identification 
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of racial difference in all cases. Everyone from the Supreme Court to Chesnutt to his 
characters recognize this as obviously impossible. What is at stake, however, is the 
maintenance of the system that can arbitrarily regulate and therefore affirm the arbitrary 
distinction. The irony, in Burke’s sense, of this scene is irreducibly ambiguous and 
therefore must be adjudicated upon in order to maintain the dominant power structure. In 
other words, in the face of an impossible dialectic tension, the arbitrary ruling is the only 
possible course of action – what remains is to decide the means by which this power may 
be wielded, by whom, and in what circumstances. In this case, the conductor, as the 
representative of capital, takes that role. 
Chesnutt’s point in The Colonel’s Dream demonstrated the way in which racial 
distinction operated similarly to the structure of technological progressivism in its 
regulatory processes. In The Marrow of Tradition, however, that eruptive quality of racial 
division through a technological logic exists as a structural element of the act of vision 
within a technological system. The historical present, in fact, occurs in the gap created by 
several gazes happening simultaneously but only being authoritative in retrospect. The 
“present” of pre-judicial politics does not in any real sense exist. It is a moment of crisis 
in the assumed continuity between a future of the railway and the past of the graveyard. 
The evasive power of prejudice, its ability to continue in a modulated form despite its 
patent absurdity, in fact, relies on its non-existence in the present. It is always grounded 
in a past and projected into a future whose contours have already been determined by the 
assumption of an a priori historical mechanism of change, that of technology. What 
Chesnutt implicitly develops, however, is the possibility for speaking from within the 
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gap, not as a necessarily quasi-uncertain present, but as a positive position of non-linear 
political positing. His term for this gap is the “parallax.” 
 
“I See Myself Seeing Myself”: The Parallax View 
“Irony,” like “technology” and “prejudice,” is an extremely expansive term and 
thus difficult to define in any precise way. For Chesnutt, however, the concept of irony 
was an essential element to understanding race and how it operates in American thought. 
Chesnutt’s critics have pointed out that irony can be a technique of subversion in which 
one half of a dialectic speaks a language that both replies to the other and means 
something else to itself. Chesnutt, however, implies that subversion’s target, prejudice, 
also operates by means of irony. Any ironic subversion of that order, while sometimes 
politically useful as a means of evasion of the dominant ideology, cannot directly address 
the power that also gains its legitimacy through irony. This kind of political dialectic 
plays out with particular force within technological spaces. In Chesnutt’s works, trains 
literally penetrate or transgress political boundaries. For some critics, the railway’s 
breaching of political boundaries through destabilizing sensory experiences becomes a 
place for a potentially new politics in which traditionally strict racial categories may be 
questioned and new relationships formed (although that potential is rarely realized). 
Critic Julia H. Lee, for instance, incorrectly summarizes Chesnutt’s train chapter in The 
Marrow of Tradition by claiming that the figure of the train “forces each character to 
consider the relationship between African Americans, the Chinese, and the laws that are 
meant to define their relationships to America” because the train itself “defamiliarizes” 
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sensory experience, “thus destabilizing the social relations and cultural assumptions that 
make up our lives” (Lee 347). At issue here is the casual use of “thus” in Lee’s 
formulation of the effects of the railroad on racial division, as if racial division had been a 
stable category before the appearance of the train. The more radical possibility, and the 
possibility that more closely follows the text itself, is that instability is constitutive of 
both racial division and the sensory apparatus that supposedly grounds racial division in 
differences in skin color. What the railroad and the ideology that surrounds it as an 
assumed instrument of social-historical change reinforces, rather, is a particular form of 
instability that supports white supremacist ideological assumptions. 
Chesnutt’s view of the railroad, albeit only partially developed in his writings, 
may be more complex than simply offering a destabilization that reveals the absurdity of 
racial division as an empirical or legal category. Although the space of the railway 
certainly offers the potential for destabilizing political categories, Chesnutt also suggests 
that there is nothing necessary about this causality and, in fact, it has the potential of 
reinforcing particular instabilities that support the white supremacist order to the same 
degree. In his novels, and The Marrow of Tradition in particular, Chesnutt employs the 
trope of the railway as a dominant form of structural political control. This control works 
through the materiality of technological relationships that anthropomorphically relate 
material conditions to social ends through regulated conceptual instabilities. Because they 
are essentially anthropomorphic, literature is often the clearest medium in which this 
articulacy is visible. The creation of potential instabilities in moments of decision that 
arise necessarily from the tropes of seeing that are assumed to be natural Chesnutt calls 
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“the parallax view.” Chesnutt’s parallax posits a heuristic rather than stable position from 
which speaking about history as a dynamic process may be possible but is by no means 
assured. 
For Chesnutt, the parallax view serves as a counterpoint to the dominant concept 
of a more or less unified, autonomous subject speaking simultaneously from and about a 
particular tradition of social assumptions. This counterpoint both incorporates the 
assumption of a stable speaking subject in it and moves beyond it to a certain degree. 
Within the practical realm of literary representation, the parallax is a position created 
through the deployment of a set of tropes that show the necessary plurality of supposedly 
unified subjective positions. The dominant trope of much of Chesnutt’s polemic writing 
is sarcasm, a more contextually specific form of irony. At first glance, Chesnutt seems to 
repeat many of the rhetorical strategies of other black public figures of his generation, a 
generation the poet and scholar James Weldon Johnson would later dub the “oratorical 
generation” (What Now?). In the mold of Frederick Douglass, many of Chesnutt’s 
writings profess to an even-handed, objective evaluation of the current social state of the 
United States. In its traditional argumentative form the stated purpose of these public 
writings was to convince a hostile, mainly Northern, white audience of the injustices 
being committed in the country and of the urgent need for legislative and social change. 
Chesnutt employs literary tropes that go beyond the traditional plea, however. Chesnutt’s 
sarcasm does more than mock the sections of the American public that either implicitly or 
explicitly support the white supremacist assumptions he seems to be arguing against. 
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Because his sarcasm so thoroughly permeates his writing, his positive statements are 
negated through sarcasm, but those negations are in turn negated to create parallaxes. 
A representative example of Chesnutt’s particular mode of sarcasm can be found 
in his essay on “The Future American,” which has received some attention from critics 
although without much agreement as to its significance. His stated purpose with the essay 
is to correct the “conscious or unconscious evasion” other essayists have made “of the 
main elements of the problem involved in the formation of a future American race” 
(Essays 121). Its main theme interrogates “amalgamation” between races and the effect 
this will have on race prejudice, an “amalgamation” that has already been going on for 
the entirety of United States and Western history (Essays 123). The “mechanical 
mixture” of races, Chesnutt argues, could conceivably be forcibly required of the 
population by a government interested in dealing with the issue of race as a means of 
eliminating of any clear racial markers (Essays 125). Biologically justified racial types as 
they were understood by his audience could, mathematically, take a few generations in 
this scenario to be so confused that they would cease to be indices of race. Superficial 
distinctions between skin-color or the texture of one’s hair would be forcibly dissociated 
from a specific hereditary line. Critic Sally Ann Ferguson has been one of the strongest 
voices of opposition to Chesnutt’s politics as found in this and other essays of his with a 
similar theme. She claims, taking Chesnutt literally at his word, that this indulgence in 
speculations on racial mixing “clearly reveals the limited nature of Chesnutt’s social and 
literary goals” (“Chesnutt’s Genuine Blacks” 109). His position is limited, according to 
Ferguson, to “alleviating white color prejudice” against “color-line blacks or those of 
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mixed races,” and treating the plight of “genuine negroes” (Chesnutt’s term from his 
essay “What Is a White Man?”) as “virtually insoluble” (“Chesnutt’s Genuine Blacks” 
109-10). While Ferguson is certainly right to point out the places where Chesnutt’s 
personal, bourgeois ambitions affect his thinking, it is difficult to take this division as 
essential to what is primarily interesting in his work when he also spent a significant 
amount of time arguing that any racial division is itself a false premise. 
From the outset of “The Future American,” the argumentative frame that Chesnutt 
provides for his argument belies the content. As he puts it at the beginning of the first 
section of his essay:  
if the writer has any preconceived opinions that would affect his judgment, they 
are at least not the hackneyed prejudices of the past – if they lead to false 
conclusions, they at least furnish a new point of view, from which, taken together 
with other widely differing views, the judicious reader may establish a parallax 
that will enable him to approximate the truth. (Essays 121) 
More than simply a rhetorical gesture of humility meant to placate a potentially hostile 
reading audience, Chesnutt’s qualification of his argument is more significant when his 
sarcasm is taken into account in its specificity. In fact, the parallax in this context 
implicitly critiques the nature of the “objectivity” that it ostensibly is attempting to claim 
for its own argument. The possibility that Chesnutt offers is an attempt to approximate a 
truth through the gap of the parallax, not as a concession to uncertainty but as the basis 
for a positive statement that moves beyond a tradition that defines the limits of what one 
can be certain about, the “hackneyed prejudices of the past.” Ultimately, Chesnutt’s 
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argument in this essay is an ironic position on the trans-historical principles upon which 
historical movement is assumed to be based in the white supremacist tradition. The 
traditional opinion of white supremacist America took the dominance of the white race as 
inevitably “winning out” over any inferior influence “by some strange alchemy,” as 
Chesnutt put it, within the rhetoric of a kind of social Darwinism (Essays 122). Chesnutt, 
on the other hand, rejects the automaticity of this kind of historical thinking, while 
appearing to adopt it for his own argument. Although he does accept that “selection and 
environment” are to some degree determinative of some aspects of racial difference, 
these elements are not a replacement for a priori principles, as in the white supremacist 
Social Darwinism (Essays 122). Like technological progressivism, the white supremacist 
position assumes historical change along the lines of causal, linear development to be an 
a priori law of nature. Historical change is therefore an immanent character of material 
relations actually in the world. Change, then, in effect, has always already happened. We, 
as historical creatures, are simply waiting for the inevitable laws of nature to express 
themselves. Chesnutt, by contrast, assumes historical change to be necessarily 
retrospective and created through parallax gaps, constructed from “widely differing 
views.” Linear historical causality, in Chesnutt’s model, is not immanent in material 
relations but a function of multiple points of view on something that has already 
happened and can never fill the sematic field of possible meaning from any one point of 
view. 
 To illustrate his point, Chesnutt tells a story he had read in a newspaper “whose 
omniscience of course no one would question” in which a Chicago merchant who did 
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business in Texas was revealed by the paper to be a “mulatto” (Essays 126). Chesnutt 
goes on to write that shortly “after the publication of the item reflecting on the 
immaculateness of the merchant’s descent, there appeared in the Texas newspapers, 
among the advertising matter, a statement from the Chicago merchant characterizing the 
rumor as a malicious falsehood” (Essays 126-7). Between the newspaper and the 
merchant, the question of race is one of the accurate application of empirical categories, 
and the answer to this question has important effects on the life of the merchant. To be 
publically labeled a “mulatto” in his society would in all probability affect his business 
relationships. And yet, from the third position, that of Chesnutt himself in his peculiar 
sarcastic mode, the question does not lie in the truth as constructed by the two poles of 
the dialectic. Rather, the ultimate target is the assumed “omniscience” of the newspaper 
that the merchant’s dispute calls into question. Whereas the merchant, being a merchant, 
is economically required to take the omniscience for granted and simply argue the 
antithesis of that institution’s claim, Chesnutt is not. Rather than a subversion that simply 
negates the initial claim, Chesnutt also negates that negation by sarcastically undermining 
the very terms by which racial division is claimed at all. It is less that the merchant is or 
is not a mulatto – he is from the white supremacist point of view to the degree that he is 
accused of such. Through the ironic parallax, the question is suspended in a moment of 
hesitation when “omniscience” itself, the sujet suppose savoir, is revealed to be incapable 
of control over the total semantic field. 
 The parallax, then, taken more generally, is a constitutive gap. This gap, in turn, is 
by definition always a differential. As with binocular human vision, for example, depth 
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perception is created in part by the differential between the planes of vision of the two 
human eyes taken together in a single act of seeing. Importantly, any one image is always 
the result of “the difference in the positions and shapes of the images in the two eyes” 
(Howard and Rogers 2). The plane of sight which is assumed to be a stable mode of 
human understanding is always, in fact, the result of the reconciliation of two distinct 
vantage points, a distortion, albeit a distortion that is socially normalized in the abstract 
and useful for individuals in the particular. Chesnutt’s phrase, then, the “parallax view,” 
is redundant, but pointedly so. A parallax can only be several places from which to 
“view” the object in question, taken simultaneously in a single rhetorical act. Any clear 
position on the question must create a picture, a necessarily distorted picture, through an 
atmosphere. The very definition of an act of vision, then, takes into account an initial 
ambiguity that necessarily creates the conditions for another claim of clarity. 
 In the realm of ideological relations, this parallax gap as outlined by Chesnutt, 
clarifies the difficulty in understanding Louis Althusser’s claim that ideology is a 
“representation of the world whose imaginary distortion depends on the imaginary 
relation to their conditions of existence” and that this “imaginary relation is itself 
endowed with a material existence” (a claim that is itself another version of Lacan’s 
“signifier” put within an explicitly Marxist vocabulary) (“Ideology” 166-7). Paul Ricoeur 
took this concept from Althusser to mean that the distortion of ideology necessarily 
implies that there is an initial, relatively stable object in order for a distortion to occur, 
that ideology in the final analysis is “not distortive but integrative” (Ricoeur 57). To map 
Ricoeur’s response onto the problem Chesnutt outlined, the fact of the dispute between 
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the merchant and the newspaper would imply the necessary, stable truth of the race of the 
merchant. But this criticism misses the point by insisting on a direct causality that 
ideology does not necessarily follow. What Althusser and Chesnutt both suggest is that 
ideology’s relationship to the material is closer to the causal model of quantum than 
classical mechanics. As Werner Heisenberg notes, quantum mechanics, whose elements 
cannot be directly observed, does not fit within a neat concept of “reality.” Rather, taking 
an Aristotelian term, material objects can better be understood as “potentia” that do not 
necessarily follow usual “logical patterns” (Heisenberg 156). Classical mechanics 
describes certain relationships more or less well at relatively large dimensions. And yet, 
these descriptions should not be taken for reality but a particular “tendency toward 
reality” (Heisenberg 156). What Chesnutt suggests in the realm of ideology is that there 
is no ideological object to view except as it is approached from a position that constitutes 
it. In effect, objects are not there to be distorted but an initial distortion creates the effect 
of stable objects of ideology. Potentia have a different causal logic than is found in 
classical mechanics. Rather than necessary causes, all causes remain sufficient. Like the 
railroad itself, this weakly causal ideological system places limitations on what is 
possible. It regulates tendencies but does not command necessities. 
 More recent theoretical works by Slavoj Žižek and Kōjin Karatani have 
developed a similar concept of the parallax, coming from a position within modern 
critical theory rather than from Chesnutt’s practical politics. What Chesnutt illuminates in 
this concept is its relation to technology as a means of socially regimenting parallax 
views. Karatani, in fact, uses technology to illustrate his theoretical point about “the 
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parallax” without fully investigating it. Karatani points to the unsettling effects of 
photography on people’s relationship to their own images as an example of a 
“pronounced parallax” (Karatani 2). While the traditional analogy for philosophical 
introspection had been the mirror in which one identifies one’s self as object, the 
introduction of photography complicates the easy assumption of a unified subject by 
presenting us with a new, uncanny view of ourselves. For a brief moment when someone 
“first” sees their photographic image, they are presented with themselves as an essentially 
“plural subject” (Karatani 2). Whereas Karatani’s work remains within the strictly 
philosophical, treating the material reflection as a common metaphor for the self-
reflection of philosophical thought, Chesnutt seems more willing to follow Lacan in 
claiming that “man thinks with his object” (Four Fundamentals 62). The sarcasm that 
Chesnutt employs in describing the dispute between the merchant and the newspaper 
points out the reification at work when its method of circulation, its ability to be both 
here and there, is improperly taken by its readers as an abstract “omniscience.” It is 
through the parallax created by these material structures that the full significance of 
Chesnutt’s politics can be understood as the technological regimentation of a present 
absence. 
 Although critics are fond of quoting a young Chesnutt’s journal in which he 
proclaims his “high holy purpose” in writing novels that express an authentically black 
point of view, Chesnutt’s concept of the relationship between politics and literature did 
change significantly during his life (qtd. in Andrews xvii). By the end of his career, 
Chesnutt to some degree regretted his decisions in writing The Marrow of Tradition. 
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When he accepted the Spingarn Medal from the NAACP for his contributions to the 
cause of equality in 1928, Chesnutt commented that he had “no apologies” to make for 
his seemingly disappointing career as his books were written a “generation too soon” 
(Essays 514). Both The Marrow of Tradition and The Colonel’s Dream did not sell as 
well as he had hoped and Chesnutt never published another novel in his lifetime. He 
claimed in his speech that whenever he let his “feelings get the better of [him] and 
[became] dogmatic and argumentative” in his fiction, its “artistic quality suffered” 
(Essays 514). In that speech, Chesnutt seems to endorse the idea that he was somehow a 
failure as an artist. For an artist, however, who so radically questioned not only the 
superficial elements of prejudice, but the ideological basis for it, “failure” in terms of 
adherence to a dominant standard of success was almost inevitable. 
 Almost thirty years before his acceptance of the Spingarn Medal, Chesnutt 
described The Marrow of Tradition as a “purpose novel” (Essays 169). This purpose was 
to “throw light upon the vexed moral and sociological problems which grow out of the 
presence, in our Southern states, of two diverse races, in nearly equal numbers” (Essays 
169). The metaphor of “throwing light” is apt here in that Chesnutt goes on to describe 
the true problem of racial division to be the concept of “tradition” which has no corporeal 
presence in itself. As I argued in my previous chapter, systems of signification such as 
tradition participate in the sub-stance of the historical development of discourse as it 
effects language. According to Chesnutt, his novel attempted to “picture, through the 
medium of narrative, the atmosphere in which these problems must be worked out – an 
atmosphere of which the dominant note is Tradition” (Essays 169). In a somewhat odd 
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evasion, Chesnutt never exactly defines the “problems” that arise from the “two diverse 
races.” Instead, Chesnutt describes the “atmosphere” in which problems arise and are 
worked through. To describe Tradition as an atmosphere, in the context of his metaphor, 
gives it a structurally determinative role that has a dialectic movement in history. If, as in 
his term “the parallax,” no single position can be taken with certainty of its ground, the 
metaphor of vision and light as illuminating truth changes its significance. As Lacan 
termed such relationships, tradition creates the effect of “seeing oneself” in the act of 
seeing but from another point of view. Because the self must be mediated through its 
object, the distortions of the atmosphere in which the imago of the self is created 
determine that representation to some degree. Tradition operates more like technology 
than a positive categorical statement. It structurally inflects rather than creates. Rather 
than vectors of light, tradition plays the role of an additional refraction of that light that 
creates the image that we take to be reality. Tradition, then, is not an object itself. It is 
material, however, in that it must be approached by way of its real effects on 
representations and their distortions. It is in The Marrow of Tradition where Chesnutt 
most extensively structures his novel to account for this concept of “tradition,” and it is in 
that novel that the complex temporality of prejudice is most fully incorporated into the 
structure of his narrative. 
 
Why Does the World Want to Murder a Child? 
 It is perhaps unsurprising that a novel structured around the absent sub-stance of 
Tradition should be so confusing a plot for critics. By the publication of The Marrow of 
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Tradition in 1901, Chesnutt was at the height of his ambitions for a career in fiction 
writing. In Chesnutt’s own words, the plot of the novel is fairly straightforward. It has 
“several threads of interest, the chief incidents being concerned with the fate of the child 
of a proud old family [, The Carterets,] related by an unacknowledged tie to the family of 
a colored doctor,” Dr. Miller (Essays 169). The “father of the child leads a reaction 
political movement against the Negro, while the doctor is at the head of an enterprise for 
the education and uplift of his people” (Essays 169). Besides these main “threads,” there 
is also “a crime, followed by a threatened lynching” and an “episode of injury and 
revenge, another of wrong and forgiveness” (Essays 169). Chesnutt’s own description of 
the plot of his novel differs noticeably, however, from those given by his critics. In 
summarizing the novel, Chesnutt’s critics rarely place the focus of the plot on Major 
Carteret’s child, as Chesnutt does. More often, they focus on Major Carteret’s attempt to 
win political advantage for his white supremacist movement, on Miller, the “colored 
doctor” that is attempting to “uplift” his people, or upon the interplay between the Miller 
family and the Carterets.10 
 Each of these acts of attention by critics, of course, is entirely reasonable as the 
structure of the novel, its weaving together of several threads that at times are related and 
at others are not, requires the reader to choose what he or she considers most important as 
his or her conscience dictates. At the same time it seems telling that Chesnutt and his 
                                                 
10 Critics William L. Andrews and Ryan Simmons both take the Carteret and Miller families together as a 
dialectic center of the novel. Matthew Wilson and Julia Lee understand Miller himself as either the 
“mouthpiece” for Chesnutt and therefore the novel as a whole or the consciousness through which the main 
themes of the novel work themselves out (Wilson 113). Dean McWilliams and Willie J. Harrell, on the 
other hand, find abstract foci for the novel in the contest between the “political” and the “family” plots or in 
“southern prejudice” taken as a homogenous whole (McWilliams 155; Harrell 27). 
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critics should so immediately diverge from one another, not only on what the novel is 
about, but also in what kind of abstract terms the novel should be discussed. Chesnutt’s 
critics prefer to consider the novel in terms of either a literal or metaphoric topography. 
Many critics choose to find a particular character to attribute the ethical “center” of the 
plot and draw their map of event relative to that center in an attempt to find the 
authoritative voice, le sujet supposé savoir, which will be a correct place of judgment on 
the rest of the action. The hinterlands of the plot are then understandable to the degree 
that an organizing center makes use of them for didactic purposes that reinforce the 
values of a particular centralized institution. Miller’s calm, bourgeois rationality and 
focus on the protection of property and family (which does, in fact, closely mimic the 
kind of approach Chesnutt often took to his own affairs), for example, inflects how we 
should read the values voiced by other, more revolutionarily-minded characters. 
Alternately, those who prefer a more literal topography make sense of the novel through 
its battle lines. Either the two families, who occupy different sections of the segregated 
town, or the two races taken as a wholes and are literally, topographically cordoned off 
from each other constitute the tensions of the plot of the novel. For Chesnutt, however, 
these topographies are less important than the Carteret child’s “destiny.” Rather than any 
topography that understands narrative conflict in the quasi-militaristic vocabulary of 
certain kinds of revolutionary politics, Chesnutt prefers the unfolding of a particular 
weakly causal problematic, more related to the mechanics of a particular institution’s 
functioning or non-functioning than the topography of total relations. In other words, 
rather than the metaphoric relations between the workings of a town’s political totality 
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and the topographic, synchronic images we use to understand them, Chesnutt prefers the 
metonymic or diachronic - the town not as a static totality but as a dialectic function 
within a mutating totality. 
 The novel itself begins with the birth of the new Carteret child. After a difficult 
delivery, the narrator describes Major Carteret as breathing “a silent prayer of 
thanksgiving” for the new life, knowing “in advance that it will bear its Father’s Name” 
(MoT 10, “Ideology” 176). “All nature” also rejoices at the birth of the child “in 
sympathy with the happiness at the fruition of this long-deferred hope, and to predict for 
this wonderful child a bright and glorious future” (MoT 10). The narrator describes the 
birth of the child as a manifold relation, not simply to the parents of that child, but to an 
anthropomorphized “nature” itself. At the same time, when focalized through Carteret, 
contingent relationships take on added meaning. “With the child’s first cry a refreshing 
breeze from the distant ocean cooled the hot air of the chamber; the heavy odor of the 
magnolias, with its mortuary suggestiveness, gave place to the scent of rose and lilac and 
honeysuckle. The birds in the garden were singing lustily” (MoT 9-10). For Carteret, the 
material and the social are intertwined naturally. Carteret experiences the 
anthropomorphic pairing of natural and social development as unproblematic, as for 
himself. Carteret remains alienated from the nature that grounds his concept of 
patriarchal progression in that his own power is in the transmission of the “Father’s 
Name” rather than this own being. Yet, Carteret experiences this alienation as for him. 
With this introduction to Major Carteret, we see Chesnutt replicating the machinations of 
dominant ideology outlined by Howells in my previous chapter as a kind of “mythic 
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thought” understood metaphorically as a kind of magic. The natural order and the human 
order are placed in parallel with the child already assumed to provide a racial continuity 
of the family name from a past and into the future. The social and the natural are, from 
this point of view, in “sympathy” with one another. Because it is a description of 
dominant ideology, however, this particular form of magic, the juxtaposition of two 
heterogeneous regimes of signification, is understood when focalized through Carteret as 
simply the way things are in a kind of natural magic. 
 In a move that Chesnutt will repeat in the novel, however, chapters that are 
focalized around Major Carteret, such as the first, will widen their scope at the very end 
to establish a parallax position. The primary rhetorical mode in which Chesnutt describes 
parallax in his novel is litotes. In this case, the litotic parallax is established through a 
servant whose job requires her to be in close contact with the Major. With the birth of the 
child, the narrator adds an ironic view from Mammy Jane, the child’s black nurse who 
has been with the family for decades. Unlike the Major, Jane was “not entirely at ease 
concerning the child” (MoT 10). Mammy Jane discovers under the child’s ear 
a small mole, which led her to fear that the child was born for bad luck. Had the 
baby been black, or yellow, or poor-white, Jane would unhesitatingly have 
named, as his ultimate fate, a not uncommon form of taking off, usually resultant 
upon the infraction of certain laws, or, in these swift modern days, upon too 
violent a departure from established social customs. It was manifestly impossible 
that a child of such high quality as the grandson of her old mistress should die by 
  141 
judicial strangulation; but nevertheless the warning was a serious thing, and not to 
be lightly disregarded. (MoT 10). 
With the narrator’s shift in focalization comes a shift in the “suggestiveness” of nature’s 
anthropomorphic relation to socially produced meaning. Instead of the reciprocity that 
assumes nature to mirror the progress of patrilineal families, for Mammy Jane the mole 
under the child’s ear becomes a stigma or an “anamorphosis,” in Lacan’s sense of the 
term, the distortion that traps the desiring gaze of the viewer (Four Fundamentals 92). 
While nothing about the future of the child has been decided, the contours of any possible 
decision are structurally present before there is even an object to contour. In effect, the 
child has become the bearer of the “lethal factor,” the impossible choice, of the white 
supremacist assumptions of historical movement. The ultimate horizon of the politics into 
which the child is born requires particular kinds of symbolic deaths, in this case the 
possibility of “judicial strangulation” or the scent of magnolias. The baby, therefore, as a 
signifier metonymically displaced onto the mole for Jane, refracts meaning for both 
Carteret and Jane depending on their point of view. In this case, the baby is itself 
Chesnutt’s parallax, or the object that inhabits the gap within possible perspectives. 
 Although Jane feels it unwise to warn her employers of the danger the mole 
represents, she does go so far as to take a vial of water the child had been washed in to a 
conjure woman in the neighborhood, replacing it under the child’s pillow as a precaution. 
The resolution of the chapter, in an even more explicitly ironic mode, reinterprets 
Carteret’s narrative as a kind of “development,” as Kenneth Burke would put it, in which 
several perspectives are taken together, simultaneously (“Four Master Tropes” 512). 
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Additionally, “none of the ‘sub-perspectives’ can be treated as either precisely right or 
precisely wrong” (“Four” 512). Rather, irony charts the “return” of a term within the 
dialectic movement as its opposite (“Four” 517). The narrative juxtaposition of the two 
focalizations, the two vantage points, creates a parallax position that “refracts” meaning 
in two senses taken together. The mole redirects certain meanings (the modern usage as 
with the refraction of light) through its rhetorical accommodation of diametrically 
opposed meanings (its obscure usage) (OED). As a newborn, the child holds meaning for 
both Jane and Carteret. Yet, there can be no stable meaning about the child’s future from 
these positions on the child as a “lethal factor,” simply being a material space for adult 
speculation. As a carrier of social meaning, marked from birth, the child, ironically, in 
being born returns as not yet having been killed. From within racial logic made mobile by 
the railway, to choose life for the child is to choose to be not yet dead enough. Litotes 
describes the particular conceptual structure Chesnutt creates with his peculiar mode of 
sarcasm. 
 That the metonymic substitution of the child and his mole should occur within the 
competing discourses of magic is unsurprising given the community in which he is born. 
The “mythic thought” of Major Carteret understands magic to be simply a metaphor for 
the historical certainty of the linear progression of a racial purity that secures his own 
power. Mammy Jane’s “conjure” magic, however, is a more flexible understanding of 
systems of signification in that it operates through litotes, through the parallax, rather 
than Major Carteret’s parallelisms. Frederick Douglass in 1881 had already pointed out 
the similarities between racism along the “color-line” and the supernatural. He described 
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race prejudice as a “moral disorder, which creates conditions necessary to its own 
existence, and fortifies itself by refusing all contradiction. It paints a hateful picture, and 
distorts the features of the fancied original to suit the portrait” (Douglass 567). As a 
result, people who believe in the veracity of the portrait are similar to “those who believe 
in the visibility of ghosts” (Douglass 567). Douglass points out, recast in Lacanian terms, 
the power of race as a material signifier, a present absence or “ghost,” which structures 
the distribution of terms (le facteur létal – the distribution of its impossible choices) in 
American racial discourse. Douglass goes so far as to say that although some freedmen 
had gained some independence by 1881, he has “ceased to be the slave of an individual,” 
the freedman remains “the slave of society” (Douglass 568). It is this weak causality of 
racial thinking that is in an asymptotic sense “material,” that Chesnutt dramatizes in The 
Marrow of Tradition. As a material object, the mole is insignificant. As a pure signifier, 
however, the mole operates through litotes, creating a parallax view between two forms 
of magic, which are in turn racialized modes of viewing the juxtapositions of 
heterogeneous systems of signification. 
 Ultimately, in fact, Jane’s worries are proven correct in a certain sense. In the first 
third of the novel, the young Carteret child nearly loses his life several times by almost 
falling out of a window, choking on a small rattle, or being smothered by the family cat. 
Despite no permanent harm coming to the child, as the novel progresses, even the child’s 
mother falls “prey to the most agonizing apprehensions” about her child (MoT 46). When 
Mrs. Carteret eventually finds one of Jane’s conjure items in the child’s bedroom, her 
“first impulse was to throw the bag into the fire, but on second thoughts she let it remain. 
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To remove it would give unnecessary pain to the old nurse. Of course these old negro 
superstitions were absurd, - but if the charm did no good, at least it would do no harm” 
(MoT 108). In this example of litotes in which doing good and doing no harm are not 
entirely equivalent options, the mother’s moment of hesitation is a hesitation over two 
different parallax views on the lethal factor of the child, those of Major Carteret’s natural 
magic that structures a white supremacist history and the conjure that produces 
Chesnutt’s parallax view. In effect, conjure actually occurs within the diegesis to the 
degree that the prejudicial thinking embedded in language structures the discourse of its 
characters. Conjure here operates through a weak causality structured by litotes, forming 
parallax positions. The immaterial structures of prejudicial discourses produce actual 
effects through the mother’s actions whose basis is in the gap of a series of metonymies 
beginning with the mole and continued through Mammy Jane’s conjure objects. Conjure, 
then, describes the weak causality of historical movement in opposition to the direct 
causality assumed by Major Carteret’s natural magic that underpins the white 
supremacist understanding of unproblematic, linear history. 
 Chesnutt, in fact, develops the theme of “magic” as a way of structuring 
perspectives on causality to a greater extent toward the end of the novel regarding social 
structures as a whole rather than particular political actors. Magic returns in the final 
scenes of the novel in a more threatening because less obvious form. The culmination of 
Major Carteret’s efforts to consolidate political control of the town for whites is a “riot” 
that takes up the last chapters of the novel. In the morning of the riot, at “three o’clock 
sharp the streets were filled, as if by magic, with armed white men” (MoT 274). The 
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crowd, like the mob in The Colonel’s Dream, is not described as an unruly, desiring id. 
Rather, the agency of the scene operates through the repetition compulsion of 
technological logic. The crowd is present in that it operates and creates effects but exists 
nowhere in particular – it occurs “as if by magic.” On that morning, “the negroes” in the 
aggregate “had noted, with uneasy curiosity, that the stores and places of business . . . 
were unduly late in opening” (MoT 274). Later, “every passing colored man was ordered, 
by the first white man he met, to throw up his hands . . . When he met with another group 
of white men the scene was repeated” (MoT 274). The crowd is not that of Benjamin’s 
flâneur within the American context. Rather than an inchoate mass, tradition operates as 
a regulating function to legitimize an almost bureaucratic adherence to a repetitive, 
regulatory process. The time of prejudice is never exactly present because it is never an 
event within a linear causal structure. Rather, it is a-temporal because it is iterative within 
the logic of spaces of relative security that are unevenly distributed along racial lines. 
 Earlier in the novel, the principles that would be put into action at the end are 
articulated during a meeting of the white supremacist elements of the town. McBane, 
Carteret, and General Belmont, the leaders of the explicitly white supremacist movement, 
are oddly explicit about these terms. As the General puts it, implicitly invoking the 
language of Max Nordau, they “cannot carry on politics in these degenerate times without 
a certain amount of diplomacy” (MoT 81). In “the good old days” before the war, white 
citizens could command blacks as they would “convicts” (MoT 81). In this “modern age,” 
however, they “must profess a decent regard for the opinions of even that misguided 
portion of mankind which may not agree with us. This is the age of crowds, and we must 
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have the crowd with us” (MoT 81). To have the “crowd with us” however, is not only a 
matter of rhetoric but of the control of political space (which is to say all space in the era 
of the total train system) through technological means. In effect, the “riot” comes into 
being through the combination of technologized space that is available for iterative, 
managerial control and the tradition that modulates the visible for racial division. The riot 
only happens after it has happened and will continue to happen as long as the conditions 
for the effect are generally assumed. 
 The odd relationship between technology as a dominant system of relationships 
that mediate the social and the material is stated explicitly at a seemingly insignificant yet 
decisive moment in the text. In response to a potential lynching in the middle of the 
novel, one of the more revolutionarily-minded black citizens of the town, Josh Green, at 
one point suggests that the black citizens “kin fight, ef [they] haf ter” to save the man 
whose life is in danger (MoT 191). Dr. Miller responds, however, that it would be 
inadvisable to do so as messages “would at once be sent to every town and country in the 
neighborhood. White men from all over the state, armed to the teeth, would at the 
slightest word pour into the town on every railroad train, and extras would be run for 
their benefit” (MoT 191). In this exchange, the relationship between pre-judicial politics, 
technology, and time is brought fully into conjunction. The technological system of the 
railroad does not need to actually bring mobs of white men to kill in order to maintain 
dominant power relations. The mere presence of the railway makes accessible certain 
actions that, in turn, support a particular ideology of predictive action. The circulation of 
the railroad, then, with its acceleration of goods and customers effectively limits actions 
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of others through its potential to create crowds in Chesnutt’s sense, crowds whose 
operation is not random but controlled through tradition. Because of the railroad, crowds 
functionally exist everywhere in that they can potentially exist anywhere. 
 Several critics of Chesnutt have sought to illuminate the political significance of 
the riot that takes up the final chapters of the novel by attempting to trace its real, 
historical model. The most obvious candidate, and the one the Chesnutt explicitly 
mentioned as influencing the novel, is the “riot” that took place in Wilmington, North 
Carolina in 1898. Linda Beleau and Ed Cameron have argued that Chesnutt’s The 
Marrow of Tradition attempts to “represent the African American perspective” on that 
real event in a fictional mode (Beleau and Cameron 7). Fictional works, in this argument, 
serve to “recontextualize” journalistic accounts in order to supplement the racial 
“blindness” of reporters whose bias affects their narration of history (Beleau and 
Cameron 7). Critic Gordon Fraser has made the case, however, that Chesnutt’s novel 
diverges significantly from the historic records about Wilmington. In order to “synthesize 
the dyadic critical readings [The Marrow of Tradition] engenders” one must also take 
into account details from the New Orleans race riot of 1900 (Fraser 19). Fraser does not, 
however, explain how one could “synthesize” a “dyadic” reading by pointing out which 
historical precedent might “most” prefigure a literary one, confusing categorical for 
statistical reasoning (Fraser 19). As Gilles Deleuze points out, “repetition is not 
generality” (Difference and Repetition 1). That something can be said to repeat does not 
grant it the status of the transcendental. That details from a historical account have close 
analogues in a work of fiction, even at the admission of the author, does not make that 
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repetition significant as a generalization. Chesnutt’s use of parallax positions to structure 
the novel, in fact, lead us away from the impulse to establish a “true” historical 
connection in favor of the structural links created by technological systems. Through the 
repetition of power relationships, the technological system gives the grounds for the 
appearance of a transcendental principle of history to the white supremacists. Because the 
technological system allows for the rapid circulation of people, the presence of the white 
mob must be taken into account in each political decision by the black citizens of the 
town. Again, although absent, the effect of the railroad is to make the potential for a mob 
quasi-present at all times under certain weakly causal circumstances. What must be taken 
into account in understanding the novel’s relationship to history is not simply all the riots 
that did, in fact, occur, but also all the riots that did not occur. 
 The particular moment of decision Dr. Miller and Josh Green find themselves in 
is also structured through the technological by a calculation that requires a hesitation. 
Causes and effects within such a technological system can no longer practically be 
limited to the simple application of abstract principles to a particular case. Rather than 
being an “assimilationist,” Dr. Miller’s point is not that the lynching should not be 
stopped, but that stopping it would come at a cost higher than the reward given the 
potential existence of white mobs anywhere. Far from being an agent of progress in any 
sense other than the economic, then, the railroad effectively creates a different kind of 
hesitation in political calculation. The white citizens of the town, because the railroad 
supports the concept of progress that benefits them, are able to pretend as if a classic 
sense of subjectivity and political action still exists. For a white citizen of the town 
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lynching was “as a rule, unjustifiable,” yet that citizen maintains that “there were 
exceptions to all rules, - that laws were made, after all, to express the will of the people in 
regard to the ordinary administration of justice, but that in an emergency the sovereign 
people might assert itself and take the law into its own hands, - the creature was not 
greater than the creator” (MoT 193). In this neat evasion of the point through the 
misapplication of an anthropomorphism, any and all actions become permissible when 
they are grounded by a concept of “the people” that is supported by a white supremacist 
concept of linear, progressive history. 
 The implicit question, then, of political action from within the technological 
system looks fairly bleak. It is unsurprising to some extent that one of the most repeated 
lines describing The Marrow of Tradition is that of William Dean Howells when 
reviewing the novel on its release. Howells considered the novel too “bitter” in its 
political outlook, an assessment that has been repeated by critics ever since, including 
Chesnutt himself. If, however, this novel is “bitter,” of what does that bitterness consist? 
For Howells, there is “no reason it should not be so, if wrong is to be repaid with hate, 
and yet it would be better if it were not bitter” (“Counter-current” 882). Chesnutt, in his 
novel, became “inartistic” to the degree that he played “the advocate” for a particular 
group (“Counter-current” 882). Even Howells whose assessment of “bitterness” has been 
over-simplified through the years of critical citations to a less complicated opinion of the 
novel than is really the case, cannot escape the litotic logic that Chesnutt uses in the 
novel. There is “no reason it should not be” bitter, yet, from within the parallax, Howells 
simply asserts arbitrarily that is should not be so. 
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 Unlike Howells, whose arbitrary denial of the parallax implicitly takes as its basis 
the dominant ideology of history, the novel itself importantly ends on an ambiguity. But, 
as is fitting for a novel riddled with parallaxes, the terms of that ambiguity are important 
and necessarily arise from the manner in which racial division and technological thinking 
have been developed in the novel. In the course of the riot that takes up the last chapters 
of the novel, the Carteret child, once again, is put in danger. Rather than giving an 
obvious melodramatic ending in which the Cartets and the Millers transcend their racial 
divide and save the child, the novel gives somewhat more ambiguous ending, although 
one suggestive of that melodramatic option. The final moments of the novel are taken up 
with a question and a response between Dr. Miller and another doctor. Miller asks if the 
Carteret child “is still alive” (MoT 329). In response, Dr. Evans replies: “Yes, thank God . 
. . but nearly gone . . . There’s time enough, but none to spare” (MoT 329). In The 
Colonel’s Dream, Major French’s sickly child is killed by the disaster structurally created 
by the railroad. In The Marrow of Tradition, however, the Carteret child remains alive 
“enough,” despite the constant threat of disaster. The lives of these children are 
metonymic for the patrilineal guarantee for the forward motion of history, yet, within the 
technological system that history’s linearity is precarious at best. From within the 
parallax, the moment of hesitation constitutes the present from which alternate histories, 
and perhaps non-linear histories such as those Henry Adams attempted become possible. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Empire of Coal: Henry Adams and Progress without Sequence 
In the course of the nineteenth century, as the bourgeoisie consolidated its positions of 
power, the concept of progress would increasingly have forfeited the critical functions it 
originally possessed. (In this process, the doctrine of natural selection had a decisive role 
to play: it popularized the notion that progress was automatic. The extension of the 
concept of progress to the whole of human activity was furthered as a result.) 
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project N11a, 1 
 
 Ainsi qu’on le dit de certain carrières, l’histoire mène à tout, mais à condition d’en 
sortir. 
Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage. (1962) 
 
At past fifty, Adams solemnly and painfully learned to ride the bicycle. 
Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (1918) 
 
The Story of an Absence 
 By the first decade of the twentieth century, like William Dean Howells with 
whom he had been a member of “The Club” of Boston cultural and intellectual elites in 
the 1870s, Henry Adams had become disenchanted with American society. The Western 
world as a whole had “snapped” its “continuity” somewhere around 1900, he claimed in 
his Education of Henry Adams (Education 433). In his romanticized version of the 
movement of history, the West at the time of the First Crusade “was a unity . . . in 
thought, will, and object” (Mont Saint-Michel and Chartres 35). By the twentieth 
century, however, it had become a society of “multiplicity,” as he put it in the subtitle to 
his own Education. Adams’s claim recalls other, similar statements by artists and 
intellectuals who would come to be known as Modernists. Unlike Virginia Woolf’s 
famous version of the claim that “in or about December, 1910, human character 
changed,” however, Adams was more circumspect about restricting the claim to the 
sphere of “all human relations – those between masters and servants, husbands and 
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wives, children and parents” (Woolf 22). The human itself, what distinguished the 
thinking, speaking animal from the rest of inchoate nature, was in question for Adams. 
He, more quickly than most of his contemporaries, located the break in humanity’s 
concept of itself within nature in the reorganization of thought brought about by new 
technologies. The difference between Woolf’s and Adams’s verbs in describing the 
modern situation is, in fact, decisive. When he claimed that civilization had “snapped” he 
was being very nearly literal. 
 As we have seen in previous chapters, American progressive ideology in the late 
Nineteenth Century often assumed social and economic growth to be a necessary 
corollary to scientific certainty and increasing technological complexity, an assumption 
not necessarily questioned by Woolf’s formulation of the situation. Many people 
assumed, for a variety of reasons which became overdetermined in time, that it was 
impossible for “society,” conceived as a quasi-biological whole encompassing all human 
activities whose development can only be linear, to go both forward and backward. As 
Henry Adams’s brother, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., put it in 1869, gravitation “is the 
rule, and centralization the natural consequence, in society no less than in physics. 
Physically, morally, intellectually, in population, wealth, and intelligence, all things tend 
to concentration. One singular illustration of this law is almost entirely the growth of this 
century” (“A Chapter of Erie” 12). In other words, many Americans assumed that that 
linear, historical sequence follows universal principles which grounded its development a 
priori. On the face of it, this seems intelligible enough in that it has a clear geometry to it 
which takes all potential claims about reality to function along the lines of classical 
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mechanics. Such geometries become problematic, however, when dealing with ideology, 
whose structuring functions are often much more indirect. After the economic crash of 
1893 which nearly ruined his family’s fortune, Henry Adams moved from simply 
questioning why Americans took progress to be a self-evident truth, to actively arguing 
against the hasty equivalence between the increasing complexity of a scientific and 
technological system that underpinned capitalism and the social development of the 
humans that used that system. Although he did not always have the vocabulary to 
articulate it, for Adams such an equivalence always hid the degree to which technology 
and even science itself were also beholden to ideological formations as an activity done 
by humans within real, historical institutions despite their presumed status as entirely 
disinterested. As his career developed, he attempted to come to terms with the new 
“multiplicity” in its specificities. 
 This chapter will argue that Henry Adams’s thought developed along with the 
ideological relationship between American progressivism and technological systems. 
Most importantly, Adams was particularly sensitive to the rise and ossification of the 
ideological implications of the railway for social thought. These implications carried on 
after the railway itself began to recede from the forefront of political struggle after the 
nineteenth century. For Adams, the ossification of the railway system as an ideological 
framework led to what he called the global “empire of coal.” This was not an empire of a 
central government over other, conquered nations, but rather an empire of a set of 
conceptual relations established by the total train system that created its own subjects to 
the degree that they were within the reach of the combination of its technologies that 
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organized space and abstract capitalist circulation within that space. Coal, the fuel for the 
railway, became in effect the coin of the realm which served as the entrance fee for its 
subjects to participate in the game as a player rather than serving as a cost of playing. 
Although this empire created the impression of linear development in that it was growing 
in speed and scope, it did so at the cost of traditional historical causality which was often 
obscured behind the spectacular images of capitalist development – its novel machines, 
massive wealth, and equally massive economic crises. Once the railway had filled 
political space and ideologically ossified a particular set of articulations, its logic became 
dominant for the maintenance of global capitalism.  
The “empire of coal” signified the unification of the world as a technological and 
capitalist system for Adams but, at the same time, historically cut it off from any causal 
continuity with the past except as a rhetorical gesture to be activated in the name of a 
nationalism that rallied populations as a local tactic to secure a better bargaining position 
in the global game of exchanges. What the empire gained in the extension of space within 
which its endless exchanges occurred at an accelerating rate, it lost in a causal relation to 
what had come before it. Although the railway was a product of Western society, for 
Adams, it brought out a set of contradictions in Western thought about progress that 
could no longer be tenably held without embarrassment to everyone involved. These 
contradictions had been there from the very beginning but required the particular, 
historically contingent ideological formulation of the railway to bring them to a point of 
“snapping” at the end of the nineteenth century. 
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 From Adams’s first two novels and his early journalistic work I will demonstrate 
the process by which Adams became disenchanted with the progressivist assumption of 
linear historical development that technologies such as the railway seemed to support. 
Rather than a continuation of the Enlightenment tradition Adams felt himself beholden 
to, the railway, although created by that tradition, brought out contradictions in American 
assumptions of historical development that set that tradition at odds with itself in a kind 
of historical impasse that Adams could no longer accept after the 1880s. Turning to 
specific historical events surrounding the development of the railway system and its 
technologies, I argue that the railway offered new concepts of articulation that were both 
the result of bourgeois ideas of sequence but exceeded them in important ways to make 
the abstraction of causal sequence from technological certainty to human history 
impossible for Adams. By initially limiting spatial relations to accommodate for the 
railway, containing populations along its own lines, new political formations ossified as a 
result.  Finally, turning to his later works, the Education, his Letter to American Teachers 
of History, and his Mont Saint-Michel and Chartres¸ Adams began to develop a new 
variation on the concept of the modern subject that was formed by this spatial 
containment and incorporated the technological into its own operations. At the same time, 
this new concept of the subject had the effect of creating a new model of racial thinking. 
In Adams’s case, Jews rather than African-Americans would serve as a model for a 
racialized Other in the West. After the consolidation of the “empire of coal,” Western 
society as a whole could be treated as an organism at a higher level of abstraction, open 
to the metaphor of biological determinism in a more expansive sense that compensated 
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for its failure to describe differences between individuals. Racism, therefore, rather than a 
biological difference, became a spatial difference, marked by who was or was not 
contained within the “ghetto,” the space geographically within but conceptually outside 
of capitalist circulation. 
 In his early career, roughly from his return from England to the United States in 
1868 where he had been secretary to his father who had served as ambassador for the 
United States during the Civil War to the upheaval in his personal life most notably 
brought about by the suicide of his wife in 1885, Henry Adams had largely followed his 
contemporaries in his assumptions of the necessarily linear nature of historical progress. 
The United States government had been a political space where elected officials met as 
bearers of “personal and political credit” placed in them by the “common interest” of 
those they represented, conceived of as a simple aggregate of individual interests (“The 
Legal-tender Act” 303-4). “Common interest” guaranteed an approximation of a 
community’s collective will, more or less agreed upon between the individuals of the 
nation. The public, according to Adams “has so thoroughly adopted the idea that it is 
itself the responsible governing power, and its representatives only delegates to enroll its 
orders, that the healthy process of criticising [sic] a policy once adopted seems to it 
almost an attack on its own authority” (“Legal-tender” 304). In other words, the 
American public had come to have the idea of government both ways. It was a mediating 
institution that did not mediate but directly expressed the will it represented. Agreement 
could be cultivated and guided into a progressive future which could, in turn, more 
perfectly reflect that common interest. Institutions such as the United States government 
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were convenient fictions that represented the reality of individual interests taken together 
in an abstract “common interest” for the sake of efficiency in practical instances of 
decision-making. For a young Adams, it was almost an inevitability that he would 
personally aid in this progress by going to Harvard College and afterwards entering the 
federal government in some capacity. “For generation after generation, Adamses . . . had 
gone to Harvard College, and although none of them, as far as known, had ever done any 
good there, or thought himself the better for it, custom, social ties, and, above all, 
economy, kept each generation in the track” (Education 56). Adams, in defiance of 
tradition, became increasingly suspicious of the ability of the metaphorical railroad 
“track” he had been on to guarantee general, social progress in the name of a self-evident 
“common interest,” or, indeed, the unified Enlightenment subject it was meant to 
aggregate. 
 Already in 1869, just a year after his return to the United States, in an early 
journalistic effort, Adams was beginning to employ the figure of the machine to describe 
the ways in which institutions did not necessarily develop as functional analogies of the 
aggregate common interest. Instead, he used that figure to describe places were 
mechanisms for the circulation of an abstract power developed quasi-autonomously from 
clear human intention. The congressional session of that year was, according to Adams, a 
“witch’s cauldron . . . of corruption,” which also resembled a “machine” that “groans and 
labors under the burden” of its task (“The Session” 611). And yet, a young Adams still 
maintained that the average American could at least learn a “lesson” by hypothetically 
visiting Washington to witness the “passage . . . of some little bill, interesting only to 
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himself, and perhaps having ‘a little money in it’” and the inevitable corruption and 
inefficiency that went along with the effort (“The Session” 610). Although the 
vocabulary of the autonomous machine was already in his work in a nascent form in the 
1860s, Adams at that point retained his faith that humans could rationally overcome these 
obstacles in a linear development of the powers of the American people to best govern 
themselves. As technological systems, and most importantly for Adams the railway 
system, became a dominant rather than emergent social phenomenon in the last decades 
of the 19th Century, he put an increasing emphasis on the ways in which assumptions of 
natural historical sequence became not only difficult but impossible for anyone 
attempting to understand the development of American society. The “track” that 
Adamses had been on for generations might not, in other words, follow a clear 
progressive line into a better future. 
 Henry Adams’s early journalism in the 1870s, mainly written in conjunction with 
his brother Charles, sought to promote reform policies to prevent the corruption 
surrounding the expansion of the railway system in the United States. Reform, in their 
minds, involved the effective management of progress by an intellectual and cultural 
elite. Those who proved worthy of the task would be elevated into that rarified sphere 
while those who were unequal to it were shunted back into the “people.” By bringing 
progress under the control of rational democratic principles the harmful effects of 
irrational capitalist expansion and destructive competition between the robber-barons 
could be largely mitigated to an ever increasing degree. Adams would come in the second 
half of his career, however, to abandon his previous faith in this kind of reform, in his 
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more depressed moments describing himself in terms of a new “philosophy of 
conservative anarchy” (Education 392). Even this reactionary nihilism, however, 
eventually proved untenable for a world that did, it seemed, have the organizing “stamp” 
of the railway, but which did not function along traditional lines (Education 393). Many 
critics see in Adams’s work a decisive difference between his early novels and his later 
histories. The novels, written in the 1880s, were intellectual diversions in a purely 
Victorian form for Adams while he wrote his more serious histories of the 
administrations of Jefferson and Madison. The economic and political crises of the late 
nineteenth century led Adams in the twentieth, however, to theorize and put into prose 
non-sequential experiments in historical form in an attempt to represent an economy of 
abstract forces describing technological systems that were by then fully dominant aspects 
of American society. And yet, this reading of Adams’s intellectual trajectory may place 
too much unexplained confidence in typically “modernist” literary tropes to demarcate 
the serious from the non-serious in literature. Although Henry Adams explicitly claimed 
to William James (though the degree to which Adams was simply attempting to flatter the 
James family is open to speculation) that his later works attempted something like the 
experiments of Henry James, I argue that the novels are an important step in Adams’s 
trajectory and should not be dismissed by critics simply for not being Henry James. 
 Despite Adams’s reputation as a representative American Modernist on the basis 
of his experimental histories, Mont Saint-Michel and Chartres and The Education of 
Henry Adams, both published in the early twentieth century, it seems surprising that 
critics would consider him at the same time so inept at the representative modernist 
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genre, the novel. Although since the 1980s, some critics have attempted to recuperate his 
“under-appreciated” and “brilliant but underrated” early novels, the prevailing sentiment 
has been that Adams was an inartistic novelist whose “failure” is primarily interesting to 
the degree that it illustrates “the dangers which his better work overcomes” (Mind and 
Art 89, MacFarlane vii, Scheiber 353). In one critic’s summary, the novel as a genre has 
“always been modern – always concerned mainly with contemporary life, as the name 
suggests,” adding that the novel’s ability to represent a polyphonic “formal difference” 
allows it to respond to a new “world of change,” of “trauma, disaster, conflict, and war” 
(Matz 1, 7, 8). Adams’s novels, for many critics, did not have the interest in literary form 
that expressed this new “world of change,” creating only indifferently interesting novels. 
Putting aside the purely aesthetic question of whether or not these Modernist tropes are 
better or more authentic art than others, I argue that there is more continuity in Adams’s 
work than many critics admit, in the sense that his later, experimental works attempt to 
represent the new modes of articulation that compensated for the problems at the level of 
narrative with which he dealt in his early novels. These narrative problems, in turn, were 
precisely those brought about by the railway’s confusion of causality that American 
culture more generally was attempting to reconcile. Both the formally traditional novels 
and the later, experimental histories equally deal with a world of “change” but 
importantly conceive of that change in different ways that change along with Adams’s 
understanding of how society functions. 
 His two novels, the anonymous Democracy and pseudonymous Esther, both 
published in the 1880s, are essentially the same novel but cast in different sub-sets of 
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American society. Both novels represent an individual attempting to comprehend the 
veiled prime motor that they assume to structure the rules for their particular sub-set. For 
Democracy the abstract social energy of “common interests” functions as a veiled prime 
motor for specific political actions whereas the Christian God does so with personal 
decisions in the case of Esther. Whereas William Dean Howells simply intuited the 
connection between American Christian Millennialism and American bourgeois 
progressivism as equivalent guarantors of historical movement, Adams brought the 
weight of his impressive knowledge of both the Medieval Christian tradition and modern 
American politics to bear in his attempts to describe those traditions and their particular 
problematics. The veiled prime motor, an image Adams borrowed from Thomas Aquinas 
but also applied to the modern forces of capitalist society, was particularly attractive to 
Adams as a thought-object. As a model for action at a distance, the motor seemed to 
account for those aspects of American society that did not obviously stem from a concept 
of individual human will. At the same time, this model of action at a distance that is 
hidden from but controls the individual became a conceptual impasse for Adams when he 
attempted to use it to describe any kind of willed progressivism. The more modern 
technological systems were imbricated into Capitalism in the name of progressivism, the 
more it became impossible for Adams to think actively from within the logic of American 
progressivism itself. 
 In each of Adams’s novels, a free-thinking young woman is inducted into a social 
system that produces and distributes abstract power, the intrigues of Washington politics 
or the intrigues of New York Christian society, respectively. Each woman is given the 
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choice between two overdetermined marriage options, with one suitor representing the 
chaos of individual will and the other the order of strict determinism. Both women 
ultimately choose neither suitor, finding both to be unpalatable for reasons that 
importantly shift from the first to the second novel. As with Aquinas’s famous 
watchmaker God, the veiled prime motors in Adams’s novels stand outside of society 
which they structure through their specific principles of articulation. To understand the 
society that one is in, for Adams in his early years, one must understand the principles of 
its external motor that to a variable degree controls human action at a distance. These 
motors cannot be directly observed but only deduced from the articulations within history 
that the motor has determined in advance. Historical progress, the progress towards 
Judgment Day or a bourgeois Utopia, might be mysterious in its specific features from 
within its movement but, at a higher level of abstraction, was guaranteed by the motor 
that was outside of that historical movement. 
 In their narrative form, each novel is, in fact, structured in a way that strangely 
resembles the classic mystery novel, though they predate the publication of Conan 
Doyle’s first Holmes stories by several years. Between the narratives of the protagonists 
and their attempts to understand an a-historical, structuring motor, both stories 
“superimpose” two temporal schemes in a single narrative as Tzvetan Todorov has 
argued about the traditional mystery story, quoting George Burton (Todorov 44). For a 
traditional mystery narrative the first story is the “story of an absence,” the crime itself 
whose inaccessibility is a prerequisite for the telling of the story of the crime’s detection 
(Todorov 46). The second, “just as excessive” narrative, that of the detective, “serves 
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only as a mediator between the reader and the story of the crime” (Todorov 46). In the 
traditional mystery story, the two temporalities are two sequences of events, those of the 
crime and its later detection. Put in Bakhtin’s terms, the typical mystery story has a 
chimeric chronotope. The sequence of events in the narrative serve only as an index of 
another, already completed chronotope. For Adams’s metaphysical mystery stories, 
however, the protagonists attempt to reconstruct the a-temporal principles of articulation 
already at work in the narrative of the protagonist. The narrative does not attempt to 
reconstruct a previous time-space, but rather the timeless principles that make the 
protagonist’s story’s chronotope certain for its own characters. Adams’s protagonists 
continually put off decisions until they can be certain of the correctness of the tropes of 
the narrative they are in. If every “work of art is an uncommitted crime,” for Adams’s 
first two novels this is because the revelation of the prime motor never becomes a 
present, unmediated, or certain ground upon which to base decisions about the future 
(Adorno 111). In each case, the presence of either a truly representative government or 
God can only be metaphorically represented as a machine whose motor is essentially 
veiled and can only be arbitrarily assumed through the mechanistic effects it is assumed 
to govern. 
 Democracy tells the story of Madeline Lee, a wealthy New York widow who, 
“tortured by ennui” in discovering that “so much culture should lead to nothing – 
nothing,” moves from New York City to Washington D.C. (Democracy 3). In doing so, 
she hoped to “see with her own eyes the action of primary forces; to touch with her own 
hand the massive machinery of society; to measure with her own mind the capacity of the 
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motive power” (Democracy 7). By juxtaposition, Mrs. Lee hopes to discover the 
“primary force” that “leads” society in Washington D.C. in compensation for the 
emptiness of New York culture, which Mrs. Lee understood as simply an effect of an 
absent power. In fleeing from one city to the other, she was “bent upon getting to the 
heart of the great American mystery of democracy and government” (Democracy 7). The 
terms of the “great American mystery,” here, are set on the one hand by a progression of 
not entirely metaphorical, empiricist verbs and on the other by a set of increasingly 
specific nouns. The parallelism of the construction is, in fact, a conceptual progression 
that betrays a mechanistic logic which collapses the metaphor of society and a machine. 
Mrs. Lee takes the revelation of the mystery of democracy to be a matter of “seeing,” 
“touching,” and “measuring” the particular means by which American democracy 
objectifies “primary forces” that operate “the massive machinery of society” by way of 
“motive power.” The kind of articulation Mrs. Lee expects in Washington is essentially 
technological in its mediation of abstract energy and human political ends by way of the 
principles of the machine. The difficulty of the initial description of the mystery is, in 
fact, that the metaphor by which Mrs. Lee understands the abstraction of American 
government is not metaphorical enough. 
 Mrs. Lee understands the “motive power” that emanates from “primary forces” to 
be not only represented but empirically verifiable in its sensory effects through the 
“machinery of society.” The anthropomorphism of society as a machine begins to 
collapse, however, and Mrs. Lee assumes the procedures of empirically understanding a 
machine actually to apply to society itself. There is, therefore, already in Adams’s first 
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novel a certain anxiety to the anthropomorphism of society as a machine. Although in 
this case it remains for the most part a simple analogy to explain an abstraction in 
concrete terms, the terms of the concrete half of the analogy already have a way of 
invading the more abstract half in Adams’s thinking. As Jacques Lacan points out, 
however, this invasion is not entirely surprising. When Mrs. Lee assumes these “primary 
forces” that shape both material and social articulations in the world to be essentially 
empirical some such equivocation will always occur. Whereas Mrs. Lee takes the world 
to communicate its meaning based on a priori principles of the synthesis of perceptions, a 
synthesis whose terms are set in advance by the veiled prime motor, Lacan argues that for 
the production of meaning in language the “sensorium is indifferent in the production of a 
signifying chain” (Écrits 447). Rather, the signifying chain, “imposes itself, by itself, on 
the subject” and “takes on, as such, a reality proportionate to the time” with “its own 
structure, qua signifier” which “is distributive as a rule – that is, it has several voices and 
thus renders equivocal the supposedly unifying percipiens” (Écrits 447). The reality that 
Mrs. Lee takes to be the work of a single, unfolding principle, in other words, can only be 
understood as such through a relationship to reality through a language which is initially 
essentially “distributive” rather than synthetic. Any possible synthesis can only occur 
from an initial distribution of terms in language to synthesize. Put another way, Adams, 
by way of an intuition, half-formulated the “parallax view” that Charles W. Chesnutt 
began to identify in American politics two decades later. Although Mrs. Lee may think of 
herself as a particularly alienated individual who hopes to understand her world through 
the measurement of its forces, Lacan points out that the very terms of that desire, created 
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from the split instituted by the signifier, have themselves been made to measure by the 
concepts Mrs. Lee employs to understand them. To do an injustice to La Rochefoucauld, 
in other words, we would not wonder where the power of democracy comes from had we 
not first heard it talked about. The vocabulary of technology that gives the sense of 
certainty, rather than objectively describing empirical effects, is “proportionate to the 
time,” which is to say historically contingent, as a means of producing social truth. 
 Because the ultimate source of energy the prime motor represents is essentially 
veiled, essentially absent for direct sensory experience, the terms of history’s articulacy 
are uncertain for Adams’s protagonists and can only be understood in an act of revelation 
of the whole that never arrives in full. The action of each novel consists of the repeated 
suspension of a decision of whom to marry in anticipation of a revelation of the prime 
motor that will, in turn, guarantee the mechanism and set the terms for the correct choice 
of attachment. There is, in fact, a series of partially revelatory moments in each novel. 
What is partially revealed, however, is the essential absence of those prime motors to 
immediate human understanding of the sub-stance of their worlds. Although he did not 
have a precise vocabulary to describe it, Adams comes to implicitly understand the veiled 
prime motor as a signifier in Lacan’s sense, an absent presence that dialectically 
structures concepts of reality from within its own material history. The signifier presented 
itself as a problem for an assumed linear history, grounded in a priori principles, and the 
American progressivism that assumption supported. For Mrs. Lee, moments in which 
politics should present new options that demonstrate the progression of history often 
reveal the opposite. Nothing has changed. The sovereign signifier remains within history 
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despite the contingent changing of its guard. In his early novels, Adams attempted to 
retain the features of the idealist veiled prime motor but reaches an impasse when he is 
unable to reconcile his concept of history with the dialectic movement of the signifier 
which is not outside of history’s own movement. The machine, as a metaphor that 
anthropomorphically links material reality with a priori scientific certainties initially 
attempts to ground reality in certainty but slowly reveals itself to be just as historical as 
anything else to Adams throughout his career. 
 Through the rest of the novel, Mrs. Lee attempts to understand the anxious 
anthropomorphism at work in the metaphor of democratic society as a machine that 
allows for the possibility of understanding the essential principles of an a-historic prime 
motor. While watching the investiture of a new President of the United States soon after 
her arrival in Washington, for instance, Mrs. Lee, “groaned in spirit” at a procession of 
well-wishers filing past the president and his wife (Democracy 51). The ritual was “worse 
than anything in the ‘Inferno’” for Mrs. Lee, who considered the scene to be “an awful 
vision of eternity” (Democracy 51). The new president and his wife “stood, automata, 
representatives of the society which streamed past them . . . To [Mrs. Lee] it had the 
effect of a nightmare, or of an opium-eater’s vision. She felt a sudden conviction that this 
was to be the end of American society; its realization and dream at once” (Democracy 
50-1). “What put it in [the president’s] foolish head,” asks Mrs. Lee afterward, “to cease 
being a citizen and to ape royalty” (Democracy 53). The ecstasy of Mrs. Lee’s first half-
revelation is not a direct connection with a prime motor, but the alienation of being 
subject to the signifier. The procession she witnesses reifies the signifying “chain” 
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through which the signifier is constituted in materially embedded language, the body of 
the president in this case.  
As the subject of a ritual for the endowment of the signifier, the president is not a 
subject but an object of the power of the people, a body whose subjectivity is “always 
somewhat apart,” hidden “in a car someone else is driving” as Ronald Reagan put it 
(Reagan 322). With each shake of the hand of a different yet identical “constituent,” the 
power of the people is only made present in a particular body through the endless 
repetition of an exchange. Because it must be constantly reaffirmed to remain present, the 
power of the president is, for Mrs. Lee, a mockery of the European sovereign who wields 
power over subjects from outside of the law. As a representative, the president should be 
an empty vessel through which the will of the people expresses itself. As Adams said of 
the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant, one was never sure “that he did think” (Education 
253). And yet, as the soldier that won the war, Grant “represented order” for the 
American people (Education 249). As a human body which is itself subjectified, the 
president presents a problem for the unproblematic expression of the will of the people. 
 The president, as a suspended subject-object can only be understood by Mrs. Lee 
as a dream, or an object which is subject to a dream-logic. As such, he is a signifier, 
whose essentially absent nature can never fully express a “reality that can no longer make 
itself except by repeating itself indefinitely, in some indefinitely never attained 
awakening”11 (Quatre concepts fondamentaux 69). Rather, the order that the president is 
                                                 
11 The translations of Lacan are my own here and in the next quotation and I’ve cited the French text:  
“. . . la réalité qui ne peut plus se faire qu’à se répéter indéfiniment, en un indéfiniment jamais attaint 
réveil.”  
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meant to represent can only be anthropomorphic, a mechanical repetition that reifies the 
abstraction it is meant to represent. The distortion produced by Mrs. Lee’s gaze on the 
president does not reveal the empirical forces at work in the ritual of power that might 
explain its place within a predetermined unfolding of a simple mechanism toward a 
progressive future. Rather than a clear, ideal separation between the dream of democracy 
and its realization that would guarantee the latter’s progressive path toward the former, 
Mrs. Lee’s experience of power as a signifier places both the ideal and the real 
exclusively within history, within the historical dialectic of the signifier, as America’s 
“realization and dream at once.” Because there is no ideal external to history, there is 
therefore nothing guiding the course of history from a place external to it. Thus, the 
experience of the president, because of the distortion it creates, is an experience of the 
“real” which “is that which always comes back to the same place” whether the subject 
wants it to or not but in a distorted form (Quatre 59). Whereas Charles W. Chesnutt 
might quickly understand this position of power to function as a parallax, as I argued in 
my previous chapter, Adams could not yet fully begin to think such a possibility. The 
president, as a signifier, introduces another “lethal factor” in the hesitation between 
subject and object which, in this case, is also the hesitation between a citizen and a royal 
as well as a hesitation between history as controlled by subjects or itself subject to the 
control of an absent prime motor. This impossible decision of American power writ large 
is precisely the one that is then mapped onto Mrs. Lee’s personal decision for a marriage 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Le réel est ici ce qui revient toujours à la même place – à cette place où le sujet en tant qu’il cogite, où la 
res cogitans ne le rencontre pas.” 
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partner as the novel progresses and the stakes of this equivocation are heightened for 
Mrs. Lee. 
 The choice of marriage partner, for Mrs. Lee, becomes, like her experience of the 
president, a false choice between two metaphors, the automaton and the veiled prime 
motor, the machine that expresses its principles of articulation through a repetition within 
history or an a-historical machine whose principles structure historical repetition, by 
which she hopes the presence of power can be established in order to either be guided or 
obeyed. After arriving in Washington and witnessing the inauguration, Mrs. Lee quickly 
becomes a center of Washington social life, much as Adams himself had done with his 
wife Clover. Following nineteenth century novelistic tropes, Mrs. Lee becomes quickly 
embroiled in a love triangle.12 One option is Mr. Carrington, a young lawyer from 
Virginia who had fought for the South in the Civil War. Mr. Carrington maintains a 
young Adams’s idea of progressive government. As a Southerner who fully embraced (to 
the degree that that was possible) the Northern government after the war, Mr. Carrington 
subscribes to the idea that the United States, as another character put it, is “the inevitable 
consequence of what has gone before it” and that all “our civilization aims at this mark” 
(Democracy 44). The Southern defeat in the Civil War was not a failure, but an inevitable 
if tragic step towards the perfection of American governance. Carrington fought for the 
South during the war in the same way he worked in Washington after it – out of a sense 
of duty to an inextricable destiny placed on him by his dual allegiance to the United 
                                                 
12 In fact, it is a love square but I will artificially reduce the terms here in order to sacrifice strict correctness 
in the name of expediency. Hopefully this will not greatly damage my argument as the fourth element, 
Sybil, Mrs. Lee’s sister, simply multiplies the terms established in the triangle. While Sybil does present an 
interesting variation on the terms, it is less pertinent to my argument about Adams’s intellectually trajectory 
as a whole. 
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States in general and Virginia in particular. As that minor character succinctly put it, 
American government within this framework “is the only direction society can take that 
is worth its taking . . . Every other possible step is backward, and I do not care to repeat 
the past” (Democracy 44). The necessity registered by this character is a result of the 
geometry of the metaphor which is taken to literally apply to the abstraction it attempts to 
represent. On the other hand, Mrs. Lee is also drawn to a Senator from Illinois, Silas 
Ratcliffe, the suitor she takes most seriously. Ratcliffe does not subscribe to the idea of 
representative American government but, rather, to the chaos of individual wills within a 
“political mathematics” of the arbitrary (but not random) economizing and distributing of 
political force (Democracy 90). He sees his role as a Senator to be one of willfully 
managing the forces of the nation towards his and his party’s interests which he considers 
to be as good as but not representative of anyone or anything else’s. Ratcliffe “loved 
power, and he meant to be president. That was enough” (Democracy 50). 
 The decision between suitors, by the end of the novel, comes to a head when Mrs. 
Lee makes it known that she intends to choose Ratcliffe, thereby gaining access to the 
power he represents and the ability to guide the powers of the government toward 
humane ends. Repeating her earlier “groaning,” however, Mrs. Lee slowly understands 
Ratliffe, through a series of “half revelations,” to have adopted a “distorted politics” the 
realization of which changes her decision to marry him at the last moment (Democracy 
96). Mrs. Lee makes these discoveries when Mr. Carrington reveals to Mrs. Lee in a 
letter sent because of the “necessity for [her] knowing its contents” that Ratcliffe had 
already been corrupted before the events of the novel took place. Ratcliffe had, in fact, 
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taken bribes to end his opposition to a Steamship Subsidy, and Mrs. Lee takes this as a 
sign that any attempt to influence him towards a more humane use of power would be 
fruitless (Democracy 178). Like the classic mystery narrative in the tradition of Conan 
Doyle, however, the revelation of the facts of the crime do not constitute the revelation of 
the truth of the absent story. Rather, it is the exaction of a confession, the utterance of the 
criminal that marks the narrative of facts as true, which signifies the resolution of the 
crisis. That Ratcliffe had taken money in exchange for political influence is, according to 
Ratcliffe when confronted with Carrington’s letter, “true in its leading facts” and yet 
“untrue in some details, and in the impression it creates” (Democracy 190). For Mrs. Lee, 
this statement, rather than the revelation of the facts in the letter, is the “moment” when 
“she really felt as though she had got to the heart of politics” (Democracy 191). This 
“heart,” however, rather than a simple Hobbesian “spring,” is ultimately an absence of a 
prime motor that would provide a causal structure for the brute facts.  
The crime committed by Ratcliffe was, in his own version, motiveless. The 
private interests he colluded with “made no open avowal of their reasons” and Ratcliffe 
“did not press for one” (Democracy 191). In a moment that anticipates Gore Vidal’s 
insight that the powerful “don’t have to conspire because they all think alike,” the heart 
of American politics is revealed as a structuring silence conditioned by the circulation of 
power (qtd. in Solomons). Ratcliffe did not technically violate the letter of the law and 
yet entirely violated the spirit of progressivism that Mrs. Lee assumed always to operate, 
if at times mysteriously. Reason was not necessary for, and from Ratcliffe’s point of view 
even hinders, the progress of the expansion and development of American power. 
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Whereas Mr. Carrington assumes the machinations of politics to be corrupt because they 
are secret and therefore not open to public scrutiny and debate in terms of a moral 
principle outside of historical movement, Ratcliffe understands that secrecy is not 
necessary for the machine to operate, but is merely a convenience to make the essential 
operation more efficient in particular instances. The revelation Mr. Carrington offers to 
Mrs. Lee of Ratcliffe’s corruption was never hidden in that it had always, in fact, been in 
plain view but at a structural level. At the same time, Ratcliffe’s corruption also 
demonstrates the impossibility of Carrington’s position as a viable description of the 
“truth” of American politics. 
The silence of Ratcliffe’s transaction demonstrates to Mrs. Lee that power in its 
American form is not expressive in and of itself as the unfolding of an a priori principle. 
Rather, it structures other systems of signification from within history, as a letter 
containing the truth, passed from person to person, whose revelation changes nothing 
about its function as a signifier. This circulation, even in this early work of Adams’s, can 
only be understood through the metaphor of technological articulation which seems to 
account for the ways in which Enlightenment progress fails to describe the workings of 
American politics. How could the forces of society be economized and put under the 
control of a rational Enlightenment aggregate subject if its operations were not the 
sequential unfolding of a mechanistic process but a dialectic, structuring absence that is 
mechanically repeated and circulated? The aim of this metaphysical mystery novel to 
understand the absent structure of its own chronotope, in Democracy, never comes to 
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pass but is eternally put off and evaded. Ultimately, the solution to the mystery is that 
there is, in the final analysis, no mystery at all.  
As almost a prescient comment on where Adams’s thought would go in his next 
novel, by the end of Democracy Mrs. Lee has “shaken [her] nerves to pieces” and thinks 
“what rest it would be to live in the Great Pyramid and look out for ever at the polar star” 
(Democracy 200). The “bitterest part of all this horrid story” was, according to Mrs. Lee, 
that “nine out of ten of our countrymen would say I had made a mistake” in refusing to 
marry Ratcliffe (Democracy 202). The fear that is articulated in the metaphor of politics 
and machinery is less that, as one critic put it, “mechanization has taken command and 
human reality has departed from politics” (Art and Mind 88). Rather, it is that “human 
reality” had never been a positive presence that could “depart” from anything, but was 
the effect of a distortion created by the historical movement of the signifier. The basic 
assumption of reform – that the predominantly automatic progress of society can be 
managed to increase the efficiency of its procedure – had been revealed to be not 
necessarily the case. Rather than progressive, the circulation of power in Democracy is 
iterative in the manner of an automaton or the circulation of a letter. The contingent 
features of power may change but the essential structure remains the same. The solution 
to this impasse offered by Mrs. Lee, however, is simply that of escape. By the time 
Adams came to write Esther, however, even escape has become impossible as a response 
to the machinic order as part of the development of that order is its expansion. 
Adams’s second novel Esther, written just four years after Democracy and 
published under the pseudonym Francis Snow Compton, tells an almost identical 
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narrative but on a different theme. Rather than American democracy, the veiled motor 
that the equally “free-thinking” Esther Dudley attempts to reconcile herself with is the 
“one central idea” of the Christian church, “that idea which the church has never ceased 
to embody, - I AM” (Esther 7). In this case, the titular Esther feels compelled to choose 
between two suitors, the clergyman Mr. Hazard and the atheistic world-traveler and 
geologist George Strong (loosely based on Adams’s friend Clarence King). Mr. Hazard 
attempts to convince Esther that “I AM is the starting point and goal of metaphysics and 
logic, but the church alone has pointed out from the beginning that this starting-point is 
not human but divine” (Esther 7). Strong is, on the other hand, an atheist. “Mystery for 
mystery,” he claims, “science beats religion hollow” (Esther 107). Rather than assuming 
a unified subject whose independence is guaranteed by a divine and therefore a-historical 
transcendental, Strong believes in pure historical contingency, or, as he puts it, “survival 
of the fittest” (Esther 103). “If Hazard can manage to convert Esther, let him do it,” he 
says at one point of the novel, and if “not, let her take him in charge and convert him if 
she can,” adding that he will “not interfere” (Esther 103). Like the choice in Democracy, 
these correspond to two different positions on “truth” as a means by which contingencies 
are put into order and given the sense of causal necessity. In keeping with its subject 
matter, however, the choice in Esther is more abstract than Democracy in that it is a 
choice of whether to affiliate oneself with the traditional, Christian determinism or the 
apparently novel contingency of Nineteenth Century Social Darwinism. And yet, even in 
this more abstract decision, deeply embedded in Christian society from its beginning, 
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technology interrupts the apparently balanced decision between new and old, 
conservative and progressive. 
Toward the end of the novel, taking the same position as Mrs. Lee does in the 
beginning of Democracy, Esther escapes New York on a train. Having entered into an 
engagement with Mr. Hazard that the entirety of the New York society who took 
themselves to be knowledgeable on the subject considered to be unwise, Esther breaks 
her engagement when she comes to believe that her lack of Christian faith will make 
marriage to a clergyman impossible within the practicalities of New York society. 
Fearing being persuaded otherwise by Mr. Hazard, she takes a night train to visit Niagara 
Falls to collect her thoughts. Niagara would become more and more overdetermined in 
Adams’s thinking as it developed. Twenty-six years after writing Esther, in his Letter to 
American Teachers of History, Niagara would come to represent in his mind the “system” 
that “supplied its own force . . . by degrading its own energies” (Letter 175). Or, as the 
narrator of Esther put it, to “have Niagara as a rival is no joke” (Esther 144). In Esther, 
Niagara functions as a material correlative, expressed in an anthropomorphism, to 
Hazard’s God rather than Strong’s assumptions of historical contingency. It “rambled on 
with its story, in the same steady voice, never shrill or angry, never silent or degraded by 
a sign of human failings, yet so frank and sympathetic that [Esther] had no choice but to 
like it” (Esther 143). In this sense, Esther more than Democracy, retains the hope that the 
division between the contingent and the determined has some kind of solution in the 
natural world. And yet, technology already in Esther begins to play the disruptive role it 
will come to fully articulate more fully in Adams’s later writing. 
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During the train trip to Niagara, in an unusually lyrical passage from Adams, 
Esther “felt excited by the sense of flight and the rapid motion which was carrying her 
she knew not where, - away into the infinite and unknown” (Esther 136). Unable to sleep, 
she contents herself by watching the landscape through the window of the moving train. 
Alone with the “noisy quiet of the rushing train” she “stared into the black void outside,” 
finding that nothing “in nature could be more mysterious and melancholy than this dark, 
polar world, beside which a winter storm on the Atlantic was at least exciting” (Esther 
136). It is not the view of nature that Esther finds melancholy about the experience, but 
rather the  
twinkling lights from distant and invisible farm-houses, the vague outlines of 
barn-yards and fences along doubtful roads, the sudden flash of lamps as the train 
hurried through unknown stations, or the unfamiliar places where it stopped, 
while the tap-tap of the train-men’s hammers on the wheels beneath sounded like 
spirit-rappings. These signs of life behind the veil were like the steady lights of 
shore to the drowning fisherman off the reef outside. (Esther 137) 
This moment represents a nadir for Esther. For Howells’s Marches, gazing out of a train 
window was problematic for a sense of historical continuity but not decisive. The 
problems of historical narration could be compensated for by alternate, statistical regimes 
of knowledge. For Esther, however, the experience marks a snapping that precipitates her 
decision to marry neither suitor, to choose neither future. As she puts it in the novel’s 
final line, she loves Hazard rather than Strong but cannot bring herself to submit to his 
law for all that. Unlike Niagara, which is a system that provides its own energy, 
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technology takes its energy from elsewhere, converting it and economizing it under 
prearranged conditions. Language, structured by the total train system cannot directly 
represent the life that Hazard’s law supposedly orders from the point of view of the train 
system but only give “signs of life behind the veil.” Technology as a means by which 
social ends and material means are articulated is a “veil” that is not itself “life” but, 
instead, mediates it, making it no more sensible than “spirit-rappings” from unseen 
“train-men.” Technology is essentially veiled in that, although it gives the appearance of 
a prerequisite material reality, it is in fact ideologically determined within history as well. 
It appears to lead outside by way of scientific principles, only to return once again to 
history, inescapably.  
Through its mediating function, technology reveals sensory experience to not be 
an unproblematic means of access to truth, but, instead, renders the real world into “signs 
of life” that suggest but do not guarantee causal relationships. In this moment of despair, 
the railway provides the formal context in which the indecision created by the seemingly 
opposite yet structurally similar “poles” of truth represented by the two suitors. Not 
choosing, in this case, is tantamount to an eternal hesitation between two false choices. 
Although the train seemingly moves in a straight line towards Niagara, it conceptually 
allows for the repetition of an impossible decision of the “drowning man,” brought about 
by the total train system. American progress towards either a bourgeois or Christian 
Utopia becomes not an a priori progress but a rhetorical justification for historically 
arbitrary (but not random) and unequally distributed power between “unknown stations” 
for Adams by the writing of Esther. In this sense, Esther is more pessimistic than 
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Democracy. Ultimately, in Adams’s final novel, even if the veiled prime motor did 
function in the way he assumed it to, humans would be unable to understand it from their 
position, drowning at sea. 
As Adams would later describe the break he suggests but does not develop in 
Esther, the new “power” that the railway helped introduce “was disintegrating society, 
and setting independent centres of force to work, until money had all it could do to hold 
the machine together. No one could represent it faithfully as a whole” (Education 398). In 
Adams’s late-career vocabulary, one’s relationship to abstract force, political or 
otherwise, had become “a struggle not of men but of forces” and those men “became 
every year more and more creatures of force, massed about central power-houses” 
(Education 400). Karl Marx, who Adams anxiously studied, hit upon a similar 
conclusion, albeit in different terms, when discussing the means by which Capitalism 
reproduces the working-class as an economic category of human.  Whereas the “Roman 
slave was held by chains,” the wage-laborer under Capitalism “is bound to his owner by 
invisible threads,” Marx claimed (Capital 719). These threads are invisible in that they 
are “maintained by a constant change in the person of the individual employer, and by the 
legal fiction of a contract” (Capital 719). Marx’s thread, like Adams’s veiled “power-
houses” create and accumulate “creatures of force,” that they themselves have constituted 
as subjects. These power relations do not create the illusion of reality through a direct 
force like the chains of the Roman slave, but through a formal one that is stamped in 
material reality and historical through and through. Without the assurance of a prime 
motor that is outside of history and therefore able to guarantee its path, Adams had finally 
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given up his hopes for a self-evident progressivism as his contemporaries blithely 
assumed it necessarily to exist. Technology would not, for Adams, be the expression of a 
progressive sense of history. Rather, technology would be the institution that created the 
sense of progressing in history.  
 
“I Have Met My Death” 
 As a descendant of two American presidents, and heir to the aristocratic 
assumption of national political importance, no one had been “given better cards” than 
Henry Adams in his birth (Education 10). And yet, by 1907 Adams also wrote that the 
tradition that formed him and expected him to guide the powers of the nation had been 
obviated from the beginning. Adams “and his eighteenth-century, troglodytic Boston,” as 
he put it in the often-quoted first pages of the Education, “were suddenly cut apart – 
separated forever – in act if not in sentiment, by the opening of the Boston and Albany 
Railroad; the appearance of the first Cunard steamers in the bay; and the telegraphic 
messages which carried . . . the news that Henry Clay and James K. Polk were nominated 
for the Presidency” (Education 11). The generation of Adamses that produced Henry was 
a generation whose fortunes were intimately connected to the railway, for better or worse. 
While Henry was the editor of The North American Review in the 1870s, he and his 
brother, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., collaborated on a series of articles on the corruption 
occurring in the construction of the railways that shocked the nation and launched 
Charles into a position of national importance. Partly as a result of this journalistic effort, 
Charles would go on to run the Union Pacific Railroad for several years (somewhat 
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unsuccessfully, as it happens, but even Charles could be swapped out for another 
capitalist). Just as it made Charles’s fortune, investment in railroad companies would 
almost ruin the entire family in 1893 during the spectacular economic collapse of that 
year. Through his connection with his brother, Henry Adams would have a lifelong 
interest in the railway, noting the developments in the various railway systems around the 
world on his many and varied travels. Adams would record the creation of the “Pullman 
civilization” which he dutifully reported back to his brother by correspondence 
(Education 235). As the first chapter of the Education points out, however, the railway 
introduced a split in the continuity of an American Enlightenment tradition Adams felt 
himself beholden to more than most and that he had already begun to be suspicious of in 
his early novels. By 1892, his hopes of reform dashed and his personal life shattered after 
the suicide of his wife, Adams “felt nothing in common with the world as it promised to 
be. He was ready to quit it” (Education 303). 
 The effects of this “splitting” that came with the railroad in the 1830s took 
decades to ossify their form as the railway expanded across America and the globe after 
Adams’s birth in 1838. By 1901, the railway and the technological thinking it introduced 
had shifted from an emergent to a dominant structural position within American society. 
The railway as a material object had receded from its place as an urgent political 
problem, yet the logic it had introduced remained as a structuring principle of human 
exchange in general. “Russia had vanished,” by 1901, Adams claimed in his Education, 
“and not even France was felt; hardly England or America. Coal alone was felt – its 
stamp alone pervaded the Rhine district and persisted to Picardy – and the stamp was the 
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same as that of Birmingham and Pittsburgh” (Education 393). The coal that powered the 
railway system had split Adams’s world and “stamped” it (a metaphor for the shaping of 
material reality by social relations Adams shares with English translators of Karl Marx) 
in its own form, increasing its rapidity of exchange that was both its means and its end.  
The railway had levelled society to a certain degree, making all regions reducible 
to the same term and yet separated each of those regions from any kind of linear, 
historical continuity with their images of themselves as unique political bodies with their 
own trajectories of development. One “great empire,” the entire world in this case, “was 
ruled by one great emperor – Coal” (Education 393). The engine that was the purpose of 
that coal, in Adams’s late-career imagination, was “but an ingenious channel for 
conveying somewhere the heat latent in a few tons of poor coal hidden in a dirty engine-
house carefully kept out of sight,” and whose power could be felt, importantly in a simile 
rather than a metaphor, “much as the early Christians felt the Cross” (Education 361). 
The engine was veiled, now, not by its removal from history but by its spatial relation to 
the effects it created which were, in turn, temporally condensed by the speed of 
transmission between its nodes. Coal became an emperor, then, in that it supplied the 
energy that created new kinds of historically contingent subjects through the 
technological systems of production and circulation within a specific space and over a 
specific time. The articulations required by the material circulation of power had 
reformed the sovereign signifier from an Imperator to a Capitalist system of circulation 
which established power relations indirectly, as a social form stamped on commodities 
through their circulation. Although both the Emperor and Capitalist circulation were 
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signifiers that structured reality, they did so in radically different ways that were 
historically contingent and could occur simultaneously. From the original, material 
“splitting” of a spatial relationship to Boston, to the secondary “splitting” that happened 
at the global level of the subject itself in its relationship to the nation as its Ich-ideal, the 
Enlightenment subject capable of domination over nature had itself, in other words, 
become subject to the split caused by its own efforts of domination. 
More than simply an abstract dispute over the terms by which power was 
represented in literature, Adams saw the nature of power change in the very historical 
institutions of the United States itself through the final decades of the nineteenth century 
in the political struggle over the expansion of the railway. The technologically fueled 
economic shift that brought about a conceptual shift in how Americans thought of their 
relation to the nation is, of course, too complex to fully examine in this context. As 
Henry’s brother Charles put it, any single mind can only “fail to grasp” the immensity of 
the new “Appian Way of America” and the speed with which it was constructed (“The 
Railroad System” 334). The example of the fight over the so-called “Granger Laws” in 
the Midwest in the late 1860s and early 1870s that became part of the narrative of 
expansion that the young Adams brothers documented, however, can serve as a 
representative example of one way in which steam, “as whimsical as it is powerful,” 
“proved itself to be not only the most obedient of slaves, but likewise the most tyrannical 
of masters” (“The Railroad System” 346). Through this example, we see the problem that 
became an ideological impasse for Adams in his literature playing out in the history of 
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the United States itself and gain a better sense of what kind of new articulation the 
railway brought about that so affected Adams. 
If society had “split,” according to Adams, because of the conceptual changes 
ushered in by the railway, the fight that led to the Granger laws demonstrates the 
peculiarities of this shift. These laws, instituted mainly in the Midwest at the state level 
throughout the 1870s and instituted at the federal level in 1887 by the Interstate 
Commerce Act, sought to regulate the monopolistic tendencies of the railway companies 
as they developed and their practices changed. They were passed by state and federal 
representatives largely to placate Midwestern farmers (thus, “granger” laws) who 
believed the rate-setting practices of the railway companies were prejudicial against 
them. It was common practice in the 1860s and 70s, as the Minnesota railway lawyer and 
eventual President of the Chicago Great Western Railway, A.B. Stickney, described it, 
for railway lines to offer different rates for carrying commodities on different stretches of 
track. While it began as a pragmatic measure by the railways in part to subsidize 
construction and operation in frontier areas where mass agriculture had not yet been 
developed, over time the practice began to be wielded by the companies as a way to 
control which areas of the country would be developed and which would not to benefit 
their own interests. As Stickney unequivocally put it, a manager of a few thousand miles 
of railroad track in the 1880s had the power “through malice, ignorance, or stupidity, to 
decree which out of say a thousand cities and villages located on his lines should prosper, 
and which should not” (Stickney 6-7). In other words, the potential for malice, ignorance, 
or stupidity in a particular manager may or may not have existed before the railway 
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system but that system’s structuring of political space made certain expressions of malice 
possible that had not been before. The railway itself was unmotivated but shaped the 
expression of motivation depending on who controlled its workings. With the passing of 
the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, the federal government made it “unlawful for any 
common carrier” in the United States “to make or give any undue or unreasonable 
preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, 
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever” (Interstate Commerce 
Act, Sec. 3). The power relationship and the means by which it could be acted upon 
between the managers of the technological infrastructure and labor had, however, by that 
time already been largely set. 
What is more interesting to my discussion of Adams than the institution of a 
relatively pragmatic problem and citizens’ attempts to legislate away its effects, however, 
is the dialectic means by which the problem developed and, in that process, created 
political bodies by way of a spatial division and with a specific class consciousness out of 
previously disparate farmers, in what economic historians occasionally somewhat 
ominously refer to as “interest-group formation” (Gilligan 40).13 States such as 
                                                 
13 Historians for nearly a century and a half have been predictably divided on the significance of the 
Granger acts generally and the Interstate Commerce Act in particular. Solon J. Buck claimed in 1920 that 
“change has been so swift and spectacular as to approach a complete metamorphosis” in the American 
West (Buck vii). “Simple farming communities have waked to find themselves complex industrial regions 
in which farmers have frequently lost their former preferred position” (Buck vii). At the same time, some 
historians such as Lee Benson have argued that the merchants rather than farmers were the single most 
important group supporting regulation as a way to stabilize their own markets in “self-policing agreements” 
(Benson vii). Gabriel Kolko, by contrast, claimed that “the railroads, not the farmers and shippers, were the 
most important single advocates for federal regulation as such” (Kolko 3). Agreeing with Kolko, though for 
different reasons, Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast claimed that since “farmers were the most diffuse 
[interest] group, theirs is unlikely to have been the most active lobby,” avoiding any concrete argument on 
the issue altogether (Gilligan 41). It seems that scholarly historians on the subject have not shown an 
interest in any kind of dialectic that might move beyond arbitrarily designating a certain group’s “interests” 
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Minnesota and Wisconsin, in which the Granger agitations largely occurred were 
historically unique in that their institution as territories and then states happened at the 
same time as the railway expanded “itself in the reduction of difference,” as Charles 
Adams put it (“The Railroad System” 343). The two states’ development as political 
bodies were therefore tied up in the pragmatic development of the material institution of 
the railway as it reduced local difference by way of its connection to Eastern markets for 
a predominantly agrarian population. As Stickney pointed out, one of the first acts of the 
first assembly of the Minnesota territory in 1849 was the “granting of charters to railway 
companies,” followed quickly by “laws intended to induce the building of railways” 
(Stickney 8). Rather than altering preexisting political structures, the railway’s logic, in 
this case, shaped political space in advance of its presence in these territories. And yet, 
even by 1856, the land of Minnesota “had not been proven” for mass agricultural 
production and railroad companies were perhaps understandably hesitant to speculate on 
the purchasing of land and construction of track, particularly after the economic bubble 
burst on land speculation in Minnesota in 1857 (Stickney 9). Throughout the 1850s and 
60s the growing population of Minnesota remained relatively poor and therefore 
desperate for the perceived economic opportunity the railway might provide its 
agricultural and lumber industries. By 1871, the now state of Minnesota had made 
concessions to the railway companies in order to persuade capitalists to invest in the 
state, providing loans in the form of government bonds to subsidize the construction of 
track, granting rights of way to railroads through public lands, and making the lands 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be “important” on the subject so I will restrict myself to referring to them for facts only, as much as that 
is possible. 
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bought by railroads immune from taxation. If citizens resisted these concessions, “they 
were threatened with change of location to such a distance from the existing towns as to 
destroy them, and build up rivals” (Stickney 11). The railway representatives, of course, 
tended to describe this negotiation process as bringing the citizens “to their senses” on the 
subject (Stickney 14). The problem of development as it unfolded in Minnesota was its 
continually partial character from the point of view of the capitalist, in an example of 
Marx’s point that the potentially infinite number of Capitalists to which one can sell 
one’s labor creates the illusion of free choice by reducing it to an infinite iteration of 
slight variations on the same choice: to live under the railway managers’ version of 
capitalism or be destroyed by it. There would be no third option. 
Any advancement was, from the point of view of the railway companies, not 
advancement enough to guarantee profitability beyond a doubt which waxed and waned 
with the periodic busts and booms of the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
movement of power from within the total train system, was not a matter of sui generis 
maliciousness on the part of the capitalist, but a function of the means of articulation 
introduced by the railway itself. Maliciousness was a byproduct of a particular mode of 
technological expansion that unevenly distributed access to control over the means of 
circulation, a control whose expression happened spatially in the separation of the 
civilized from the savage through access to the routes of the railway. Intention was not a 
prerequisite for the system, but the system itself created particular kinds of intention. 
Different social groups were therefore structured around these new, technological modes 
of intention rather than any traditional sense of the “will of the people.” As it expanded, a 
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sense of progress was the effect of the solidification of the political boundaries 
established by the railway. Within this historical dialectic between labor and capital that 
played out through the mediating term of spatial control, we see the same problem in the 
practical sphere that Adams was struggling with in a literary mode in his early novels. 
Although technological advancement was often ideologically assumed to be both a 
product and guarantor of abstract American “progress,” that progression did not unfold 
through the principles of the veiled prime motor it was assumed to be. From the points of 
view of the capitalists, the farmers were “senseless” in their demands. From the point of 
view of the farmers, the capitalists were malicious in their autocratic wielding of power. 
Because both sides thought the dialectic of power to operate by way of abstract, a priori 
principles, both missed the ways in which historically contingent technologies for the 
control and distribution of energy for social ends rather than the veiled prime motor 
structured their relations. 
The central problem of the railway, then, came in a set of two splittings. First, the 
political splitting of space which began as a more or less mutual problem between labor 
and capital. Where the railway would run to a large degree separated the “civilized” and 
the “savage” not as a border to be pushed back but as a set of vectors or lanes of motion 
that were variable and were established within the nation itself. Secondly, this split space 
eventually ossified into particular power relationships that created the “interests” it was 
supposedly in service of. Because of the economic and social structure of the railway, the 
very political space of the nation became a tool for capital to “bring labor to its senses,” 
which is to say create a sense of its own interest exclusively in terms of a specific mode 
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of capitalist circulation. Because of its new means of spatial articulation, the railway 
brought with it new means of articulating society and the mechanisms of aggression and 
retribution that came with it. As Charles Francis Adams put it, the “infinitely varied 
influences of the railroad system are so much a part of our everyday acts and thoughts 
that they have become familiar, and have ceased to be marvellous [sic]. The changes have 
been so gradual that we have failed to notice their completeness” (“The Railroad System” 
338). This change was complete not simply because it filled out the literal space of the 
nation but because it revolutionized how that nation imagined itself, literally from the 
ground up. What it meant to be an individual had changed from a sense of a unified 
Enlightenment subject who willingly subjected him or herself to the “common interest” 
to an obviously alienated subject for whom the distributive terms of language had been 
determined in advance by the articulations made possible by the railway system. 
Whereas technologies had been objects used for particular ends, with the advent 
of the total train system space would now be an effect of technology that would limit 
possible human actions. More than this, the railroad was imbricated in the creation of The 
United States as a political space. The railway system “rapidly disseminated one element 
over a vast wilderness” and “rendered existing America possible” (“The Railroad 
System” 341). That element was the ability to articulate disparate political spaces as such 
into a system of exchange that homogenized all objects as exchange-values to the degree 
that they were in the reach of that technology. In other words, it created an “empire of 
coal.” The change in space created by the railway also changed the way people thought, 
imagined the country, and behaved toward one another. As Teresa Brennan put it, the 
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“relation between physical and social determination has been conceived of as a one-way 
street, when it should allow for two way traffic. The social actually gets into the flesh, 
and unless we take account of this, we cannot account for the extent to which socio-
historical realities affect us physically” (Brennan 10). As Brennan also points out, this 
two way traffic requires the “containment” of channels of energy along which exchange 
occurs in historically contingent formations (Brennan 10). I would slightly diverge from 
Brennan, however, in her claim that “my feelings physically enter you, or yours me” is a 
useful description of what it would be to imagine “that the subject is not self-contained at 
the material level of energy” (Brennan 10-11). As I’ve already argued about the work of 
Charles Chesnutt, “energy” is the first step of a technological anthropomorphism. 
Brennan’s description (which, admittedly, is to a degree simply an attempt to make 
concrete a very difficult and abstract point) attributes to energy only the limitations of 
Newtonian mechanics, which describes its behavior only at certain degrees of magnitude. 
“Containment” at times does mean something close to the mechanical control of channels 
of energy at large dimensions but can also mean something more indirect. 
As I’ve also already argued, I much prefer Heisenberg’s concept, taken from 
Aristotle, of potentia to describe the ways in which a “reality” that is assumed to function 
along the lines of Newtonian mechanics is limited. Technology mediates ideology and 
material reality through a limiting set of potentia that determine some features of a 
potential subject position in advance. With potentia, in which certain tendencies are 
asymptotic toward reality, we get a clearer sense of how indirect relations dialectically 
determine the supposedly unified (at certain significant dimensions) “me” and “you” that 
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exchange “feelings” in history and through language which, following Lacan, is both 
present and absent simultaneously. In order for labor to be “brought to its senses” about 
the politics of the railway, it first had to be literally, spatially contained by channels for 
the transmission of energy and brought within its scope of influence, made part of its 
speeds of exchange and its technologically limiting potentia. These containments also 
happened, however, ideologically, as an indirect limitation of the horizon of possibility in 
addition to the more obvious containments of the railway system. In other words, the total 
train system, as a complex of containments, both material and ideological, contained 
populations at many different points of articulation in slightly different ways that 
changed, both with the material conditions and historically as the complex developed. 
The new subject that Adams hoped to describe would now be a containment also 
articulated by technological systems that makes available a subject for intersubjective 
communication, as being the subject of reflection for the other, or having reputatio. 
The question Henry Adams had come to an impasse about in his novels was, put 
in Brennan’s terms, the issue of containment, or, put in Kenneth Burke’s terms, the 
variabilities formed in language between the container and the thing contained. For a 
linear, progressive history to make sense as a causal scheme required it to be contained 
by the principles of a veiled prime motor. The conclusion that Adams came to, however, 
was the failure of a single, universal prime motor to account for the variety of possible 
containments in the era of the railway, which, as we have seen even in the work of 
William Dean Howells (who did not have Adams’s taste for the esoteric), broke down 
and reorganized previous modes of containment in language. In Democracy, one form of 
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containment occurred through the repetition of rituals of power. Endlessly shaking the 
hand of the president was mutual containment of power as a particular kind of articulacy 
in democracy. In Esther, Niagara and the railway were two different modes of 
containment, with the railway more accurately representing the new mode of social 
formation than the romanticized waterfalls. The politics that was formed by the railway 
and would follow it after it fell away from the immediate politics of the day would be 
shaped by technologies which had become ideologically determined forms of 
containment that presented themselves as a priori truths. Politics, then, would not simply 
be a matter of abstract allegiance to a principle in the era of the total train system. It 
would be formally controllable by capital through the technologies it created and which, 
in turn, created the capitalist formations to come. 
Henry Adams was well aware of the difficulty of this “empire within a republic,” 
as he already described the railway system in 1870, in which no single actor could be 
identified, except as a subject-position created by the material articulations of a 
technological system and the economic mechanisms they structurally limited (“Gold 
Conspiracy” 106). As the railway became ideologically imbricated in already established 
political division between Capital and Labor, it in turn changed their relation to one 
another as the system developed. Even Adams’s favorite personal target to blame for 
economic instability in his journalistic days, Jay Gould, could not be entirely blamed as 
an individual for his almost single-handed collapsing of the American economy in 1869. 
Gould simply possessed the “disposition” for “subtlety and elaboration of intrigue” that 
the railway system had made “necessary” for the bankers that owned it in the final 
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analysis (“Gold Conspiracy” 104). The motors that had only multiplied and intensified 
since James Watt’s double-action steam engine proved difficult concepts to represent in 
Adams’s world whose vocabulary had its roots in twelfth century assumptions of unity. 
He and his contemporaries “felt a railway-train as power; yet they, and all other artists 
constantly complained that the power embodied in a railway-train could never be 
embodied in art. All the steam in the world could not, like the Virgin, build Chartres” 
(Education 368). This double split caused by the railway, then, also had a curiously 
double effect that was difficult to “embody” in art. It forever tore apart the assumed unity 
of the Enlightenment subject, and replaced it with its own articulations which, in certain 
respects, were antithetical to previous assumptions. Just as Carrington’s revelation of 
Ratcliffe’s corruption was no proof of Carrington’s correct principles, the railway did not 
fully displace the Virgin as a veiled prime motor, but incorporated it into its new 
formations. While the split had made the sequential continuity of a bourgeois idea of 
progress impossible to think, it had also unified the West as a “great empire,” making its 
means of subjectification global to the degree that it was in the sphere of influence of the 
railway. 
With perhaps Henry Adams’s two most famous figures for the two options he 
represented in his novels, the Dynamo and the Virgin, he reified the two competing 
models for causality he struggled with throughout his career. Critics have, 
understandably, tended to reduce the movement of his dense and difficult thought to these 
images. Leo Marx, in his classic study of technology and the pastoral in American 
fiction, claimed that The Education of Henry Adams before all others, exemplified the 
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American “habit of defining reality as a contradiction between radically opposed forces” 
(The Machine in the Garden 344-5). More specifically, Marx argued that it “is 
technology (the new railroads, steamboats, and telegraph) that has separated Adams from 
his family’s eighteenth-century tradition. Writing in this vein Adams virtually endorses a 
theory of technological determinism,” as opposed to the previously dominant tradition of 
the pastoral American landscape as “the dream of a retreat to an oasis of harmony and 
joy” (Machine 3, 346). More recently, other critics have gone even further. Following the 
tradition of Leo Marx’s influential work, Samuele F. S. Pardini argued that in The 
Education Adams created the first “history of technology” in the American tradition 
(Pardini 22). To view Adams as setting “forceful engineers against inert agrarians,” as 
Cecelia Tichi put it, or to emphasize the sequential, causal relationship of Adams’s 
“history,” following Pardini, however, is to miss some of the complexity and difficulty 
Adams ascribes to technology’s relationship to a progressive sense of history (Tichi 138). 
Adams, rather, describes the new conditions in which bourgeois history would be 
understood from within a technologically driven progressivism. Technological systems, 
such as the railway, had rendered sequence impossible for historians attempting to supply 
causality to simple chronology. The Virgin and Dynamo were “convertible, reversible, 
interchangeable [attractions] on thought” rather than dichotomous poles (Education 364). 
Adams’s formal experimentations do not attempt to save sequence for bourgeois 
consciousness but attempt to replace it with a sometimes dizzying series of alternative 
organizational models. 
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It was not until the second half of his career that Adams attempted to formulate 
what he considered to be the new intellectual environment brought about by the 
expansion and modes of containment of the railway and technology in general. Adams’s 
own attempt at “literary experiment” in the vein of Henry James as he described his 
Education to William James, was an attempt to represent at least his own experience of 
this “snapping” (and the physicality of the metaphor is more significant than Leo Marx’s 
“separation” indicates) (qtd. in Monteiro 158). In his attempt to trace these forces’ effects 
on himself, Adams questioned the procedures for assembling history that he had been 
trained in. Historians, according to Adams, had always assumed “in silence a relation of 
cause and effect” so that “if any captious critic were to drag them to light, historians 
would probably reply, with one voice, that they had never supposed themselves required 
to know what they were talking about” (Education 363).  
The Dynamo and the Virgin are often presented in criticism as opposite poles of 
history that represent to two halves of history that have snapped and organize history in a 
“Manichean fashion.” In Leo Marx’s often-cited formulation, Adams  
uses the opposition between the Virgin and the Dynamo to figure an all-
embracing conflict: a clash between past and present, unity and diversity, love and 
power. In his Manichean fashion he marshals all conceivable values. On one side 
he lines up heaven, beauty, religion, and reproduction; on the other: hell, utility, 
science, and production. (Marx 347)  
The introduction of accelerating technologies such as the railway, in this reading, moves 
society from one pole to the other at an increasing speed. At the same time, and as we 
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have seen, what Adams means by the metaphor of the “snapping” of society may not be 
as simple as the geometry of the metaphor suggests. Importantly, the Virgin and the 
Dynamo are metaphors for the two models of causality about which Adams had come to 
an impasse in his novels. As a veiled prime motor, the Dynamo is an image of action at a 
distance whose split has occurred spatially, from within history. The Virgin, on the other 
hand, is the classic concept of Aquinas’s veiled prime motor which organized from 
outside of history. As she appeared to St. Bernard, the Virgin was “the great mediator. In 
the eyes of a culpable humanity, Christ was too sublime, too terrible, too just, but not 
even the weakest human frailty could fear to approach the Mother” (Mont Saint-Michel 
90). As his protagonists’ refusal to choose between the images indicates, Adams did not 
necessarily conceive of the choice as one between two radical alternatives, but an 
impossible choice in which precipitates the loss of both to some extent. Rather than two 
mutually exclusive truths, the Dynamo and the Virgin are two modes by which the 
signifier distributes the terms of containment and are both at work although, historically, 
with the advent of the railway, the Dynamo had taken over from the Virgin the place of 
dominance for society’s image of itself. Rather than controlling thought directly, both the 
Dynamo and the Virgin control political space in different ways that shaped thoughts 
about them. 
 As Paul Virilio has also pointed out, capitalism’s control of space as a political 
tool is a thoroughly dynamic process. As the example of the Granger laws demonstrates, 
the city is not a central command from which those who own capital distribute orders, a 
position of control reserved for the Virgin and her representatives. Rather, the “city is but 
  197 
a stopover, a point on the synoptic path of a trajectory . . . where the spectator’s glance 
and the vehicle’s speed of displacement were instrumentally linked” (Speed and Politics 
31). Or, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari put a very similar point, capitalism “is not at 
all territorial” (A Thousand Plateaus 454). Following Karl Marx, they point out that 
capitalist economy has become in the modern age “a mobile and convertible substance” 
that produces “axiomatics,” codes that articulate “purely functional elements and 
relations whose nature is not specified, and which are immediately realized in highly 
varied domains simultaneously” (Plateaus 453-4). As Capitalism deterritorializes labor, 
making it “free labor” (in Karl Marx’s ironic sense of the phrase), with one hand, it 
reterritorializes it with the other and at a different level of abstraction as “materialized 
labor” (Plateaus 454). The process by which geographic spaces were deterritorialized and 
reterritorialized in the late nineteenth century was through the shifting potentia of the 
train system. The train system, as a collection of materially based procedures for routine 
operation reorganizes the relationship between the city and the country as a mobile set of 
trajectories for both commodities and political “points of view.” The Virgin and the 
Dynamo, in Adams’s phrasing, are two “independent centres of force” that are caught in 
a moment of deterritorialization and reterritorialization during the expansion and 
consolidation of the railroad and its ideology. 
 While Henry Adams provides us with works that attempt to articulate the 
theoretical significance of the shifting power relationships caused by mass technological 
systems, it is his brother Charles that wrote the more detailed historical account of 
material aspect of this political shift towards capitalist deterritorialization and 
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reterritorialization. If an Adams were to be given the title of having founded the history 
of technology in the United States, Charles would (perhaps ironically) seem to fit that 
role better than his historian brother. By turning to Charles’s writing, a clearer idea of 
exactly how the conjunction between technological systems and ideological structures 
operates will allow us to return to Henry Adams’s broader theoretical considerations in 
his late career with more precision. Already in 1878, Charles Francis Adams Jr. remarked 
that the organizational structure of the railway had become dominant in American, and 
indeed Western, thought. He claimed that the railway was particularly dominant over the 
means by which the nation as a whole imagined itself in that it presented “one distinctive 
problem”: it had “usurped” the function that had previously been performed by the 
highway system (Origins 80-1). Although it replaced the highway system, the railroad 
was, at the same time, “a thing sui generis – a vast and intricate formative influence, as 
well as a material power,” in other words, a technology that set material limits on 
particular ideological potentia (Origins 81). The “formative influence” of the railroad’s 
“material power” produced, in turn, a new technological thinking that made bourgeois 
sequential thinking impossible, and, in its impossibility, terrifying.  
Charles Francis Adams, in his Notes on Railroad Accidents, published in 1879, 
described the “ghastly record” of the development of the railway system which, as it 
happens, “began with the opening of the first railroad – literally on the very morning 
which finally ushered the great system into existence as a successfully accomplished 
fact” (Notes 3). In Charles’s “notes” on technology, each new technological component 
of the railway is tied to a series of events in which a “ghastly” aspect of what a 
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technology is capable of produces a new technology meant to create a stop-gap in the 
current system to correct the first technology’s problems. Thus, the system becomes more 
complex as a result of attempts to correct its functioning. In this case, correction does not 
simplify or rationalize, however. It complicates and proliferates. These technological 
innovations do make the train system function more “humanely,” in that they make 
vectors of safety more reliable. At the same time, that “humanity” is now a byproduct of 
an ever more complex and powerful system whose principles of development are more 
and more strictly technological. 
In his collected notes on railway accidents, Charles gives his own version on the 
causes and possible solutions to the series of railway accidents that had shocked the 
world since the system’s inauguration. This series of horrors, even the comparatively 
optimistic Charles admits, began with the inception of the railway itself and continued 
unabated, although in a shifting form that increased in quantitative scope with the railway 
itself as old problems were solved and new ones took their place. He describes in Notes, 
perhaps the first victim of the total train system, one Mr. Husskison, who was killed in 
the passive voice during the opening ceremonies of the English Manchester & Liverpool 
line in 1830. Struck by a train door while distracted by the celebratory commotion at the 
arrival of the first commercial train at its destination, Mr. Husskison was thrown to the 
ground between two tracks. One of his legs was unfortunately cast over the track upon 
which another train was approaching. The train, of course, crushed his leg “shockingly” 
(Accidents 6). Upon realizing what had happened, the crowd rushed to his aid but Mr. 
Husskison understood the severity of the injury and was reported to have exclaimed “I 
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have met my death” before being loaded back on the train to be taken in search of 
medical aid (Accidents 6). Mr. Husskison was correct in his assessment of the situation 
and he died shortly after the incident. At the dinner held after the demonstration of the 
train, one speaker reflected on the significance of Mr. Husskison’s death, reportedly 
saying that “the melancholy reflection, that these prodigious efforts of the human race, so 
fruitful of praise but so much more fruitful of lasting blessings to mankind, have forced a 
tear from my eye by that unhappy casualty which deprived me of a friend and you of a 
representative” (Accidents 8). Again, the killing of Mr. Husskison was effectively done in 
the passive voice, the railway having confused the relationship between subject and verb, 
even from his own point of view. Mr. Husskison understood the train to have introduced 
a new danger into human society that had a direct relationship to what it would now mean 
to “meet one’s death.” We have already seen a fictional rendering of the same principles 
that Mr. Husskinson realized at the very advent of the total train system, in my discussion 
of the works of William Dean Howells. To control death can no longer be a matter of 
decision making but of structural control. We saw with William Dean Howells that the 
railway had loosened the traditional separation between life and death as categories 
determined by the signifier. As Paul Virilio put it, salvation in the modern era “is no 
longer in flight; safety is ‘running toward your Death,’ in ‘killing your Death.’ Safety is 
in Assault simply because the new ballistic vehicles make flight useless” (Speed and 
Politics 47). The “fruitful blessings” of the railway, as a result, would be experienced at 
the level of the individual as a “deprivation” of safety that could only be compensated for 
by the proliferation of more technologies. 
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Charles Adams, as a president of a railroad company, attempted to identify the 
practical means by which accidents such as that which occurred to Mr. Husskison could 
be avoided. The primary solutions Charles identified for the then-current problems of the 
railway, which involved “a degree of risk which no one would believe ever could 
willingly be incurred, but for the fact that it is,” were the Westinghouse Brake and the 
Miller Platform (Accidents 15). Unable to flee the potential to be killed by these 
machines, the lanes through which the capacity of the machines to kill would be 
regulated and standardized by these innovations. Both technologies found new, material 
means for addressing the old problems of sequence and speed within the pragmatic 
situation of the railway. In fact, both technologies seek to obviate the reaction times 
required by new speeds with some kind of regimentation of sequence, either temporal or 
spatial. From its beginning as a commercial effort, railway cars were typically equipped 
with standard air-brakes. This meant that in order to stop the train, tubes that ran along 
the cars would be pressurized by the conductor, which would in turn press down on 
clamps that created friction on the wheels to stop their revolution. Of course, any damage 
to the tube would prevent it from pressurizing, leaving the system open to frequent 
accidents of sometimes colossal magnitude. The Westinghouse brake, however, reversed 
the action of the standard air-brake, making it a kind of negative capability. With the 
Westinghouse brake, the lever controlled by the engineer depressurized the tubes 
connected to the clamps, whose basic state is to be clamped to the wheel. By having the 
tubes constantly pressurized, the basic state of the wheels is to be braking. Thus, if any 
error in the system occurs, a state of relative “safety” is the default of the system. The 
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implicit admission at work in the Westinghouse brake is that control over the force of the 
train system could no longer reliably be placed in the control of a human. For anything 
like a “safe” system for human use to be put in place would require the removal of human 
decision from the equation. In its place, a system of automatic, mechanical procedures 
could prevent the operation of the machine in order to create a span of time in which a 
human could identify if there was a problem, what it might be, and how to proceed. 
“Safety” in this case, means the creation of a space for the time of human thought within 
the automatic process of the machine – hopefully before it is too late. This time-space of 
human thought, however, functions as an exceptional case within an otherwise automatic 
system. The human aspect of the total train system, then, happens at the level of design, 
prior to its existence, and the level of maintenance, only occasionally intervening in the 
action of the system under unusual circumstances. 
We have, in fact, already seen in my second chapter the ideological effects of the 
Westinghouse brake play out in detail in a scene by Charles W. Chesnutt, and it may help 
to return to that example briefly. In Chesnutt’s novel, The Colonel’s Dream, as I’ve 
already argued, Chesnutt represented the new divisions of political space in the American 
South through the figure of the train. The Colonel’s young boy and his black servant were 
killed at the end of that novel by a train that, when started on the track, is not stopped 
quickly enough to avoid hitting the two who have accidentally fallen in its path. A 
mechanic on the train, seeing the victims at the last moment, pulls “a lever mechanically, 
but too late to stop the momentum of the train,” which was “not equipped with air brakes, 
even if these would have proved effective to stop in so short a distance” (Colonel 323). 
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The point Chesnutt makes implicitly and in passing, Charles Adams makes generally and 
concretely. The human subject, as a locus for rational decision making has changed its 
position when placed within the total train system as an ideological reaction to a shift in 
material practice.  
Rather than a tool constructed to fulfil human ends, the human decision making 
process has, by means of the material structure, been made a secondary process to the 
workings of the machine itself, even in its absence. Humans, in other words, would now 
be required to “think with their object,” as Lacan put it, and that specific kind of object 
would be structurally required, in what Marx called the creation of “a new need,” by the 
circulation of commodities as it historically took shape through the political and 
technological struggle with the problems introduced by the total train system (Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts 93). It is perhaps less surprising, then, that there had been 
such a struggle between labor and capital over the Granger Laws in the 1860s and 70s. 
For the Capitalist who benefited from the expansion of the total train system, the decision 
of the workings of the railway was always already made. The farmers’ complaints of 
non-inclusion in the decision making process were therefore “senseless,” tantamount to 
throwing themselves stupidly in the path of the oncoming train, from the capitalist’s point 
of view. 
Whereas the Westinghouse brake attempted to put automatic processes to work in 
the name of a safety within a temporal scheme, Charles Adams also describes how the 
Miller Platform attempted to put standardization to work in a spatial dimension to assure 
the safety of the machine system as a whole. It was soon revealed after the inauguration 
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of the train system that the telescoping effect of time-space caused by the train system 
was, in fact, a two-way street. Not only did the train telescope distances, making 
previously distant spaces closer together in temporal terms, but that telescoping effect 
could, under certain conditions, recoil on the machine itself. Early trains linked each car 
to another by way of a simple metal chain. It was quickly discovered that such a means of 
articulation could not safely withstand the inertia of slowing a train. In other words, when 
heavy, American train cars were brought to an abrupt stop,  
the platforms between the cars would have been broken off and the forward end 
of each car riding slightly up on its broken coupling would have shot in over the 
floor of the car before it, sweeping away the studding and other light wood-work 
and crushing stoves, seats and passengers into one inextricable mass, until, if the 
momentum was sufficiently great, the several vehicles in the train would be 
enclosed in each other somewhat like the slides of a partially shut telescope. 
(Accidents 46) 
The Miller Platform was invented as a way to evenly distribute the inertia of the train 
along the entire floor of each car, articulating them at the correct points of pressure to 
avoid a car behind another from jumping over the floorboards of the leading car. Whereas 
the Westinghouse brake sought to eliminate human decision from the operation of the 
total train system in the temporal dimension, the Miller Platform sought to regulate the 
construction of individual cars at the spatial level, making their articulations standard 
across the industry. Neither the Miller platform nor the Westinghouse brake introduce 
radically new concepts into the train system. They, as Charles Adams repeatedly put it, 
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employ a “simple” and “obvious” recurrence to correct mechanical principles (Accidents 
52). Through the histories of these aspects of the total train system, however, we can see 
the means by which ideology and material reality dialectically shaped one another. Space 
and time were “thickened” into a particular articulation determined by the railway. 
“Safety” as a political concept was changed by technological formations and, in turn, 
determined the path of technological development, making each seem to reinforce the 
other in a progression that was, in turn, taken to be the progression of society as a whole 
toward a utopian future. From the point of view of the capitalist who experienced the 
alienation created by technology as for his own good, the only thing to do would be to 
“bring to their senses” anyone who could not see this inevitable system’s ineluctable 
workings. 
 The resistance to these inventions in the American railroad system, Charles put 
down to railroad operators who were of “a certain type” who “always have protested and 
will always continue to protest that they have nothing to learn” (Accidents 156). Both the 
Adamses agree, then, that education, taken broadly, had failed the American system, 
although they disagreed on the ability of the system to adapt to the new multiplicities of 
American life with the old vocabulary of unity. Charles Adams makes clear that the 
realm of deterritorialization and reterritorialization would extend to the material itself in 
which the construction and maintenance of safety within the speeds of capitalist 
circulation would have to be part of the machine itself. What was gained in speed would 
be lost in control and reaction time. The only way out of the problem with a “reasonable” 
loss of human life would be the increasing complexity of the technical system, and its 
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being brought under the control of few and fewer centers of human decision making. The 
system itself would be the only apparatus that could deal with the problems it itself had 
created with enough speed to not make the collateral damage unpalatable to the news-
reading public. These technologies, then, operate chronotopically, to slightly (but only 
slightly) extend Bakhtin’s use of the term. They “thicken” particular modes of space-time 
along prearranged lines that determine the potentia of specific, technological modes of 
containment. These particular thickenings are, at the same time, ideologically motivated 
and structure material reality through technology. As individual technologies were 
developed to compensate for the inherent drawbacks of already existing technologies, 
they combined to form a set of interlocking chronotopes that standardized certain kinds 
of spatial and temporal articulation, both materially and ideologically. 
 As Walter Benjamin put it, the very immensity of the railroad and its regimes, 
both material and social, for establishing interlocking sequences could, ironically, have 
the effect of confusing sequence in general. People, as the railway was developing, “did 
not really know how they should react to technological advances,” which “had no 
precedent in the past” (“Firth of Tay” 564). In his description for a radio broadcast 
describing a train accident that occurred over the Firth of Tay, Benjamin quoted first-
hand accounts of the night-time plunge of a railway car off a bridge over the firth. 
Sequence is made difficult by the technology’s arrangement of space relative to the 
human capacity to understand it. The “first sign of the disaster was not the noise made by 
the falling train, but the flames that three fishermen noticed at the time, without 
suspecting that they came from the locomotive as it went hurtling down” (“Firth of Tay” 
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567). History, in this case, the placing of chronological events into a meaningful series of 
causal relationships, becomes an essentially retrospective affair and cannot be directly 
lived in any sense. The railway ultimately confuses bourgeois development-in-time 
because the actual forces of which the train is an effect cannot be understood by the 
human eye. The divisions both of space and subjectivity brought about by the total train 
system would require, according to Henry Adams a new kind of subjectivity that 
incorporated the technological into it. It is this new subjectivity that attempts to progress 
without sequence but within a particular space he describes in his later works, A Letter to 
American Teachers of History, Mont Saint-Michel and Chartres and The Education of 
Henry Adams. 
 
Bicycle Riding 
 In describing new subject positions from within the now dominant ideology of the 
total train system, Adams would come to stress historically contingent spatial relations. 
These relations had become to a degree standardized and temporally regimented through 
the technologies of the railway above the a-historic veiled prime motor which he kept in 
his constellation of influences, but in a negative capacity, as a mode of defining the new 
position by contrast. Although Adams was sensitive to the new technological formations, 
he was often overzealous in his assumptions of the degree to which variation was 
eliminated within the new formations. Society, in 1868, when he returned to the United 
States from England, was already coalescing around large-scale lanes of movement in 
that it “offered the profile of a long, straggling caravan, stretching loosely toward the 
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prairies, its few score of leaders far in advance and its millions of immigrants, negroes, 
and Indians far in the rear, somewhere in archaic time” (Education 228). Within his new 
understanding of the regimentations put in place by the railway, even in its comparatively 
early stages, old hierarchies that associated a not particularly diverse “other” with 
“archaic time” and an implied whiteness with modernity by negation remained firmly 
established in his Brahmin mind. By 1893, when Adams began speculating on the precise 
features of this new, technologically determined subjectivity required by the total train 
system also began to introduce racial thinking of a new sort. 
 Although much has been made by critics of the repression of twenty years of his 
life in the Education, it is no accident that Adams chose to resume his narrative just 
before 1893. As Adams’s biographer, Ernest Samuels, put it, the economic panic of 1893 
“opened his eyes to the larger economic and social movement” that had become difficult 
for him to want to engage with after the collapse of his efforts towards a progressive 
reformism and the death of his wife (Samuels 124). Significantly, Henry Adams was 
recalled in 1893 from his nomadic travels to Quincy, Massachusetts by Charles in order 
to deal with the fallout of the economic collapse. Although Henry, never one for great 
financial risk, was relatively untouched by the damage of the event, Charles and their 
other family intimates were severely hit by the crash. Additionally, Henry’s social sphere 
showed signs everywhere of their own precarity under certain conditions. As his 
biographer put it the  
most conspicuous casualty [of the 1893 panic] was Clarence King, [on whom 
Adams had based the character of George Strong in Esther] who escaped from the 
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hopeless confusion of his affairs by going quietly mad so that he had to be packed 
off to Bloomingdale asylum for a few months. Everywhere social circles chattered 
of suicides and sudden deaths. (Samuels 117) 
As Adams himself put it, in “1871 he had thought King's education ideal, and his 
personal fitness unrivalled. No other young American approached him for the 
combination of chances – physical energy, social standing, mental scope and training, 
wit, geniality, and science, that seemed superlatively American and irresistibly strong” 
(Education 330). After 1893, however, madness would be not an aberration or divine gift 
but a reasonable reaction to an irrational, yet technologically organized capitalism. In a 
perverse mode by which the space for the time of human thought could create safety, 
Clarence King demonstrated to Adams that madness and the asylum could now function 
as a space of safety in the perverse speeds of the total train system. As Andrew Carnegie 
wrote in 1893, it “is doubtful if a more disastrous financial cyclone ever blasted a country 
to such an extent in so short a time” (Carnegie 355). The panic of 1893 was significant 
enough, in fact, to throw into doubt the very process by which valuation was established 
at the level of the temporal compression of geographic space. 
 In many ways, the economic crash of 1893 and the political turmoil that 
surrounded it were part of the same struggle that had broken out a couple of decades 
before around the Granger Acts. The populist agitations that had begun in part because of 
perceived abuses by railway companies had become so organized over time to include the 
fight over whether or not the American economy should base its currency on the assumed 
natural value of gold. By 1879 the United States had returned to the gold standard after 
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the Civil War in which so-called “greenbacks” or government notes had circulated as 
currency until the Resumption Act of 1875. Effectively, however, throughout 
Reconstruction “there was a dual monetary standard – the greenback dollar and the gold 
dollar – the one official and the other unofficial” which existed in an uneasy equilibrium, 
each benefiting different sectors of the economy (Friedman 27).  “World production of 
gold,” however, “had decreased between 1865 and 1890 whereas the production of 
industry, mining, and agriculture had increased. Moreover, the population also increased: 
in the United States in 1890 it was almost twice that of 1865” (Cashman 302). The 
disparity between the increasing population and decreasing access to gold led to 
discontent over the scarcity of currency and an increasing demand by farmers for 
currency coined in silver in some sectors of the economy to replace the easy accessibility 
of “greenbacks.” The demand for silver currency in the United States primarily came 
from farmers whose transactions were typically not large enough to require the gold 
currency used in international markets. Because the demand for silver was comparatively 
higher in the United States than other industrialized countries, European governments 
were able to “relieve” the United States of its fund of “pure unchanging healthful gold” in 
favor of the now more abundant, “blood-poisoning silver,” as Andrew Carnegie put it 
within the metaphor of the social organism of capitalist exchanges (Carnegie 358). In 
1893, “the commercial failure of a stock market favorite . . . touched off a panic for 
which the stage had been set by the general uneasiness about the currency” (Friedman 
108)14. 
                                                 
14 An alternate, perhaps more depressing version of this dissertation could conceivably be written on what 
Milton Friedman might mean by “general uneasiness” here but, for the sake of a more or less simple 
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Because more accessible, however, basing the currency on both silver and gold 
was perceived by Midwestern farmers as more egalitarian than remaining exclusively on 
the gold standard. Writing for the Populist movement that advocated for an expanded 
currency in 1893, for instance, senator William Alfred Peffer of Kansas demanded an 
“exclusively national currency . . . to consist of gold and silver coined on equal terms” in 
order to “emancipate labor” and be sure that the people are “served equally and alike” 
(Peffer 665-6). Walter Benn Michaels has argued that this struggle over the very 
definition of value and production, what it meant to be treated “equally and alike” within 
an economic system, caused a rethinking of literary representation at the time. He 
claimed that  
because the economy cannot, on the one hand, be reduced to the material it is 
made of (desires, actions) or, on the other hand, be turned into some other person 
and reduced to the material that person is made of (consequences), it provides a 
singularly compelling image of the naturalist distinction between material and 
identity. (Michaels 179-80) 
Although, as Adams pointed out, few people in the debate actually understood the 
difficult issue, it was swept up in the overdetermined demarcations of political parties and 
their allegiances to capital or to labor that had initially been set in the spatial “splitting” 
brought about by the railway. Adams himself somewhat facetiously claimed he “had 
taken no interest in the matter, and knew nothing about it, except as a very tedious hobby 
of his friend Dana Horton” (Education 319). Adams had seen the circulation of 
commodities create cities in the Midwest in the 1860s and 70s. Material and identity were 
                                                                                                                                                 
explanation of the generally accepted narrative of events, it suffices. 
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less distinct from Adams’s point of view than Michaels argues, missing the dialectic, 
when it came to the discursive practices that could not be reduced to a single term. 
Persons themselves are to a certain degree a spatial function for Adams, rather than a 
category distinct from the circulation of capital. The motion of the total train system’s 
exchanges could make even the strongest of Americans, like Clarence King, go mad in 
order to escape its impossible decision between value as a circulation and as an 
imminent, material quality. The most problematic image of this creation of persons 
through mechanized spatial division that underwrote material value in Adams’s later 
thought is the Jewish ghetto with which he had a complex relationship. 
 Adams’s first attempts in and around 1893 to describe modern multiplicity, 
brought with it another tendency in his thought that has not been fully accounted for by 
critics: the intensification of his anti-Semitism late in life. As J.C. Levenson argued, 
Adams’s anti-Semitism took a comparatively strange form to many of his aristocratic 
contemporaries, becoming an “obsession” after 1892 as a result of Adams’s “loss of the 
Enlightenment faith,” the suicide of his wife, and the anger and fear brought about by the 
economic panic of 1893 (“Etiology” 577). He does not seem to have drifted into anti-
Semitism as a cultural obligation of upper-class Boston, but through a slow, personal 
development. Although not especially anti-Semitic in his early writings for someone of 
his cultural background, by 1888 Adams’s letters began to include offhand anti-Semitic 
statements, such as his wish to “damn the Jews” during his frustration with having to 
borrow money in order to make repairs on his home (qtd. in “Etiology” 578). Levenson 
calls such comments a “Briticized-colloquial defiance of money-lenders” rather than a 
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developed and targeted anti-Semitism (“Etiology” 578). Although Adams was always 
“immune to home-grown anti-Semitism of Populist melodrama,” his anti-Semitism began 
to develop as a British-influenced association of particular Jews and bankers (“Etiology” 
582). Adams came to see Jewish bankers in particular as profiteers in the fallout of the 
economic panic of 1893, writing to a friend in 1895 that the “Jew question is really the 
most serious of our problems. It is Capitalistic Methods run to their logical result. Let’s 
hope to pull their teeth” (qtd in “Etiology” 583). The most virulent, “French” phase of his 
anti-Semitism developed from this association of Jews and banking to an association 
between Capitalism as such with Jews as such – the “‘Jew régime’ of corrupt government 
and recurrent financial scandals” (“Etiology” 584). 
 Levenson’s argument hoped to determine whether or not Adams’s anti-Semitism 
should be considered systematic enough to classify him with T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound 
as authors whose racial prejudices should be taken by critics as fundamental to their 
artistic practices for “a post-Auschwitz era” (“Etiology” 570). Levenson ultimately 
decided that Adams’s anti-Semitism should not be considered as recalcitrant as those 
writers. And yet, one should not be too quick to dismiss Adams’s thinking about causality 
and historical development and his simultaneous growing anti-Semitism as entirely 
isolable. If the disruption of Western historical continuity ultimately led to an “empire of 
Coal” which simultaneously unified the world as a mechanistically determined whole and 
split it from historical sequence, in Adams’s mind, this lack of temporal sequence in 
favor of spatial difference provided the conceptual category that set the terms for a new 
kind of racist thinking.  
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Rather than a strictly biological difference, racial categories became geographic 
for Adams, biological determinism having, by an anthropomorphism, come to rule at the 
level of society conceived of as a totalizing mechanical organism. Whereas the empire of 
coal produces subjects by their location within a disjointed circulation and its vectors of 
relative safety, the Jewish population became in his mind the population that was both 
geographically exempt from that circulation, “reeking of the Ghetto,” and, because 
outside of the circulation, in a unique place to take the role of controlling, veiled motor 
for the Capitalism Adams hated (qtd in Levenson 592). Although Adams’s explicit anti-
Semitism abated with time, the conceptual relation within the new, non-sequential 
progress Adams attempted to describe adopted racism less as a continuation of old 
traditions of biological racial superiority than as an economic category relative to 
capitalist circulation, a function of the biological metaphor that society had become 
through the total train system, whose racism could exist in the twentieth century in a 
more mobile form. Effectively, because “contained” by the ghetto rather than the railway 
system, biological difference could be reinscribed as a spatial difference rather than a 
biological one. 
After around 1906, with the conclusion of the Dreyfus Affair, Adams seems to 
have to a certain degree conquered the worst of his anti-Semitic outbursts (which had, at 
any rate, almost always been limited to private conversations and correspondence) in 
response to the obviousness of the scapegoating of a Jewish man by European society. 
Although even in the Education there are remnants of anti-Semitism, he seems to have 
either decided that if the Jews were responsible for the worst of what international 
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capitalism has become, those effects would not be changed by hating the people who did 
it, or, and perhaps more likely, he seems to have simply given up caring about the subject 
at all. In his own Education, Adams says relatively little about race. At the same time, he 
begins his own narrative by explicitly comparing himself to a Jew, a hypothetical “Israel 
Cohen” who “would scarcely have been more distinctly branded” than Adams himself in 
his connection with the “track” of Adamses before him (Education 9). Although, as 
Levenson notes, his Education was largely (but not entirely) free of the vitriol towards 
Jews that he had expressed earlier, the concept of the Jew was now available to him as a 
metaphor devoid of its specific history for that which is marked as outside and alien to 
the circulation of capital. 
Adams wrote that there is no precise definition of biological “race” and probably 
could not be. He also points out, in his Letter to American Teachers of History, that to 
think of race as a way of organizing humans that is trans-historical is automatically 
subject to transcendental categories, categories of which he was already suspicious. “So 
far as concerns the history of man,” as he put it, “every period of the earth’s history 
beyond its actual condition, is transcendental” (Letter 172). The “archaic time” of the 
racialized other would, in fact, operate as a transcendental within the new total train 
system, but from within its own history rather than an a-historic horizon of possibility. In 
turn, history “began with admitting as its starting-point that the speechless animal who 
raised himself to the use of an inflected language must have made an effort greater and 
longer than the effort required for him, after perfecting his tongue, to vulgarize and 
degrade it” (Letter 179). The new “transcendental” would not, like its Enlightenment 
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predecessor be an a priori category of racial difference, but a transcendental produced in 
reverse as that space which escapes Capitalist circulation and degrades a language that 
provides meaning, perhaps in the “ghetto” that, in Adams’s somewhat bizarre conspiracy 
logic takes advantage of the system that produced it. 
Adams attempted to articulate what subjectivity would be with technological 
articulation incorporated into it in its very being, from within capitalist circulation in 
opposition to the “ghetto” that was outside of capitalism’s motion. Around the time of the 
panic Adams became more equivocal about the influence of the railway, which had by 
then started to become a dominant ideological structure in society but was beginning to 
recede from immediate political struggle as an object. The railway had been “an active 
interest to which all others were subservient, and which absorbed the energies of some 
sixty million people to the exclusion of every other force, real or imaginary” (Education 
314). And yet, by 1892, the railway was beginning to wane as a new force, in the sense of 
“novel.” For Adams, it “offered less chance for future profit” than it had in 1868 
(Education 315). Rather, it was becoming “new” in Benjamin’s sense of normalized but, 
at the same time, having “no precedent in the past.” Adams “had grown up with” the 
railway, but nothing “new was to be done or learned there, and the world hurried on to its 
telephones, bicycles, and electric trams” (Education 315). The political struggles over the 
railway system were more or less decided by the 1890s. And yet, the ideological 
articulations they had produced went on to dominate social thinking in other forms. So, at 
“past fifty, Adams solemnly and painfully learned to ride the bicycle” (Education 315). 
Although the world hurried on, the structure that had been created by the railway system 
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continued to influence the relations between individuals and a technological 
progressivism, determined by the railway, which had taken a more complete form. 
With his quasi-metaphor of bicycle riding, Henry Adams attempted to rewrite for 
the modern age the famous Platonic allegory of a well-regulated transcendental 
subjectivity, one that would provide for both the rationality and madness in the new 
world. The figure of the bicycle would come to represent for Adams the new subjectivity 
that “thought with its object” in order to circulate without either falling into the spatial 
ghetto of his hypothetical “Israel Cohen” or the temporal madness of Clarence King as a 
necessary prosthetic within the capitalist circulation that required it. In the Phaedrus, 
Socrates attempted to convince Phaedrus that madness was not necessarily something to 
be avoided in all cases. The “greatest goods,” in fact, “come to us through madness, 
provided it is bestowed by divine gift” (Phaedrus 244a5). This divine madness is one 
proportion of the “mixture” that is the “ensouled” body of a mortal which Socrates likens 
to a charioteer with his two horses, one “noble” and the other “of the opposite stock” 
(Phaedrus 246b1). While Zeus, “first in the heavens,” drives a “winged chariot, putting 
all things in order and caring for all,” mortals drive “with difficulty; for the horse that is 
partly bad weighs them down, inclining them towards the earth through its weight” 
(Phaedrus 246e5). For Socrates the “soul is immortal” because, like Adams’s idealized 
version of Niagara Falls, it “moves itself” and that divine movement is “also source and 
first principle for the other things which move” (Phaedrus 245c10). Through “self-
control,” the charioteer is able to economize his forces toward an appropriate forward 
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motion of the ensemble that unites the sometimes contradictory impulses of madness and 
rationality, soul and body (Phaedrus 254b5). 
For Henry Adams in the twentieth century, who had seen his friend Clarence King 
go “quietly mad” in the face of the economic collapse of 1893, however, the causality of 
the motion of the soul had become reversed. Self-motion, or pure soul, was no longer 
thinkable in any significant sense after the introduction of the dynamo and the empire of 
coal that it required. Rather, humanity had “the air of taking for granted [society’s] 
indefinite progress toward perfection” to the degree that it had “usurped” from God the 
“rank of lord of creation” (Letter 80, 157). It was a child not of Plato but of Descartes’s 
“compromise” to escape “the dead-lock of free-will,” that Adams himself had narrated in 
his early novels (Letter 157, 160). Descartes “proposed to free man from material 
bondage,” within the human body, “provided he might mechanize all other vital energies” 
(Letter 159). This paradox, Adams claimed, would leave “the world to go on asserting 
two contradictory principles,” those of the determinism and chaos, or God and Darwin, 
“in the same breath, down to the present day, to the undiminished embarrassment of 
Universities” (Letter 159). The bicycle then, following Lacan, became Adams’s figure for 
the “signifier marking the place where it begins to be called another name,” that of 
modern subjectivity and its historically specific thought-objects or object-thoughts and 
their corollary modes of containment (Écrits 605) If modernity remains mad, it is no 
longer a divine gift but a contradiction internal to thought that plays itself out in an 
embarrassed silence. Because humanity assumed itself to be a prime mover, yet relied on 
the empire of coal to demonstrate this assumption, the Cartesian world of the twenteith 
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century would remain split along the new, technological lines, like the president from 
Democracy, unable to understand in any practical sense that “if a man who thinks he is a 
king is mad, a king who thinks he is a king is no less so” (Écrits 139). 
In his Education, Adams takes bicycle riding as a metaphor for the new, spatially 
determined subjectivity required in the age of the railway. It is the “mechanized” force 
that is the wager for individuality instituted by Descartes and made into historically 
contingent articulations by modern capitalism. The new subjectivity had become 
dominant partly to the degree that it had become institutionalized at Harvard College by 
“one’s psychological friends” who could explain the new subjectivity only because “it 
mattered so little to either party” (Education 410). Adams, having found that “the 
psychologists had, in a few cases, distinguished several personalities in the same mind, 
each conscious and constant, individual and exclusive,” professed the fact to be “scarcely 
surprising” (Education 410). For Adams,  
the compound ψῡχή took at once the form of a bicycle-rider, mechanically 
balancing himself by inhibiting all his inferior personalities, and sure to fall into 
the sub-conscious chaos below, if one of his inferior personalities got on top. The 
only absolute truth was the sub-conscious chaos below, which every one could 
feel when he sought it. (Education 411)  
Rather than Socrates’s “self-control,” the bicycle-rider now “mechanically” balanced 
himself. Madness itself had become the “only absolute truth” whose necessity 
conceptually grounded a mechanistic rationality. If a sequence to human events was 
possible in the technological age, this sequence was not a positive statement but the result 
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of a mechanistic “inhibition” grounded in the technical activity of the bicycle. In the 
wager between soul and body, modernity had chosen the soul, and in doing so had lost 
both in its new kind of impossible choice. Adams, in 1902, “woke up with a shudder as 
though he had himself fallen off his bicycle” (Education 411). 
 At stake for Adams in his Education, then, is what Lacan referred to as the 
“history of a life lived as history” in a world that had not yet entirely separated itself from 
its assumptions of history as an a priori category (Écrits 366). In order for history, which 
was no longer self-evident, to be established, it would now be at least partially subject to 
the material conditions that limited its potentia, both materially and ideologically. After 
Adams’s death, it was discovered that he had kept with him at all times a poem of his 
own composition entitled “The Prayer to the Virgin of Chartres.” In one version of that 
poem, Adams wrote to the Virgin that  
For centuries I brought you all my cares, 
And vexed you with the murmurs of a child; 
You heard the tedious burden of my prayers; 
You could not grant them, but at least you smiled 
 
If then I left you, it was not my crime, 
Or if a crime, it was not mine alone. (“Prayer to the Virgin” 126) 
Adams was not able, ultimately, to escape the logic of the total train system that had 
created both a new subjectivity that determined subjects in their acts and created a new 
kind of racial destiny that would be grounded in the biological determinism not of 
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individuals but of the social organism as a whole, anthropomorphically reified as a body 
itself. It would be left to others, including the poet and scholar James Weldon Johnson, to 
more specifically define the critique of the total train system that Adams had begun in its 
fully dominant ideological formation. 
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Chapter 4: 
 
Not Even in Daylight: The Necropolitics of James Weldon Johnson’s Autobiography 
of an Ex-colored Man 
 
And so we ride, 
Over land and tide, 
Without a thought of fear –  
Man never had 
The faith in God 
That he has in an engineer! 
James Weldon Johnson, “The Word of an Engineer” (1917) 
 
 If we wish to recognize a reality that is proper to psychical reactions, we must not begin 
by choosing among them; we must begin by no longer choosing. 
Jacques Lacan, “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’” (1936) 
 
Then nausea took possession of me, and I had grave doubts about reaching my 
destination alive. If I had the trip to make again, I should prefer to walk. 
James Weldon Johnson, The Autobiography of an Ex-colored Man (1912) 
 
The Faint Excitement of Watching Traffic 
On June 26th, 1938 the scholar, poet, novelist, and civil rights activist James 
Weldon Johnson was killed in a collision at a grade-crossing between the automobile he 
and his wife were in and a train. As the New York Times reported it, the “author of ‘The 
Book of Negro Spirituals’ and other works died a few moments after witnesses had 
extricated him from the wreckage of his automobile,” adding that “both his legs had been 
broken and his skull fractured” and that identification “of Mr. Johnson was established 
through personal papers which gave his address as 415 West 148th Street, New York 
City” (“Negro Leader Dies in Crossing Crash”). By 1938, technological death had 
become a regular part of life. Identifying people through their papers became a necessity 
because of the extreme violence done onto bodies by technological force. Additionally, 
grisly details of the effects of force on human bodies were reported in a clinical, matter-
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of-fact tone. Rather than a continued disbelief voiced by Charles Francis Adams, Jr. five 
decades earlier at the risks run by citizens every day, death by railway had become a 
normalized event. 
By 1912, the year James Weldon Johnson’s best-known work, The Autobiography 
of an Ex-colored Man, was anonymously published, the United States had more or less 
filled out the physical space of the continent with a system of railroads that inextricably 
tied the agricultural West with the markets of the East. The American frontier had been 
closed for more than two decades and was already a mythic object in the American 
imagination, no longer existing in any real form but remaining as a structure of feeling. 
Furthermore, 1912 saw the sinking of the Titanic, a terrifying tragedy that signaled the 
scale with which technological devastation would occur in the twentieth century. The 
Titanic represented the “intimate welding” of technological progress and its “sinister 
mate,” disaster, as Thomas Hardy put it (“The Convergence of the Twain” ix). Not only 
would technology necessarily escalate the quantitative scale and qualitative shock of 
individual disasters, it would fuel the escalation of American imperialism in Panama and 
Nicaragua, to bring about political regimes profitable to the interests of the United States. 
Seemingly by accident, though largely guided by Henry Adams’s closest friend John 
Hay, Secretary of State under the administrations of William McKinley and Teddy 
Roosevelt, the United States found itself militarily defending its “open door” policies in 
China and the construction of the Panama Canal that assured the material means of access 
from Europe to the East. Even as it was surpassed, the logic specific to the train system 
influenced the concept of development itself. The spatial logic of the railway as it 
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developed in its expansion across the continent and technical complexity by 1912 had 
become a truly global process. 
In his autobiography, Along This Way, Johnson described the new aesthetic 
experience of the global train system from a local perspective, or, as he put it, why 
“country people love to meet passing trains” (Along This Way 260). Living in the South 
after Reconstruction, as Johnson knew, would always require a consciousness of political 
space as also an economic space. Although for many years, Johnson was reticent about 
his own experiences with Southern violence, he knew enough to know that “a strange 
Negro on a backcountry road in Georgia was not entirely secure, not even in daylight” 
(Along 259). It was not until Johnson’s retirement from his position with the NAACP that 
W.E.B. DuBois “delivered a shocking tribute to his colleague’s activism when he 
divulged that ‘Mr. Johnson . . . was once nearly lynched in Florida, and quite naturally 
lynching was to him, despite all obvious excuses and explanations and mitigating 
circumstances, can never be less than a terrible real.’” (Goldsby 166).  In his 
autobiography Johnson wrote that, when staying in the South, he would often join a 
friend on Saturday afternoons in going to the railway station “to see the four trains come 
in and go out, two in the morning and two in the afternoon” (Along 260). Although he 
knew none of the passengers arriving or departing, “there was a faint excitement in 
watching traffic” (Along 260). Johnson did not expand on the observation, yet he 
registered the double-effect of the total train system as something that had shaped 
political space in the South, making it never “entirely secure” for a black man subjected 
to the whims of a white population’s implicit omnipresence but also giving it a “faint 
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excitement” in its material connection to global forces of routine capitalist exchange and 
its possibilities for rapid change. The train had performed a kind of political exchange 
between different kinds of security that Johnson had developed more fully in his 
Autobiography of an Ex-colored Man. While the train gave a kind of reassurance of 
regularity and connection to a broader world, it also meant that there would no longer be 
anywhere to run. As he put it later in his career, distance relative to concentrations of 
capital no longer had any political significance as there were “no more ‘vacant’ places on 
earth” (Negro Americans, What Now? 5). 
In this chapter I will argue that Johnson’s Autobiography of an Ex-colored Man, 
attempts to represent American, black subjectivity as it was structurally expressed 
through the new, now dominant, total train system. I will begin by arguing that Johnson’s 
novel rewrites the relationship between political space and identity as it was found in 
Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography for the new, material articulations created by the 
railway. Whereas Franklin’s concept of an American subjectivity was based on the 
plasticity of an identity that could be cast off as a result of geographic distances, 
Johnson’s concept of subjectivity in which geographic distances had been altered by the 
train system is inextricably tied to capitalist circulation and its requirements on 
subjectivity. Then, I will turn to the American practice of lynching as a nascent version of 
what Achille Mbembe called “necropolitics.” Johnson’s novel, I will argue, bears the 
traces of its global scene of writing in that the train system allowed the explicitly colonial 
aspects of the circulation and distribution of power to become dominant in American life 
in certain sections of the nation by way of the railway system’s influence. As a colonial 
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state that had transitioned into a fully sovereign nation, the practice of lynching allowed 
United States culture to retain colonial necropolitical practices to regulate its concept of 
itself. Finally, I will argue that this necropolitical element of American subjectification 
forces Johnson to imagine resistance to it as a reversal of the creation of necropolitical 
spaces. Rather than the creation of dead spaces in which the state guarantees its own 
safety through existential violence, resistance should be understood as a tactic for the 
creation of time within the Capitalist system of exchanges through the railway system. 
Although capitalist and white supremacist goals and assumptions are not 
identical, within American society, as Johnson points out in his novel, the alliance 
between the two has been long-standing to the point of partially merging in areas that 
supported lynching in the late nineteenth century. Once the frontier had been replaced not 
simply in fact but in the national imagination by a totalizing technological system, the 
frontier’s logic of limits to be surpassed turned in on itself to create fantastic borders 
within itself that would be empirically controlled for the benefit of explicitly capitalist 
political goals but in some cases through white supremacist means. In his Preface to The 
Autobiography of an Ex-colored Man, Johnson already signals his engagement with an 
empiricist vocabulary based on the assumption of populations whose arbitrarily chosen 
features could be statistically compared as a means of producing knowledge about the 
state. Some critics claim that the Preface is “revolutionary” in that it ironizes the 
assumptions of his white audience and the systems for representing difference, produced 
by fiat to supposedly analyze the totality of the body politic (Goellnicht 19). As Robert 
Fleming put it, the novel can only be read as a “deeply ironic character study of a 
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marginal man who narrates the story of his own life” without “realizing the significance,” 
producing the effect of a “complex and many-sided” character that evades stereotype 
(Fleming 83, 96). In the “Preface,” signed by “The Publishers” and actually written by 
Johnson himself, the author attempts to control the ways in which the novel should be 
read. For its initial publication in 1912, the novel was promoted as an authentic 
autobiography and Johnson encouraged this. It wasn’t until 1927, after Johnson had come 
to prominence as a scholar and civil rights leader that the novel was re-released with the 
author’s name on it. Like Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography before it, Johnson’s initial 
release of his novel began to ironize the concept of the unified, speaking subject that is 
defined by a narrative sequence of assumed causes and effects before the text itself had 
been read by an audience. The novel’s irony develops from its simultaneous effacement 
of individuality in a work supposed to express the totality of an individual’s subjective 
experience. 
Other critics, however, read the Preface straight, as “a coherent expression of 
personalized response to systems of signification and symbolic geography occasioned by 
social structure” (Stepto 97). For this alternate reading, the Preface is an honest statement 
of Johnson’s goals with the novel to represent “in a dispassionate, though sympathetic, 
manner conditions as they actually exist between the whites and blacks to-day,” making it 
“ultimately something less than a novel” (Autobiography vii, Stepto 127). Johnson 
claimed that writers before him had “treated the colored American as a whole” and each 
writer “has taken some one group of the race to prove his case” (Autobiography vii). He, 
by contrast, hoped to create “a composite and proportionate presentation of the entire 
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race, embracing all of its various groups and elements, showing their relations with each 
other and to the whites” (Autobiography vii). Through this method, he would be able to 
show his white readers “a view of the inner life of the Negro in America,” by way of 
being “initiated into the ‘freemasonry,’ as it were, of the race” (Autobiography vii). 
While it is clear that any attempt to represent at a single stroke the multiplicity of black 
experience in America is necessarily an ironic endeavor, requiring as it does a parallax 
view, the significance of the irony remains open to interpretation. These empiricist 
gestures are, first and foremost, correctives to an already established order whose features 
are only hinted at by the text. The “conditions as they actually exist” are, despite the self-
evidence of the claim, are what are at stake in the ironic corrective Johnson offers. 
In other words, although Johnson clearly claims to synthesize various black 
perspectives into a “composite” view for a white audience, what would the nature of that 
multiform “sphynx” be when the “veil” has been “drawn aside” (Autobiography vii)? 
Whereas DuBois, famously, described the sensation of this “second-sight” brought about 
by the veil as a “double-consciousness” that created “two warring ideals in one dark 
body,” Johnson, like Charles Chesnutt before him, suggests that the issue is even more 
complex as the ideals themselves are not unitary, but composites (DuBois 8). The very 
form of the novel seems to immediately belie its claim of rigorous empirical accuracy to 
a totality. Whereas Chesnutt’s Marrow of Tradition from a decade before might have a 
stronger claim to attempting something like a “composite” view by giving a panoramic 
treatment of an entire Southern town in a more realist mode, Johnson’s novel remains 
strictly focalized through a single, liminal protagonist through his early life as he travels 
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around the US and Europe, in a kind of Künstlerroman, shifting between and attempting 
to synthesize slightly different subject positions. These subject positions themselves are, 
however, overdetermined by the narrator’s willful assuming of particular racial 
identifications, motivated by either a struggle for racial equality or simply the desire not 
only to survive but to thrive in the United States. The overdetermination of subjectivity, 
at the same time, is also overdetermined by a shifting dialectic between the container and 
the thing contained, the deciding subject and the situation that sets the terms of decision, 
each half of the dialectic affecting the other depending the geographic and social situation 
in which the narrator finds himself, or at least the self he might tactically prefer in the 
situation. 
The novel traces the development of the protagonist as he moves from place to 
place and switches from accepting a black identity to passing for white, all the while 
attempting to develop himself as an individual and survive on his musical talent. Given 
the famously equivocal ending of the novel, in which the narrator definitively chooses to 
pass for white, it is difficult to see the Preface as anything but critically ironic of the very 
terms it sets forth by which to read the novel. Furthermore, given the narrator’s final 
claim that in passing for white, he had “chosen the lesser part” by having “sold” his 
“birthright for a mess of pottage,” the irony that structurally forces itself upon the 
narrator as the story progresses is that of an unequal exchange rather than a synthesis 
(Autobiography 100). The ironic, unequal exchange that the narrator chooses, in fact, 
plays out as the narrative progresses in many ways as a spatial transaction, through the 
system of railways and steamers that now span the globe. To change subject positions in 
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an effort to survive within American oppression can only be achieved by changing one 
space for another, and, as a corollary, one subject-position for another to meet the 
variations of a circulating and changing racist culture. 
The novel’s debt to the tradition of black writers that came before has been well 
documented and expertly discussed by critics such as Houston Baker, Robert Stepto, and 
Paul Gilroy. Johnson’s Autobiography can also, however, effectively be read as a 
revision of the Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin in that it attempts to rewrite 
Franklin’s playful use of Enlightenment assumptions of political space for the post-
Reconstruction era. By rewriting this foundational American text, Johnson not only 
makes a point about the difficulty of understanding a unified subject position from behind 
the veil of racism in America, but the degree to which the fundamental plurality of any 
subject position reinforced racial division through the material and cultural institutions 
shaped by capitalist circulation. As we’ve seen in the context of Charles Chesnutt’s work, 
literal mobility was seen as not simply a metaphor but, in the minds of some, a material 
guarantee of social mobility in the United States. Franklin helped crystalize this myth in 
the early years of the nation, setting the terms for how American’s would imagine their 
individuality to function. This quasi-metaphor of literal, geographic mobility as a means 
of achieving personal development remained intact from Franklin to Henry David 
Thoreau’s musings on a society “nowhere to be seen” when standing “in the midst of a 
huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two miles off,” and to Huck Finn’s decision 
to “light out for the territories” at the end of Mark Twain’s novel (Thoreau 241, Twain 
373). In each of these examples, following Franklin, the country is posited as a negative 
  231 
space of freedom in contrast to the ordered, positive social world of the city. For a subject 
within democracy to exist at all, for these writers, requires a space in which any external 
influence can be put in abeyance. Nature is, in effect, a space in which alternatives to 
current conditions can be imagined. And yet, as we have also seen in the context of 
Charles Chesnutt’s and Henry Adams’s work, the institution of the railway made any 
assumption of essential division between the country and the city only a rhetorical 
gesture. The railway had broken down even the illusion of these divisions, rendering both 
the country and the city different formations, different thickenings of speed, in the 
circulation between the agricultural West and the concentrations of capital in the East. It 
is precisely this concept of the split between the country and the city that Johnson claims 
no longer exists in the twentieth century as a means for creating a unified subject 
position. 
At a purely superficial level, there are many resonances between the characters of 
Franklin and the ex-colored man. Franklin hoped to influence his “Posterity” through his 
writing in that they may “imitate” his example of a slyly industrious proto-capitalist 
(Franklin 3). Both Franklin and the ex-colored man have an “unlikely beginning,” which 
for Franklin included an escape from his “harsh & tyrannical” brother who had instilled 
in Franklin an “Aversion to arbitrary Power” (Franklin 20-1, 25). Like Franklin, the ex-
colored man is a precocious child genius who often is motivated by the “gratifying” of 
his “vanity” (a phrasing that is identical to Franklin’s) and attempts to escape tyrannical 
influences to construct a coherent identity within American society (Autobiography 44). 
Coherent identity, in both cases, is understood at a superficial level to mean a separation 
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of the individual from “external” influences. Identity at its most obvious should be for 
these characters a sui generis creation. Similarly, just as Franklin partly constructs his 
identity as a negation of the ways in which English workers kept “themselves under” 
through excessive drinking, the ex-colored man does the same with the cigar makers he 
associates with during his time in Florida, who he claims are “careless and improvident” 
(Franklin 47, Autobiography 33). Both the ex-colored man and Franklin understand self-
fashioning to at least in part require the anthropological study of society to identify and 
therefore avoid the abstract forces that hamper other people’s ability to accrue power in 
some form. 
Importantly, however, while there are many superficial similarities between the 
local tactics for engaging with society of Franklin and the ex-colored man, the 
significance of these tactics within their contexts differs immensely. Like Johnson’s 
Preface to the Autobiography, Franklin similarly offers his life as a potential corrective, 
but limited to his own “Posterity” whose own subjectivity may be formed through 
imitation of his own. The corrective possibilities of Franklin’s text, require the 
dissociation of “success” in the world from one’s birth, Franklin’s own posterity having 
to learn of him by reading his text rather than simply being his “Posterity.” For the ex-
colored man, however, one’s birth remained an issue by way of American concepts of 
racial heredity. 
Whereas the first half of Franklin’s text is essentially a private joke between 
himself and his possible posteriors about the public sphere, that joke changes its meaning 
for the ex-colored man who was an inheritor not of an active reading of Franklin’s text 
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but the tradition that had misread it, a misreading that had already been inscribed in 
Franklin’s text itself. The first half of Franklin’s text, written before the war for 
independence, is a much more playful text than the second half. The first half describes 
the process by which Franklin learned to “not only to be in Reality Industrious & frugal, 
but to avoid all Appearances of the Contrary” (Franklin 68). Appearances, in Franklin’s 
autobiography, exist in the public sphere of the city, where Franklin would carry his 
products in a wheelbarrow down the main street with no particular goal in mind other 
than the appearance of industry. Reality, on the other hand, was a strictly personal life 
that was infinitely malleable and unknowable, hidden behind the mask of public status. 
For Franklin, the “real” individual does not exist in any social sense, but is merely an 
assumed prerequisite for a public life. After the Revolution, however, James Abel and 
William Vaughan asked Franklin to continue his writing, with the new country of the 
United States as an audience rather than Franklin’s own “posterity.” They, not 
understanding the fundamental irony of Franklin’s concept of the relationship between 
public and private selves, exhort Franklin to continue his self-help book as a “key to life,” 
creating “virtuous and manly minds” that would be prepared to enter the “table of the 
internal circumstances of [Franklin’s] country” (Franklin 74-5). These men misread 
Franklin’s facility with creating a public image imbricated within a specific context as a 
“discovery,” that preparation for social life is a “private power” rather than a public one 
(Franklin 74). By ontologizing Franklin’s textual play, Franklin’s misreaders set in 
motion a tautological concept of the subject whose play is now mechanized because 
assumed to be a private faculty of the “mind” rather than of language. In the second half 
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of Franklin’s autobiography he attempts to play the joke of his original text more or less 
straight, giving his audience what they request. By including the letters Abel and Vaughn 
sent him in his unfinished work, Franklin warns his audience that he is doing no more 
than is asked of him. Like Franklin, Johnson’s ex-colored man imagines his confession as 
“a practical joke on society” (Autobiography 1). And yet, the “table of internal 
circumstances” that constitute the imaginary of the nation that faces the ex-colored man 
significantly change the contours and significance of the joke he plays. 
For Franklin as for the ex-colored man, the possibility of the joke of a public 
persona’s necessary divergence from an assumed private persona to a certain extent rests 
on movement between geographic locations. Franklin is only able to construct a persona 
because he escaped Boston for Philadelphia, where his contract with his tyrannical 
brother is not known or enforced, allowing Franklin more freedom to reconstruct his life 
away from family ties. Cities in his narrative are locations on a map but also centers of 
power for the enforcement of laws, with lawless space in-between. When Franklin 
famously reaches Philadelphia with little more than a “Dutch Dollar and about a Shilling 
in copper” in his pocket, he meanders through the streets until he finds “many clean 
dress’d People” moving toward an unknown destination (Franklin 26). Franklin “join’d 
them, and thereby was led into the great Meeting House of the Quakers near the Market” 
and, “being very drowsy thro’ Labour and want of Rest the preceding Night, [he] fell 
asleep” (Franklin 26). For Franklin, travel occurs between cities which are figured as 
places of safety, compared to the wilderness. In Philadelphia, the city provides a context 
within which individual identity may be ignored or taken up depending on the situation. 
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For Johnson’s ex-colored man, however, the city would function differently. Within the 
framework of the train system, the city was no longer a unit demarcated by wilderness 
which created discrete centers of legal and social life. Rather, the country and city had 
been incorporated into a single, interconnected system of exchanges in which the casting 
off of an identity would come at a price. 
Johnson’s ex-colored man found himself in a similar situation to Franklin when 
he travelled to Atlanta after the death of his mother to begin training in a University. 
After arriving in Atlanta the ex-colored man’s stock of money is almost immediately 
stolen and, while wandering the streets of the city, he “paused, undecided, for a moment” 
before the University he had hoped to attend, “then turned and slowly retraced [his] steps, 
and so changed the whole course of [his] life” (Autobiography 29). Rather than a Meeting 
House in which Franklin heard “nothing said,” the institution toward which Atlanta’s 
traffic ran was a University whose function was to train young people to enter the market 
with saleable skills (Franklin 26). Rather than the pure waste of a silent community, 
individuality would be constructed along capitalist lines in Atlanta for the ex-colored 
man. For Franklin, the city offered a space in which temporal sequence and 
consciousness could be suspended in restful sleep amongst strangers. For the ex-colored 
man, however, the city is merely a stopping point to be hesitated over while changing 
course. Without a break in continuity the Meeting House offered Franklin, the ex-colored 
man is only given the choice of continuing on the railway to Florida in search of any 
work available. 
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The train, as a technological system, constructs travel differently than the 
undifferentiated, “uncivilized” space that separated settlements in Franklin’s text. Like 
the “Train Sermon,” commonly given by black preachers in the South, which Johnson 
quotes in the Preface to his collection of poems, God’s Trombones, the space of travel 
now bore positive meaning that constructed social valuation, rather than functioning as a 
negative space that constructed the meaning of civilization through its absence. The 
“Train Sermon” “in which both God and the devil were pictured as running trains, one 
loaded with saints, that pulled up to heaven, and other with sinners, that dumped its load 
in hell,” re-imagined space as a medium for representing vectors of force which 
distributed value (Complete Poems 5). Motion, the movement through space, would be 
already structured along the lines of a railway and be the vessel by which divine 
decisions would be carried out. As the narrator describes his train trip to Florida in the 
Autobiography, he “may live to be a hundred years old” but “shall never forget the 
agonies [he] suffered that night” as he traveled in the porter’s basket for want of money 
to pay the cost of the ticket (Autobiography 30). During the trip the narrator was unable 
to stand “on account of the shelves for clean linen” over his head, the “air was hot and 
suffocating and the smell of damp towels and used linen was sickening” (Autobiography 
30). Additionally, at “each lurch of the car over the none too smooth track” he was 
“bumped and bruised against the narrow walls of [his] narrow compartment” 
(Autobiography 30). It was a common refrain in the nineteenth century that, with the 
introduction of the railway, passengers on long journeys began to feel “as if you were a 
package,” as Benjamin phrased it, to be transported in the conditional tense from place to 
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place rather than active subjects taking part in their own voyage (“Firth of Tay” 565). 
Within the context of the American system of Jim Crow, however, this status as an 
uncomfortably contained object rather than subject took on an added level of meaning. 
To be an object rather than a subject within the space of American society would 
necessarily have taken on a racialized dimension in addition to its literal containment. 
The ex-colored man is therefore caught halfway between subjectivity and objectivity. The 
status of “blackness” is structurally positioned as not subjective enough from within the 
total train system. 
Both Franklin and the ex-colored man, then, deal with the American imaginary 
relationship between political space and the instrumentalization of identity. For Franklin, 
the Enlightenment assumption of a unified identity gives rise for dead spaces of 
community in which identity may be cast off. Subjectivity guarantees itself for Franklin 
because it may be lost in the Meeting House and a personal history can be created in “the 
future anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming” 
(Écrits 247). Johnson’s rewriting of Franklin effectively reimagines the mode in which 
this “becoming” takes place in literal space which then becomes abstracted to a concept 
of the individual created in the conditional tense, being treated as if he were a human, 
which is to say, as a passenger on the Jim Crow railway. Franklin assumed the individual 
to be certain because that certainty may be safely rejected in certain circumstances, to be 
reformed later. In the full post-Enlightenment, capitalist world of the Jim Crow South, 
however, no such safety existed and no such rejection was possible. 
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The “future anterior” would already have its mode conditionally set by the 
railway tracks whose vectors had been determined by the struggle between Capital and 
Labor over the Granger laws as a reaction to the corrupt practices of the Reconstruction 
South in the 1860s. Rather than a subjectivity guaranteed by its capacity to be objectified, 
the new subjectivity of the total train system would require individuals, and black 
individuals to an even more extreme degree, according to Johnson, to always be halfway 
between subject and object, in a perverse instrumentalization that functions as Georges 
Bataille’s concept of the tool. Bataille wrote that the  
positing of the object, which is not given in animality, is in the human use of 
tools; that is, if the tools as middle terms are adapted to the intended result – if 
their users perfect them. Insofar as tools are developed with their end in view, 
consciousness posits them as objects, as interruptions in the indistinct continuity. 
The developed tool is the nascent form of the non-I. (Theory of Religion 27) 
It is precisely this formation of the non-I that occurs to the narrator as a quasi-object 
being carried along the total train system. And yet, as more than simply a “developed 
tool,” but a fully integrated technological system, the railway did more than simply 
function as a “nascent form of the non-I.” Technology, when attached to a progressive 
concept of history, displaces the “perfection” of the means towards an intended result 
from the human to the divine. Rather than creating a free space of play, as it does for 
Franklin, the train system in Johnson separates the “sinners” from the “saints” along 
politically determined lines. The fight over the Granger laws in the 1860s was, in a 
certain sense, the fight over whether Labor or Capital would benefit from the railway’s 
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capacity to control the lines of demarcation of the railway and, after those had been set, 
who would be in control of the rates of circulation of commodities. The subjective 
position of the Capitalist would take Labor as its “non-I” or instrumentalized Other. 
Labor, in that struggle would be an eternally fluctuating productive capacity to be 
accounted for by the rational system of capitalist circulation rather than full subjects to 
play an equal part in the assigning of value to circulation. Johnson points out, continuing 
the thought, that this fight would inevitably be translated into racial terms given the 
political history of the United States as it emerged from Reconstruction. 
 Paul Gilroy has pointed out the importance of travel, the image of the “ship – a 
living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion,” for the African diaspora as a 
modulation of the concept of the “middle passage” that African slaves forcibly underwent 
within the Atlantic slave trade (Gilroy 4). For Gilroy, this image of the ship as 
metonymic for travel contained within it the possibility for “counterculture” and 
conceptual tools with which alternate ideas of sociality could be developed. Johnson, 
however, also points out another possible facet of a kind of travel imbricated within 
American capitalism that is less structurally conducive to countercultural possibility. 
With the railway, unlike the image of the ship that Gilroy illustrates, which mimics 
Franklin’s travel through uncertainty between destinations, has no starting point or end. 
Rather, it became in the United States circulation as such. In other words, it created 
subjects as a continuous middle term within the formation of a non-I that could not be 
associated with a particular “intended result,” but simply circulation for its own sake. For 
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black subjects in the American South, the railway system was a continuous “middle 
passage,” constantly suspended in the middle term. 
 
The National Disgrace 
The expansion of the railway system into the twentieth century did not simply 
change the material structures in which relationships between individuals and the fantasy 
of a social whole would be instrumentalized through capitalist circulation. The 
relationship between the state itself and its growing colonial spheres of influence would 
similarly be instrumentalized along capitalist lines. Johnson was intimately aware of the 
rate and nature of the United States’ imperial expansion. Through the influence of Booker 
T. Washington, Johnson was able to leave his teaching position in the American South to 
gain a place within the United States diplomatic service while still a young man. At first, 
Johnson was stationed in Venezuela before moving to Corinto, Nicaragua in time to 
witness a revolution against its government. For a time prior to the revolution, Johnson 
was outside of the sphere of action in the United States’ attempts to install and maintain 
political regimes beneficial to its interests. With this revolution, however, “Corinto 
became the chief entrepôt for American armed forces as well as a key point of loyalist 
strength” (Levy 117). While Johnson “of course, did not make policy,” he ably assisted 
“his government’s decision to support those loyal to President Diaz” when he personally 
“stalled the rebels through negotiations lasting several days” during an attack which 
allowed for the arrival of reinforcements and also allowed “Johnson, the captain of the 
Annapolis, and the captain of the Denver to refuse to yield the port” (Levy 117-8). Some 
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historians have a tendency to describe the United States’ interventions in South America, 
and particularly the building of the Panama Canal, in awe-struck terms; “there really 
seemed no limit to what man might do” through its feats of engineering, as the popular 
historian David McCullough put it (McCullough 25). Yet, according to the fortuitously 
named George Washington Goethals, one of the chief architects of the Panama Canal, the 
canal was first and foremost “a novel problem in government” as it presented “the 
necessity of ruling and preserving order within the Canal Zone” (qtd. in Greene 4). 
Before it was a feat of engineering, it was a feat of the creation and maintenance of 
political space by military means. Whereas in the American South, railway stations gave 
a faint sense of excitement partly through their regularity, Johnson also had first-hand 
experience in the maintenance of that system through military means as a global system. 
It was, in fact, during his time in Venezuela and Nicaragua that Johnson “all but 
finished The Autobiography of an Ex-colored Man, the novel he had begun in New 
York,” before leaving for South America (Levy 124). Brian Russell Roberts has 
persuasively argued that the Autobiography bears the traces of its global scene of writing. 
Within the context of black American thought, Roberts sees the Autobiography as 
attempting to evade the polarizing debate of the time between W.E.B. DuBois and 
Booker T. Washington in which DuBois repeatedly attacked Washington for his 
“diplomatic” approach to white Americans’ hesitation to actively pursue equality at either 
a legal or social level for black Americans. For DuBois, diplomacy was equivalent to 
hypocrisy in which concession to a fundamentally racist society was always a political 
loss. Roberts argued that the Autobiography should be read as inflected by Johnson’s 
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time as an American representative in South America and “invested in eroding the 
sedimented methodological categories and racial essentialisms that have influenced 
readings of strategic indirection as either hypocrisy or diplomacy” (Roberts 292). 
Johnson “not only hoped that his consular service would function as an indirect argument 
for racial advancement, but also that the novel he wrote would engage the question of 
indirection as a method” for interrogating “categories of ambassadorship and compromise 
in ways that seek to reinvision and racially remap the implications of seeking 
advancement through oblique methods” (Roberts 295). While Roberts’s description of 
Johnson’s rhetorical strategy seems accurate to Johnson’s activity as a Civil Rights 
leader, particularly in reference to his anti-lynching work with the NAACP, when 
situated within the context of the total train system that linked the markets of the United 
States to the world’s spheres of potentially exploitable resources and lanes of transport 
for raw materials and products, the significance of diplomacy changes.  
“Indirection” is a negative concept that reforms a previous, positive statement. 
Roberts’s choice of the word “remap” is particularly suggestive here of a broader range 
of reference for the global scene of writing inscribed in the novel which would include 
technological systems and their implications for politically defined space. Although 
Roberts does not expand on the term, it acknowledges Johnson’s diplomatic activity to be 
a question of political divisions of space, whose solidity is guaranteed by institutions’ 
dominance of space through the technological control of time. “Diplomacy,” as Johnson 
knew from his time in Corinto, would also be a matter of using speech to create time in-
between attacks. Successful diplomacy would therefore to an extent be achieved by 
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manipulating the times of dispersal of force to favor certain vectors of speed (and 
therefore force) over others. More than simply good-will or the willingness to appear to 
take a rhetorically objective position, diplomacy, taking a stance through speech, would 
also have the temporal effect of interrupting the speed of military action, which had by 
that time become an extension and weaponization of the speed made possible by lanes of 
technologically mediated commerce. As a corollary, relative “securities” would be the 
result of tactics to create a space of more time within a technological system that 
attempted to eliminate space through the condensation of time. 
The logic by which the state guaranteed its own security, both militarily and 
economically, through violence done on “stateless” people (rebel militias in the case of 
the Central American revolution) was a part of the United States’ concept of itself from 
its very inception in the form of mob violence. This violence, as one historian put it, 
“conjure[s] up images of cowboys, cattle rustlers, and a generally wholesome tradition of 
frontier justice. Lynching, it seems, represents for many a stage in the conquest and 
settlement of the West” (Brundage 1). As a European colony, the mythic origins of the 
United States always included a mobile border demarcating the civilized and uncivilized, 
the “safe” space of commerce and government, and the “unsafe” space of those outside of 
the state legally yet more or less within it geographically. It may be true that “the practice 
of organized mobs punishing alleged wrongdoers in a summary fashion was an 
established custom by the end of the colonial period” and that after “the Revolution, 
lynching expanded across the frontier, as mobs used whipping, rituals of humiliation, and 
occasionally hangings to impose social order” (Brundage 3). Maintenance of the social 
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order, however, had changed after the Civil War and with it the use and meaning of mob 
violence, particularly in the American South. The “racialization of lynching – the near-
exclusive targeting of African American people for punishment by white vigilante mobs 
– took clear shape during the era of Reconstruction” (Goldsby 17). With the passing of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1868, the state had nominally 
included all “persons born or naturalized” within its borders as citizens and supposedly 
prevented the deprivation of “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law” (US Const. Art./Amend. XIV, sec. 1). At the same time, “on the average, a black 
man, woman, or child was murdered nearly once a week, every week, between 1882 and 
1930 by a hate-driven white mob,” a number that does not include “casualties of the 
urban race riots that erupted during those years” or “the victims of racially motivated 
murders by a single killer or pairs of assassins” (Tolnay and Beck ix). Rather than a 
series of unrelated crimes, the practice of lynching constituted a state-sanctioned 
institution in many parts of the country. White Americans “used lynchings as a tool for 
maintaining dominance in a society that was forced to accept a revolutionary change in 
the status of blacks – from slaves to freedmen,” as historians Stuart Tolnay and E.M. 
Beck put it (Tolnay and Beck 257). It is unsurprising, then, that after returning to the 
United States from South America, Johnson’s focus was on preventing lynching, which 
he called the “national disgrace” (“Lynching” 720) According to Johnson, lynching was 
an “instrument” used by whites to drive black Americans “out of politics in the South” 
(“Lynching” 721). This expulsion from politics, of course, was also, from the point of 
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view of the state, an expulsion from civilization itself, but, importantly for the state’s 
rationalization of the practice to itself, only for limited times and within limited spaces. 
Both Johnson and later historians agree, then, that the practice of lynching was an 
“instrument” or “tool” for specific political ends. In order to form the “will of the people” 
as a conscious decision, certain spaces became objectified and instrumentalized through a 
mob to achieve a political goal. The status of lynching as a tool is complicated, however, 
by its lack of a single, identifiable intention by which causes and effects may be 
conceptually linked. When journalists “of the 1890s drew upon Victorian ideologies 
about male sexuality in order to portray lynching as a struggle between white ‘manly 
civilization’ and black ‘unmanly savagery,’” the mechanism of lynching was created 
conceptually through the same logic as the railroad itself, as a means by which 
civilization as an abstraction could be maintained by the dominant white ideology 
through the “nascent non-I” of the instrumentalized, stateless quasi-subjectivity of black 
Americans (Markovitz 24). In fact, this mechanism, through the last decades of the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth century was used for a variety of political purposes.  
During the Granger agitations I discussed in reference to the work of Henry 
Adams, for instance, the United States for the first time “faced the real possibility of a 
coalition built around common class interests rather than race. The vehicle for this 
potentially revolutionary development was the Populist movement and the third political 
party that it eventually spawned” (Tolnay and Beck 175). The American South, however, 
took a different political course than the West I discussed in the previous chapter. In the 
South, many who made a living through farming, “blacks and whites alike, were virtually 
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bound to the crop-lien system that required them to mortgage their maturing crops in 
exchange for credit from merchants and landlords to meet day-to-day expenses” (Tolnay 
and Beck 175). While some members of the Southern Populist party “stressed the 
commonality of African-American and white economic interests,” in the face of the crop-
lien system, “a persistent undercurrent of racism existed within the party” (Tolnay and 
Beck 176). As a political bloc, black citizens became an instrument between established 
political parties to control sections of the vote in a particular area. The “patriarchs of the 
conservative Democratic party believed that black disenfranchisement would reduce the 
threat of a political coalition between blacks and disenchanted whites” while “politically 
estranged whites concluded that the political dominance of the conservative Democrats 
would be weakened if they could no longer exploit black voters, legitimately or 
illegitimately” (Tolnay and Beck 180-1). Lynching, as a tool for political control, cannot, 
therefore be limited to a particular political end: “whether blacks voted Populist, 
Democratic, or Republican, they represented a potential political threat to someone” 
(Tolnay and Beck 180). Rather, lynching became a tool for any political outcome in the 
American South. By creating the possibility for symbolically expelling a part of the 
community out of politics through lynching, the American political system created a 
mechanism by which power could be taken by particular parties at the expense of others 
by way of zones of potential violence. The black community in the American South 
became a “nascent non-I” and therefore a tool of the political system as such rather than a 
particular interest within it. 
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Toward the end of the Autobiography, just such a lynching plays a key narrative 
role in the trajectory of the ex-colored man’s development in that it is the precipitating 
event for a decision that had been held in abeyance by the narrator about the race he 
would choose to present himself as to the public. Much has been said about the novel’s 
acceptance or redeployment of the traditional tropes of the “mulatto” in American 
literature. As critic Roxanne Pisiak put it, the “racial themes and subjects of the narrative 
not only demonstrate the ‘slipperiness’ of color lines, they also deconstruct the 
dichotomies of white and black words, and white and black worlds” (Pisiak 83). And yet, 
as Pisiak’s somewhat casual misuse of “deconstruct” indicates, the maintenance of the 
color-line through mob violence worked in more complicated ways than the simple 
revelation of the arbitrary character of a “dichotomy.” Other critics have pointed to this 
decision by the ex-colored man to pass for white at the end of the novel as an example of 
the intractability of American racism and the betrayal of a progressive politics that would 
help move American society towards a more egalitarian ideology.  
Rather than take a position on which of the two options the ex-colored man 
should have chosen, I would like to discuss the terms of the decision itself as they relate 
to the dominant ideology of progressivism and its relationship to the technologies that 
punctuate and therefore structure the journey of the protagonist throughout the novel. 
One of the most important ironies surrounding the politics of race around 1900, one that 
Charles Chesnutt only began to sketch, was the implicit assumptions about the politics of 
space which assumed an analogy between physical mobility and social mobility. In 
Johnson’s novel, travel is an essential structural element of the development of the 
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protagonist. For much of the novel, access to rapid and relatively cheap transportation 
functions as an escape for the ex-colored man from the structures of American racism 
that he finds himself in at various points. At the same time, with the final, decisive event 
of the lynching, this structure of mobility is turned against the protagonist and revealed as 
a primary means by which the oppressive ideology of America enacts the mechanisms of 
oppression through its potential to be anywhere at any time. Travel, therefore, functions 
ironically, simultaneously aiding in the creation of an ostensibly independent subject-
position for the narrator and, at the same time, supporting the ideological mechanisms by 
which that independence is reincorporated into American systems of oppression. 
By 1912, as I’ve argued in my previous chapter, the railway had become a 
dominant feature of American life, along with the ideology it supported. When it 
structured the pre-existing legacy of Southern racial violence, the railway crated a new 
concept of sovereignty itself. In his essay, “Necropolitics,” Achille Mbembe describes an 
important element of modern concepts of sovereignty as they developed out of the 
European system of colonialism into the modern polity, extending Michel Foucault’s 
concept of “biopolitics.” “Necropolitics,” he writes, is the “perception of the existence of 
the Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat or absolute danger whose 
biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life and security” (Mbembe 18). 
For Mbembe, following Paul Gilroy, this logic of sovereignty emerged in the European 
imaginary from its development as a colonial state. European colonies were “not 
organized in a state form” in that they did “not establish a distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, or again between ‘enemy’ and ‘criminal’” (Mbembe 24). Rather, 
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they were spaces outside of the state that functioned as “zones in which war and disorder, 
internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each 
other” (Mbembe 24). The “sovereign right to kill” was “not subject to any rule in the 
colonies” (Mbembe 25). With the practice of American lynching, however, this concept 
of the necropolitical space would operate within the nation itself, rather than as a space 
external to it. Additionally, rather than a definable territory, subject to rule by a colonial 
power at a distance, the railway provides for the quasi-spontaneous expansion within the 
state for necropolitical spaces to exist for more or less determinate periods of time. As 
Foucault put it, power “must . . . be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as 
something that functions only when it is part of a chain” (Foucault 29). Within this chain, 
racism “is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under 
power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 254). 
As Johnson’s scene toward the end of the Autobiography makes clear, the practice of 
lynching in the American South was exactly this kind of expression of power that 
maintained the necropolitical border between what must live and what must die by way 
of the circulation of power made possible by the railway. 
The lynching scene at the end of the novel provides the terms by which the ex-
colored man’s decision is made and therefore reorganizes in retrospect the events of the 
novel that precedes it as well as the terms by which value is distributed. Whereas in 
Chesnutt’s Marrow of Tradition, the railway played a primarily structural role, in 
Johnson’s novel the railway has simultaneously become a dominant force in American 
social and political life while, at the same time, more obviously literal in the means by 
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which power is circulated unevenly and along racial lines. These lynch mobs, as Chesnutt 
had already noted, worked by suspending the typical “course of justice” in the face of 
rationalized states of emergency, which came to characterize “race relations” in general. 
As I’ve already argued about Charles Chesnutt’s novel The Marrow of Tradition, 
lynching was conceived of by white supremacists as an extra-legal act which, in 
exceeding the law, grounded its efficacy in the same “will of the people” that Henry 
Adams initially supposed to be a trans-historic constant in his journalistic days. Because 
extra-legal, representing the violence of lynching has proved difficult. Although cloaked 
in the language and logic of legality, these events exceeded the concepts that were used to 
legitimize them to a white supremacist society. Rebeccah Bechtold has argued, the ex-
colored man’s stammered speech whenever the subject of lynching is raised or depicted 
in the novel, “represents the failure of the narrative to represent political violence,” 
revealing the polyphonic subversion of romanticized Southern concepts of national 
identity (Bechtold 34). Although the final scene of The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored 
Man has been widely discussed in the criticism, one detail typically goes unanalyzed and 
often unquoted – that the lynching occurs by means of the railway in two important 
moments. Because existing within states of emergency, the typical time of justice was 
suspended in spaces of lynching. The railway’s speed allowed whites to assemble from 
various counties to the critical mass of bodies that were required for an extra-legal 
murder of a black man. This figure of the railway encompasses both the stable point of 
the depot that connects the town to others and the speed of circulation, the combination of 
which constitutes the new, “necropolitical” aspect of the total train system. 
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The scene of the lynching itself is a complicated one. It takes place toward the end 
of the novel after the ex-colored man has returned to the United States from an extended 
period in Europe with his “millionaire” patron. Enchanted with the ex-colored man’s 
musical abilities, the patron had taken the ex-colored man to Europe to avoid the 
consequence of a bar fight in which a white woman had been killed. On his return to the 
US, the narrator-protagonist attempts to fulfil what he had conceived of as the promise of 
his life to fuse classical European music with the new ragtime music created by African-
Americans. In order to learn more of the African-American tradition and mine it for 
material to put into Classical European terms, the ex-colored man travels to the American 
South and finds himself at a Christian revival meeting. His experience at the “big 
meeting” left the narrator “in that frame of mind which, in the artistic temperament, 
amounts to inspiration” (Autobiography 86). A sense of personal ecstasy and possibility, 
however, will quickly be reincorporated into structural circulations of power when a man 
is lynched after the end of the meeting. 
At the beginning of the scene, in an echo of the “riot” at the end of Chesnutt’s 
Marrow of Tradition, the railway provides the means by which overwhelming numbers 
of white people can quickly congregate. After finding lodging for the evening, the ex-
colored man “became conscious of that sense of alarm which is always aroused by the 
sound of hurrying footsteps on the silence of the night” and found it “impossible . . . to 
remain in the house under such tense excitement” (Autobiography 87). Unlike Chesnutt’s 
Marrow of Tradition which spends much of its time detailing the various events prior to a 
riot that directly and indirectly lead up to it, the narrator of the Autobiography finds 
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himself thrown into events in media res. From the point of view of the subject, the 
conditions by which such lynch-mobs are formed cannot be directly experienced. Rather, 
they are structural conditions of possibility that, from the individual’s point of view, seem 
to behave without any clear sense of cause and effect, simply as a “tense excitement.” 
Following “the drift,” the ex-colored man goes out of the building and when he “reached 
the railroad station” there “was gathered there a crowd of men, all white” while “others 
were steadily arriving, seemingly from all the surrounding country” (Autobiography 87). 
In The Marrow of Tradition, the railway acted as a structural threat of the accumulation 
of white supremacists at any moment. In the Autobiography, however, that threat is 
represented in its consolidation. The primary structuring principle, however, in this initial 
section centers on the significance of silence. The crowd, rather than a collection of 
individuals, are a series of repetitions of a “type” – “blond, tall, and lean, with ragged 
mustache and beard, and glittering gray eyes” (Autobiography 87). The railway in this 
instance, has not created a community in which individuals can exchange commodities or 
even commodified ideas. Rather, the “type” of person for the expression of particular 
kinds of power are themselves circulated to meet the demands of that power. The narrator 
does not relate any conversations in the scene. Rather, the crowd itself is being spoken 
through by the dominant structure of the total train system in silence. There “was no extra 
noise or excitement, no loud talking, only swift sharp words of command given by those 
who seemed to be accepted as leaders by mutual understanding” (Autobiography 87). 
Despite the silence, there is communication. Everything was done in “an orderly manner” 
  253 
because the organization was not that of discourse but of the material structure of the 
railway and the dominant power it was constructed to express (Autobiography 87). 
As the scene plays out, the relationship between silence and action becomes even 
more complex. After the victim of the public murder was brought out to the gathering 
crowd the “men who at midnight had been stern and silent were now emitting that terror 
instilling sound known as the ‘rebel yell’” and “from somewhere” came the call to “burn” 
the black man they had captured (Autobiography 88). The call “ran like an electric 
current” through the crowd, signaling the “transformation of human beings into savage 
beasts” (Autobiography 88). The metaphor of electric current here is significant in that it 
reveals more than simply a comparison between two unlike things. Rather, it reveals the 
logic at work in the organization of force of which the crowd is an expression. There is 
no public sphere in the Enlightenment sense. There is merely the expression of force 
whose path operates like a technology and whose mechanisms have been established 
prior to the event. In the actual murder of the black man, a “railroad tie was sunk into the 
ground, the rope was removed and a chain brought and securely coiled around the victim 
and the stake . . . Fuel was brought from everywhere, oil, the torch; the flames crouched 
for an instant as though to gather strength, then leaped up as high as their victim’s head” 
(Autobiography 88). Within the silence, material structures form the narrative links that 
produce cause and effect, the materials of the railway providing the means and logic by 
which the murder occurs. 
The railway, therefore, has a dual presence in the lynching scene from the 
Autobiography, both of which contribute to the structural role of silence in the passage. 
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Firstly, at the level of the narrative, it provides the raw materials, so to speak, for the 
violence of white supremacists. The “counties” from which the crowd apparently 
emanates are connected by the railway and the telegraph that it requires. As such, the 
logic of circulation along the railway creates the conditions for the mass movement 
required to murder, extra-legally, an American citizen. Secondly, at a slightly more 
metaphorical level, the railway anchors the expression of violence. Johnson, of course, 
literalizes this in having the railway tie anchor the apparatus constructed for the murder. 
The railway, then, in its structural articulation of the space and time of capitalist 
circulation created the conditions for another articulation of space and time that occurs 
with the lynching in which the narrator experiences a series of stammers and hesitations 
but the crowd that he experiences do not. Their decisiveness is noted at several points. 
They are silent because the process of decision making has become entirely “pre-
judicial,” in the sense I developed in my second chapter, and the space and time in which 
that decision can occur is created by the ideological and material structures of the 
railway. 
The lynching scene produces meaning structurally, in its conditions of possibility, 
rather than expressively, at the level of content, to the point that “before [the narrator] 
realized that time had elapsed” he “was looking at a scorched post, a smoldering fire, 
blackened bones, charred fragments sifting down through coils of chain” (Autobiography 
88). The white people in the crowd had multiple reactions to the event. Some “of the 
crowd yelled and cheered, others seemed appalled at what they had done, and there were 
those who turned away sickened at the sight” (Autobiography 88). The movement of 
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power through the railway and the ideological mechanisms it served to support do not 
even require a particular intention or reaction for its expression to occur. Its expression, 
in fact, occurs at the level of structure, in excess of discursive meaning. It is, rather, 
power expressing itself in silence. As James Weldon Johnson’s The Autobiography of an 
Ex-Colored Man demonstrates, in the United States under Jim Crow, the logic of 
necropolitics was already at work within the state itself. More than this, the practice of 
lynching made necropolitics a rapidly shifting category, inextricably tied with the 
railway. The lynching scene is the moment of decision for the narrator. After that, the 
“inspiration” that the narrator had felt just before does not so much disappear as become 
recontextualized within the power structure expressed through the total train system. 
 
“I Should Have Felt Relieved . . .” 
Technologies such as the railway, then, did not create a new kind of political act 
nor did they have an inherent political function. Rather, they were tools that became 
imbricated into already existing political formations, particularly the nascent 
“necropolitical” formations that already existed in de-centralized forms, which changed 
the means by which politics were enforced, particularly in the South. Although these 
tools could have been used for different ends, to the degree that they quickly came under 
the control of dominant political structures, any possibilities for different political ends 
were quickly stifled. Jacqueline Goldsby has argued that, far from being an aberration or 
a series of singular and unpredictable outpourings of regrettable but inevitable public 
rage, the American practice of lynching in order “to oppress African Americans was 
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intensified by its relations to cultural developments we ordinarily categorize as ‘modern’” 
(Goldsby 25). Although it is common to view American racism as a regrettable ghost 
from the past which continues to haunt the present, I agree with Goldsby’s point that 
although a desire to move beyond “racism” is valuable, particular formations of racist 
practice remain unequivocally modern. Viewing racism as a practice unequivocally tied 
to the past hides some of its means of reproducing itself. Rather than a positive set of 
principles that can be refuted, American racism also shapes knowledge as a negative, 
structuring silence, allowing it to persist in ever more modern forms. Goldsby continues 
that a “significant but untold dimension of lynching’s force as a tactic of white 
supremacy derives from its capacity not just to terrorize but to traumatize survivors into 
silence, leaving gaps of knowledge in its wake” (Goldsby 35). Johnson’s novel, in turn, is 
particularly important to this historical moment in that it “locates lynching’s deadly, 
dominating impulses at the core of one of the central developments supposed to have 
transformed the nation’s life for the better – the consolidation of mass cultural production 
in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century America” (Goldsby 169). I would add, 
however, that, as a part of the total train system, the modes of “cultural production” of 
which lynching is an example were consolidated along lines that set the terms for the 
material means of creating and distributing the violence that Johnson attempted to 
represent in The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man. 
For his depiction of lynching, Johnson draws on a relationship inherent in the 
structure of the total train system as it developed within American capitalism. The 
railway, more than simply a tool, organized thought through its material modes of 
  257 
relation. The ideological agreement that sanctioned the violence of lynching understood 
silence to ground the violence that was required within white supremacist thought for the 
state to guarantee its functioning. Critics have, however, tended to avoid discussing the 
silences of the novel with the important exception of Goldsby who, following DuBois, 
has called the silent violence of the novel Johnson’s “terrible real” to distinguish it from 
the supposedly self-evident, quasi-empiricist realism of William Dean Howells. While I 
agree that Johnson holds music and its performance in particularly high regard, both as an 
example of black culture and a means of connecting black American culture with a 
broader, global community, Johnson is always careful to place that music within its 
American context, obviating any easy escape music might offer. Although music offers 
some kind of organization of sound that can be mobilized against the silence of American 
racism, that music is also, ultimately, commodified and placed within the unequal 
distributions of capitalism, fueled by the total train system.  
Sound has been taken in two aspects in the criticism of Johnson’s novel. Firstly, it 
has been discussed as the enunciating sound of oratory and secondly as the sound of 
music that is so important to the narrator’s journey. Katherine Biers, for example, has 
argued that Johnson’s novel should be understood as developed along “the material logic 
of the phonograph” in which black “cultural practices are phonographic because, in 
reproducing themselves without writing, they emphasize the materiality of sound and 
therefore resist reduction to either side of the binary,” between speech and writing (Biers 
99). Thus, the phonographic voice creates “structural and political limitations to making 
black culture into ‘American’ culture” (Biers 101). Biers’s perhaps distressingly literal 
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reading of Jacques Derrida’s critique of the philosophical tradition’s lauding of speech 
over writing should always, however, be situated within the general movement of capital 
that the railway made possible and that conditions speech-acts in the novel. Speech, as a 
mode of communication, plays at times opposite roles for conveying meaning in the 
novel. 
Prior to the famous lynching scene, the subject of lynching had come up once 
before in the novel, when the ex-colored man was experiencing the relative freedom of 
Europe. While staying in France, the ex-colored man was reminded of his home country, 
the only time he “had cause to blush for [his] American citizenship” (Autobiography 63). 
When asked by a “young man from Luxembourg” if “they really burned a man alive in 
the United States,” the ex-colored man gives a strange response (Autobiography 63). The 
narrator “never knew what [he] stammered out to him as an answer” but “should have felt 
relieved if [he] could have said to him, ‘Well, only one’” (Autobiography 63). For 
Bechtold, this moment in conjunction with the lynching scene, is an example of Johnson 
imitating “the aestheticiziation of lynching . . . if only to highlight the adverse effects it 
poses; for in neither case can the ex-colored man articulate an effective or politically 
powerful response” (Bechtold 33). And yet, one shouldn’t be too hasty to dismiss the 
details of this passage as simply not “powerful” (Bechtold does not specify what a 
“powerful” reply might have been or why this lack of power is significant). Rather than a 
denial of its existence, the ex-colored man would apparently have been more relieved if 
there had been only one murder. Within this somewhat strange logic, lynching never 
having happened and it happening regularly are less appealing options that a truly unique 
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instance of it. As we’ve seen, however, this logic may be less strange than it first appears 
in that a unique, truly aberrant act would avoid commodification through capitalist 
circulation more certainly than either the plenitude that was the reality of lynching in the 
American South or the silent denial of its existence that grounded its institutionalization 
and the perpetuation of that institution. The stammering of the ex-colored man in this 
case reflects yet another impossible decision in attempting to articulate American 
violence, which is both silent and entirely expressive at the structural level. 
The majority of the novel that leads up to the decisive lynching scene is taken up 
with the movement of the narrator through the United States and Europe, made possible 
by the ex-colored man’s musical gifts. Although his musical gifts are, initially, what 
allows the ex-colored man his freedom to move throughout the country, it soon also 
becomes the means by which he is commodified and inextricably tied to the circulation of 
global capital. Born in the South to a black mother and a wealthy white father, the ex-
colored man moves to the North to escape the more violent brand of American racism 
that would not accept him and his mother. After his mother’s death and his aborted 
attempt to go to university, the ex-colored man then drifts about the country over the 
routes of the movement of capital to the resorts of Florida to be employed in a cigar 
factory. When that business closes, the narrator then continues on his tour of the 
movement of capital to its greatest location of concentration, New York City. There, the 
narrator dissipates his time in the favorite past-times of capital, gambling and the 
consumption of luxury goods. The ex-colored man in Johnson’s novel does not travel to 
the unexploited resources of South America in the narrative but toward the concentrations 
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of capital, both literal and social, in Europe. He does this through his association with a 
white “millionaire” whom he meets while working as a piano player in Harlem after 
leaving Florida. 
The narrator’s patron was an independently wealthy man who belonged to a class 
“who were ever expecting to find happiness in novelty, each day restlessly exploring and 
exhausting every resource of this great city[, New York,] that might possibly furnish a 
new sensation or awaken a fresh emotion, and who were always grateful to anyone who 
aided them in their quest” (Autobiography 55). The “millionaire” and his group, then, are 
themselves a product of the consumer capitalism that had emerged from the nineteenth 
century to become the dominant mode of identity formation in the twentieth. Culture, 
even by 1912, had already become a resource whose consumption was tied to the ability 
of consumers to have free cash to take out of capitalist circulation and spend on cultural 
pursuits, “new sensations” and “fresh emotions,” which can be bought, if one only knows 
where to find them. New York City, the “most fatally fascinating thing in America,” 
initially presents itself as an alternative to the rural stagnation the narrator experienced in 
the South (Autobiography 41). 
The city as a concept has been an important point of argument in criticism of 
Johnson’s work. As Thomas L. Morgan has argued, The Autobiography and Paul 
Lawrence Dunbar’s The Sport of the Gods together created “a viable form of urban 
blackness in fiction” that had not previously existed in black American writing, having 
been to that point largely limited to attempting to change the stereotypical figure of rural 
blacks, as Charles Chesnutt had attempted (Morgan 214). Changing white stereotypical 
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thinking was certainly a part of Johnson’s rhetorical strategy in fiction throughout his 
career. In his pamphlet, Negro Americans, What Now?, written in the 1930s, for instance, 
Johnson recommended setting up a publicity campaign through the NAACP, both 
nationally and internationally, to gain public support for black artists who would, in turn, 
provide alternate examples of black characters in art to change the dominant conception 
of black citizens in the country. Although the city, prior to Dunbar’s and Johnson’s 
novels, may have “existed primarily as an undifferentiated space indistinguishable from 
the country,” this does not necessarily imply the inherent distinction of the division 
between city and country in the American context (Morgan 215). As we have seen with 
the work of Henry Adams, the relationship between the city and the country should never 
be seen as a strict dichotomy but an actively changing relationship in which the apparent 
difference between the two environments is largely determined by its relationship to a 
mutable, contingent capitalist concept of presence. Although Johnson certainly entertains 
the possibility for a new kind of black subjectivity made possible by the space of the city, 
like the commodities that circulate and regulate the difference between the city and the 
country, the ex-colored man is brought face to face with the fundamentally ironic nature 
of the total train system in a way that determines his fateful decision to pass for white. 
Just as the “millionaire” and his group are intimate with different sections of New 
York and the specific consumer experiences available in each, they are similarly world-
travelers. As within the separate areas of New York, the patron circulates within the 
global lanes of capitalist exchange, different areas of New York being equivalent to 
different countries in Europe, each individual part of it having lost any significance 
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except as exchange-value for him. After the “millionaire” has come to rely on the 
narrator to provide the ragtime music that is the latest novelty to be acquired, he takes the 
narrator to Europe to escape the consequences of the killing of a white woman to which 
the narrator was a witness. The narrator tells us that, following the tradition of slave 
narratives in which a relatively more racially tolerant Europe is contrasted with the 
United States, it was not “until the morning that [he and the “millionaire”] entered the 
harbor of Havre that [the narrator] was able to shake off the gloom” that he had been 
feeling since the violent episode that left a woman dead in New York (Autobiography 
59). After landing in France, the narrator “grew so light-hearted that when [he] caught 
[his] first sight of the train which was to take [them] to Paris, [he] enjoyed a hearty 
laugh” at the “toy-looking engine, the stuffy little compartment cars with tiny, old-
fashioned wheels” that “ran smoothly” (Autobiography 59). More than simply a different 
culture, one without the same kind of deeply ingrained racial prejudices of the United 
States, Europe offered a different kind of relationship to the power that was harnessed by 
the railway. The material objects that make up the railway system themselves have 
already become “old-fashioned” by 1912 and run “smoothly” as opposed to his trip in the 
porter’s basket in the United States. At the center of European imperialism, capital is 
established enough to give one half of the double-effect of the railway Johnson noted so 
fascinated rural Southerners. Its regularity and efficiency were the most apparent feature 
within the space of its most extreme concentration and, at first, the ex-colored man begins 
to conceive of Europe as an alternative to the United States rather than a different 
modulation of the same processes of accumulated force. 
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Despite Europe’s attraction and the patron’s benevolence, the ex-colored man 
eventually becomes dissatisfied with both. The “millionaire” in the Autobiography could 
easily be a stand-in for Henry Adams himself, as the patron’s character is revealed in the 
European section of the novel. Just as Henry Adams wrote to William James that he had 
“no use for time,” the narrator becomes for the “millionaire” “the chief means of 
disposing of the thing which seemed to sum up all in life that he dreaded – Time” (qtd. in 
Montiero 158, Autobiography 66-7). The narrator furthermore comments that time was 
“what [the patron] was always endeavoring to escape, to bridge over, to blot out,” by 
listening to the ex-colored man’s ragtime performances (Autobiography 67). The patron 
was, to the narrator, a friend but, at the same time, “some grim, mute, but relentless 
tyrant, possessing over [the narrator] a super-natural power which he used to drive [the 
narrator] on mercilessly to exhaustion” (Autobiography 56). Although the “millionaire” 
treated the ex-colored man largely as a social equal, this did not extend to ragtime 
performances, which the patron would demand at strange hours of the night. When the 
narrator reveals to the “millionaire” that he wishes to return to the United States to 
develop his music amongst his own people, the “millionaire” describes his own theory of 
how politics functions in the US to dissuade the narrator from his chosen course of 
action, a theory similar (although in a less developed form) to Henry Adams’s. “Evil,” 
the patron claims, “is a force and, like the physical and chemical forces, we cannot 
annihilate it; we may only change its form” (Autobiography 68). The Civil War had not 
destroyed slavery. Rather, “we only changed it into hatred between sections of the 
country” and all he can offer is his own “philosophy of life”: “make yourself as happy as 
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possible, and try to make those happy whose lives come into touch with yours” 
(Autobiography 68). Of course, the “millionaire” is only eventually able to settle his own 
account with time, escaping it “some years” after enunciating his philosophy, “forever, 
by leaping into eternity” (Autobiography 67). Thus, the stakes for one’s relationship to 
the creation of time through music are quite high in the novel to the point of staking death 
itself. 
I agree with Bruce Barnhart that what he, following Johannes Fabian, calls 
“chronopolitics” is an essential aspect of the Autobiography, particularly concerning the 
relationship between the narrator as his patron and the system of global capital that 
guides his actions and valuations. As Barnhart points out, the “narrator’s time is at the 
service of the patron” who, through his patronage, requires the narrator to play piano 
whenever the patron desires it and only for the patron, except when he “loans” the 
narrator out to friends (Barnhart 551, Autobiography 56). Furthermore, the “patron 
attempts to use [the narrator’s ragtime] to escape the force of time, and sounding in the 
narrator’s ragtime is a form of time cunningly aware of the patron’s power and 
predicament, and slyly resistant to both” (Barnhart 551). Ragtime and classical European 
symphonic music, in the novel, appear “not as detached aesthetic practices but as 
technologies of temporal and subjective shaping that are heavily invested in the struggle 
over the proper shape of American culture and not without their own relationship to 
political and institutional power” (Barnhart 553). Ultimately, the “witnessing of the 
lynching puts a violent end to the narrator’s symphonic project, but there is a violence 
implicit in the symphonic project before the lynching aborts it” (Barnhart 559). Although 
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Barnhart does not develop the interesting comment that music is a “technology” that is 
subject to institutional power, I would agree with this claim. Yet, I would add that as a 
technology, music must be placed within the wider frame of the politics of technology 
that the United States had been imbricated in through the railway. While the lynching at 
the end of the novel does, indeed, abort the narrator’s symphonic project, it does not do 
so randomly or haphazardly. Music as a technology was also subject to the total train 
system in which the concept of technology as such was linked with other systems of 
technology, all within the overarching theme of white supremacist history. 
I would extend this insight to the material structures of regimented time as they 
are nationally instantiated in the railway. Like Henry Adams had done in the 1880s after 
the suicide of his wife and the failure of his hopes for political reform, the “millionaire” 
attempts to supplement his struggle with time through not simply music, as Barnhart 
rightly points out, but travel as well. As we have seen with Adams, travel becomes a 
supplement for the lack of perceived immediacy of obvious synchronic meaning that was 
brought about by the railway system. Importantly, like the reactions of the white crowd at 
the lynching, the circulation of power through the technologies of the train system and 
music are not necessarily subject to intention. Provided that human relationships are 
submitted to the subjectification of capitalist circulation, the patron treats the narrator 
respectfully. What is oppressive about the relationship and ultimately violent in the 
lynching scene at the end of the novel is the relationship between political space and 
technology as it was formed in the late 19th Century. 
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Johnson would pick up the theme of the relationship between the formation of 
individuals and the system of global capitalism in his political pamphlet, Negro 
Americans, What Now? Written roughly two decades after Johnson’s novel. In that 
pamphlet, as opposed to the implicitly white audience for the Autobiography, Johnson 
writes directly to his “fellows,” arguing that the political solutions of Frederick 
Douglass’s generation would no longer work in the 1930s (What Now? v). He describes 
the world as being in a state of political “semi-chaos” the only solution to which would 
be an “evolutionary process” by which the black community develops its own resources, 
while simultaneously attempting to change the “national attitude” (What Now? 3, 10). 
These resources Johnson attributes to black Americans’ “numerical strength,” whose 
subsequent force he divides into particular institutions for the development and directing 
of that force: the church, the press, and organizations for the development of the race. 
This, according to Johnson had to be done in the United States, in a counterargument to 
the then popular idea that black Americans should return to Africa. Johnson knew that 
this would be an impractical idea because this would not be an escape from the forces of 
American influence. Rather, since there were “vacant” places in the world, it would 
simply forestall the now global conflict of the power of American racial thinking, made 
global through the channels of international capitalism. Space, as a potential category for 
political difference had been eliminated by the total train system. As Johnson’s 
experience in Corinto had demonstrated, however, the only remaining category for 
resistance to the Capitalist circulation of violence of which lynching was the most 
devastating category would be the creation of time in-between attacks. 
  267 
Conclusion 
Mysterious Power! Gentle Friend! 
Despotic Master! Tireless Force! 
You and We are near the End. 
Henry Adams, “Prayer to the Dynamo” 
 
 Throughout the 1920s, James Weldon Johnson worked from within his 
increasingly powerful position within the NAACP to promote federal anti-lynching 
legislation. As Jacqueline Goldsby put it, the “work that freed Johnson from his ‘horror 
complex’” that resulted from his own experience with lynching “was the lobbying drive 
he led to introduce the NAACP-backed Dyer Federal Anti-Lynching Bill to Congress in 
1921 and 1922” (Goldsby 172). That bill, however, did not pass Congress and the federal 
government, in fact, never passed any legislation to deal specifically with the violence of 
lynching in the American South. My dissertation, to the best of my ability, attempted to 
keep in mind that the movement of history in the United States must be understood 
within the dialectic between the ideological and the material could have at any point 
turned out other than it did. At the same time, I also attempted to keep in mind that it did 
not turn out any other way than it did. Perhaps, had the United States government against 
all odds taken William Tecumseh Sherman’s and Edwin M. Stanton’s lead in 1865 and, 
by any means necessary and to any significant degree, imbricated the recently freed 
slaves more fully into the invisible threads of capital relations as owners of capital, the 
course of events in the Reconstruction period and after could easily have had a different 
trajectory. Although the gambit of Sherman’s Special Field Order No. 15 is a particularly 
famous moment in American history, there are an infinite number of other moments in 
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which, similarly, something different might have happened. And yet, as Althusser put it, 
one does not get to choose one’s beginnings.  
 It is possible that we have not yet, as Lacan suggestively described it, entirely 
learned how to understand the double-trap of the “history of a life lived as history” that 
Henry Adams struggled with in the writing of his own Education (Écrits 366). As 
hopefully this dissertation began to argue, history is not automatic, despite the efforts of 
ever more complex “generations” of technology, as they’re called in “these swift modern 
days,” to convince us otherwise. The total train system would, in the Twentieth Century 
with its ability to realize a fully “World War,” play a perhaps even more ominous role 
than it had for Howells’s Marches as they attempted to reconstruct American history 
from within the safety of a railway car on their honeymoon. From within a world war, to 
be loaded onto a train no longer held a sense of wonder except, perhaps, as a kind of 
traumatic mathematical sublime or the kind of abjection described by Giorgio Agamben. 
As Charles Francis Adams and his brother Henry had already speculated, it is perhaps 
long past the time to be shocked by the development of technologies or to believe them to 
contain the secret for political problems. At the very least, it may be time to wonder if 
this constantly renewed shock is somehow considered to be preferable by some people to 
another option. The writing of this dissertation also saw this shock occur surrounding the 
events in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 on the part of those who seemed to think for some 
mysterious reason what had happed in Los Angeles in 1992 was the last word on the 
subject. 
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 Of course, the trajectory of these influences within the American context that 
were only beginning to be described by William Dean Howells, Charles W. Chesnutt, 
Henry Adams, and James Weldon Johnson would take on new forms in the Twentieth 
Century that, like their rapid change in the Nineteenth, would both be grounded in the 
past of Reconstruction and yet wholly new. Strangely enough, each of the writers I 
discussed in this dissertation, one way or another, in their after-lives as studied objects 
have had to deal with the accusation of “failure.” William Dean Howells, despite his 
artistic and financial success, was forgotten and derided in his own lifetime. Charles 
Chesnutt and Henry Adams both, toward the end of their lives, described their artistic 
efforts as failures. James Weldon Johnson did not live to see the anti-lynching legislation 
he worked so hard for come into existence. And yet, as I have hopefully argued, any 
definition of success that takes as one of its criteria the “stability” of instituting a 
universal aesthetic principle, as some perhaps incautious critics have attempted to do with 
the Modernism that in one way or another each of these authors apparently missed, 
should be viewed with the same suspicion as the association of technological 
advancement and the advancement of a “civilization” that takes that technology as its 
horizon of possibility. To fully deal with this history of the United States, one first has to 
remember it as both a material and ideological, dialectic relation to the present and hope 
that “one remembers because one gets better” (Écrits 521). 
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